Aquinas at 800, Part 2: Eschatology

Episode Topic: Eschatology

How has Thomas Aquinas shaped our thoughts on death, judgment, and the final destiny of our souls and of humankind? Contemplate Aquinas’ writings on the integration of different human dimensions in the vision of God in heaven, the necessity of embodied repentance, and how and whether we should include animals in the glorified universe.

Featured Speakers:

• Rev. James Dominic Rooney, O.P., assistant professor of philosophy at Hong Kong Baptist University
• Catalina Vial de Amesti, Pontifical University of the Holy Cross in Rome, Italy
• Jennifer Hart Weed, associate professor at the University of New Brunswick

Read this episode's recap over on the University of Notre Dame's open online learning community platform, ThinkND: https://go.nd.edu/eb6411

This podcast is a part of the ThinkND Series titled Aquinas at 800.

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Transcript

Father James Dominic Rooney's Presentation

1 0:06

Good morning everyone, and welcome to our next concurrent session. This theological session will be examining eschatology. My name is Father Matthew hdi. I'm a priest of the congregation of Holy Cross, and I'm a postdoctoral research associate in the theology faculty at the University of Notre Dame. And it's my pleasure to chair this concurrent session. We have three scholars who will each be presenting their individual work following each panelist. There will be the opportunity to ask them questions, for roughly 10 minutes. I ask that you please limit your preambles to questions so that more people will have the opportunity to join in, likewise so that those who are watching via Zoom will have the opportunity to hear and know what's going on. I'll walk around with the microphone even if you have a nice, loud, booming voice, still speaking to the microphone, so those online have the opportunity to hear what you're saying. The first of our papers is by Father James Dominic Rooney of the Order of Preachers. He is an assistant professor at Hong Kong Baptist University. He works primarily in metaphysics, medieval, Latin, and Chinese philosophy, and philosophy of religion, as well as political philosophy. His most recent books are Beyond Classical Liberalism in 2024, and Not a Hope in Hell, which is forthcoming this winter. His presentation is titled, knowing What You Want. The impossibility of postmortem repentance. Please welcome Father James, Dominic Rooney.

Aquinas' Views on Sin and Repentance

The Concept of Postmortem Fixity

Q&A Session: Animals in the Glorified Universe

2 1:44

Thank you very much. So this paper, for everybody's, information is forthcoming in religious studies, and it's up on my academia.edu. So if you want the text of the paper, to read more about what I'm not going to say here, you can look that up on your own. but I'm going to just read or cover, two sections of the paper. So let me introduce the paper and we'll get to that question here. This is connected of course, to that project on hell. It's not part of the book. It's a tangent that a lot of people worry about. So the worry is like this. Christianity has taught us that there will be no further possibilities for affecting our eternal destiny. After final the final judgment occurs. The dedicate presents it starkly. There are two ways, one of life and one of death, but a great difference between the two ways. The way of death leads to eternal death for those who follow its way. Quote, then at the end shall appear the signs of the truth, including the resurrection of the dead, yet not of all. End quote. If we end our life in sin, we end up eternally dead and separated from God. If we end our life in faith and hope we end up eternally alive and united with God. One might worry however, that God would not truly want our salvation if he fixed a definite point after which he will no longer offer us the graces to repent. And if God would need to ensure. By a special act of divine intervention that some people after death cannot repent of their sins. God would seem to want them to persist in their sins, which is pretty problematic. So this worry looks bad if, God loves and desires all be saved and find union with him, God apparently has no reason to create a situation in which there's postmortem, fixity of the will as it's sometimes called. So what I want to do in this paper, what I do in the longer version of this paper is propose a possible scenario on which God is not neither cruel, nor arbitrary in allowing that angels and humans can become fixed in their sinful desires. post-mortem humans and angels. I appeal to claims made by Thomas Aquinas to argue first sin results from failures to care about something you ought to care about. Second. In the disembodied state, we will fully identify with our desires, including our sinful desires. And third, there will be no new relevant information after death that could cause us to reconsider those desires with which we identify ourselves at death. And I claim these sort of three elements taken together. explain why postmortem, fixity, occurs, why disembodied souls will not repent. And the longer paper concludes by talking about responding to concerns about grace and predestination, that would make God responsible for postmortem fixity. I'm not gonna deal with those facts in this talk now. I'm just gonna give you the core of the explanation and we can deal with some of the other stuff later. I'll just give you a highlight on these points. So the first set of claims. this paper was initially a response to an article by time Monroe in the Hari Journal. and he says particularly he raises these series of problems for aquinas's views. He's a universalist. He affirms universalism and he thinks that postmortem fixity is evil, if God would allow it. So one of his sort of worries had to do with, motivation for human action and, angelic action where he said, this view that certain persons will never repent of their sins is contrary to aquinas's, overarching commitments to the primacy of reason and moving the will to the primacy and intrinsic desirability of the good IE God, and to the possibility of other forms of cognitive and volitional correction among disembodied souls. So the first thing I wanted to deal with was this question about the intrinsic desirability of the good and moral motivation. But in this talk, I'm not gonna, I'm not gonna deal with this in any specific detail'cause it's a prelude to the main explanation. So in short, the basic idea is how are we able to sin if everything we choose is in light of the good. So time Monroe basically seems to think with many universalists that sin is ultimately impossible because we always choose things that are good. And the only reason you would choose something that is evil is accidental to your intention. according to Aquinas, right Eve, choice of evil is accidental or beside intention. And then they conclude therefore, that people who choose evil are acting under some sort of in culpable ignorance. And I've already now hinted what the istic response to those sort of concerns are, is some kinds of ignorance are culpable. they have a problem with those kind of explanations. I'm not going to go into it. But the basic element of the explanation, is that some kinds of ignorance can be voluntary without being deliberate in the sense of I don't deliberate about whether to be ignorant about something. I just don't care about certain considerations that I ought to care about and it's in my control to care about them. But I don't. So there are certain cases where in moral action, as I said, I'm assuming people here are more familiar with aquinas's action theory, and I don't need to lay it out. But the idea at the end of the day is something I. Maritan spends a lot of time talking about non consideration of the rule. There are lots of moral facts we could consider at any given time. We don't consider a lot of them at every time because we're limited. We don't think of everything, all of our moral obligations at any time. But when we get into situations and we are now facing moral obligations, people sometimes don't consider them and it becomes culpable because they should be in those situations, thinking about what they ought to do. and at that point it becomes culpable. So the basic understanding of how ignorance enter in is it's really a fault of the will, not of the intellect at the end of the day. So moral, evil, unsurprisingly, is a problem with your will and not just you made mistakes. So that's the first thing to say. The more intense answer now comes in two parts. The first is, I'm gonna abstract from historical concerns about Aquinas's development. My point here is really just to present the scenario. However, I would note there is a longstanding set of controversies among ISTs about how to interpret Aquinas on these questions. My proposal is assertive interpretation. But we can say a plausible possible interpretation of Aquinas. I'm not going into a whole series of texts and charting the development of his thought on these issues. My interpretation builds on the way, Aquinas does point to the cognitive situation of the postmortem disembodied soul as resembling that of the angelic spirits of angels. And specifically, the person whose account I'm following is Tobias Hoffman. He came out with this book Free Choice and the Rebel Angels, I basically am using his account, and I'm just gonna assume it's true for all my intents and purposes because he does all the exegetical work for me, so I don't need to do it again for you here. So in short, here's how the scenario goes. Part one has to do with the question of how the people, after they die, become fixed in certain volitional states. So Corey has pointed to self-knowledge as a mark of rationality for Aquinas. However, in this life, we know ourselves indirectly. We know our own mental acts and self through attending to what comes through the senses. Aquinas notes, however, separated souls will not have sensation and so will need a distinct mode of knowledge. Quote. When the soul is separated from the body, it understands no longer by turning to FSMs, but by simply turning to intelligible objects. Hence, in that state, it understands itself through itself and this is the key. This is step one. Specifically the separated soul knows itself by means of its own essence. Aquinas thinks that this is the way angels know themselves. Quote, when the soul really will be separated from the body, it will know itself directly by understanding its own essence, not in an a posterior eye fashion as it does in the present state. Just as one separated substance knows another by immediately understanding its own essence. So also does the separated soul by immediately understanding its own essence. No separated substances. End quote. And Aquinas explicitly appeals to this kind of knowledge state, this new cognition state as accounting for the impossibility of postmortem repentance. and he notes it persists in the state of the glorified body after the resurrection. So here's the second quote from Dave ate question 24. After this present life, the separated soul will not understand by receiving anything from the senses. The separated soul is conformed to the angels in the manner of understanding and in the indivisibility of its appetite, which were seen to be the causes of the perfect obstinacy in the sinful angels. Hence, there will be obstinacy in the separated soul for the same reason. I'm gonna skip where he says in the resurrection it'll be the same. But the point that I think is important here, which is what I'm focusing on, is he clearly appeals to cognitive state of the separated soul as what accounts for obstinacy in the angels and in the separated soul. So the point, however, the reason there's lots of controversy among Tomos is he doesn't fill in the details. He just says that's it. so we're left to puzzle about how this is supposed to work. My purpose is to fill in the gaps. So here's how I do it. I propose the damned souls are fixed in the volitions they had at death first in that state after death, where a soul comes to know its own essence through itself, it's psychologically luminous or transparent to itself. It is impossible for souls in this state to be mistaken about their own beliefs and desires. In particular, however, they perfectly identify with all of their desires. All of the desires they have in that state are desires with which they fully identify. There would be no intrinsic grounds for any person to reconsider what they want as there could arise, no new desire in that state, in virtue of which they would want to prompt reconsideration of their higher order desires. So that's the first thing that leads to obstinacy. The second is there would be some new kinds of information that could prompt changes of desires. There will be no relevant kind of information that would do that in this state. But absent such exterior intervention, separated souls would never repent for the same reasons that angels do not. And here's the basic explanation. They know what they want and they see no reason to change what they want. They know what they want what they want, they see no reason to change what they want. So it's a fairly straightforward explanation. So as I mentioned, I'm appealing to things that come from Tobias Hoffman. so in, when Tobias is talking about how the Angels know and where Angelic Obstinacy comes from in that book, he details Aquinas's development to a later position taken in the Summa Theolog and the de Malo. So in this explanation, angels know what they want whenever they form a desire. While it's true that angels do not always consider everything at once for that's possible only for God, they are perfectly aware of themselves and their mental states. Their knowledge of themselves is always actual. So they have mental states that they cannot be mistaken about. So this is, Aquinas brings that up in Summa Theolog, prima pars. Question 56. we can draw a parallel with some contemporary epistemology. Timothy Williams has this term, luminosity. I think that's a good term. Angels are luminous to themselves. They are perfectly aware of their mental states and are infallible about them. What I'll show is luminosity suffices to make it impossible for angels to change their decisions. As Hoffman Notes Aquinas Holts, that the angel's intellectual mode of cognition causes their fixity. And since the will is bound to follow the cognition, the will is fixed as well. So here's what I appeal to. Eleanor Stump has an account of hardening of heart that she's well known for. That's based on Harry Frankfurt's Theory of Freedom of will. Freedom of Will for Frankfurt is not merely the condition of being a morally responsible agent. An agent with Frank Furie and Freedom of Will has nothing internal, which prevents them from effectively willing what they want. That's the sort of idea, and the account draws a distinction between first order and second or higher order desires, which consist respectively in wanting something or wanting to have first order desires of some sort or lower level desires of some sort. Stump gives a case where the agent doesn't want to walk out of a room despite there being an open door and a lack of physical obstacles because they have a superstitious fear, which prevents'em from walking past a black cat on the way out. In this situation, this fear is an internal obstacle which the agent can recognize as preventing them from doing what they want. They want to leave the room, but they can't do it given the fear they have. So there's an internal obstacle to them achieving their desire and they could then have a second order desire. I wish I didn't have this fear, Second order, desire to remove the fear of black cats on stumps. Revised account. Freedom of will involves having second order volitions, which are effective. In producing the first order desires that the agent wants. So when the agent lacks first order, volitions discordant with those second order volitions and they have those first order desires in virtue of being produced directly or indirectly by the second order volitions. So the idea is freedom of will is when all your desires are aligned. in terms of my second order or higher order desires produced effectively all the first order desires I should have. So this is what Stump says for an agent to identify herself with some part of herself is for her to form a second order volition that accepts or a sense to that part of herself, such as certain first order desires. And we identify with those. Because of the, and these desires express who we are because they express our reasoning faculty. They stem from the reflection of an agent's intellect on the state of her will. So like choosing an exercise program leads to me to cultivating those desires to be healthy rather than to be lazy. And I progressively come to identify myself right through practice and exercise with being a healthy person and wanting to be a healthy person and eliminating those desires, right? This is Nick McKee in ethics, right? The virtuous person starts to like virtue for its own sake and all those kind of things. If at death on my account, we come to have luminous self-aware and are transparent to ourselves in such a way we could not be mistaken about our desires or beliefs. I argue there are two plausible consequences. First, having an incoherent set of beliefs or desires usually arises because we're not aware of them or intending them all at the same time. By contrast, the state of psychological luminosity entails that one would have no conflicts among their higher order desires since one would be currently aware of them all at once, in a way that we are not so aware in this life. If it's true, we would not have any desires, which we do not intend. It seems plausible that the state of luminosity also second entails that our higher order desires would be effective in bringing about all of our first order desires that they aim at. So it's possible that our second order desires at departure from this life might be mixed in terms of a desire for like good or evil or incoherent set of desires. We call this, let's call it a divided will. We can have a will divided against ourselves at death, whatever the selection procedure by which some desires win out. What I need to say is something like this, under the influence of a psychologically transparent state, those desires inevitably tend to form a consistent set of second order desires, in which I grasp and intend all of my volitions together. And that by the way, you have a clear account of now why purgatory would be necessary. Maybe there's some temporal process by which those second order desires converge. Luminosity is just supposed to ensure that the will ends up undivided in that state. It would not be possible for there to be further kinds of new information that would revise our desires. Strictly speaking, then all I'm arguing is luminosity ensures inevitably that all discordant second order desires are ultimately eliminated. Not that maybe at death you would have a divided will. that seems possible maybe even for some time after death. In purgatory, you have a divided will. All I need to argue is luminosity leads inevitably to a coherent, unified set of volitions. So here's possible scenario one, maybe higher order desires seem in our more immediate control, but one might think it remains possible that there will be a psychological conflict among the dams first order desires. So if all my second order volitions produce first order desires with which I identify, and there are no discordant second order desires, maybe we still have discordant first order desires due to some desires we do not identify with. And in this case, we have natural, let's say we can't, get rid of our natural inclinations toward the good. stump argues Frankfurt is wrong in thinking anyone can be fully integrated around evil because such evil persons, would always be dysfunctional. And maybe you think there would be some, ongoing psychological conflict among first and second order desires. Maybe that would lead to a repentance or prompting reconsidering, but we can accommodate stumps intuition. I think without admitting that the damned have discordant first order desires. Maybe the dysfunction is not arising from internal discordance, but just from reality failing to fit their desires. And so lack of the right desires is what causes the damned pain and suffering. Or we could concede discordant first order desires. Toward the good, while denying that those good desires are effective in causing reconsideration of the second order. Volitions clearly no such desires for the good or weak movements toward the good are among the second order desires of the dam, the higher order desires are united around evil. And if they're integrated among evil, there's no reason one could not remain forever fixed in that sinful disposition, even among psychological conflict, especially given aquinas's moral account and the way in which sin results from voluntarily ignoring reasonable reasons accessible to us. So maybe those reasons, which the damn take to be relevant doesn't include those discordant first order desires. They don't will them. They recognize they exist, but they've already factored in psychological conflict while going ahead with sin. So in that case where all of their desires are volitions, they don't worry about it. So I can go more onto that. I'm going to leave it just to, to deal with a little bit of what we mean by the second factor, which is not encountering any further information.'cause I know I'm running out of time or I'm out of time. Okay. A minute. I have one minute. Okay. So I'm, I apologize. I wasn't looking at the time very closely. So the second, is the case that, people wouldn't encounter further reasons. So in this case, with angelic sin, the idea is ultimately something like, the kind of thing God gives us as a reason to have faith in him are not intellectually compelling evidence. The evidence we have for faith like miracles and that doesn't compel a scent of the right sort. And we imagine that same situation holds for the angels. They knew all of the facts, about God's will for them and nevertheless, ignore it. So one could imagine that as long as the situation holds, its analogous in the afterlife in which there's no further information of the right sort that would intellectually compel us, to form the right desires to love God. there would be no further reason to revise our desires. As I said, I don't have too much time, so I don't wanna deal with that too much. But at the end of the day, the point is something like we can have a kind of voluntary ignorance and we could persist in it after death. So if those reasons that you've been presented with in this life to love God are not sufficient to cause you to do that, then it's not very likely possible that in the afterlife there would be any special insight that's going to compel you to change your desires. But I think there is at least one possibility. Cardinal casualty raises that perhaps at the moment of death. When one has this psychological insight on my account, at the moment of death, might be the last point that you change your desires. That's very close to Cardinal Casualty's theory. on which he says at the last moment, one would be in that state, of psychological transparency. And then, however, I think you have a stronger reason that the case, for the impossibility of post-mortem repentance holds. Because if at that moment you have access to all the facts and you choose to ignore them, it's no surprise that you ignore them forever. So thank you.

1 22:49

We do have some time for questions. Again, please speak into the microphone, so that those watching on Zoom can hear us.

3 22:56

thank you so much. I look forward to tracking down the paper and reading it in its entirety. Just a quick question about the resurrection of the body. The resurrection of the damned. Yeah. Would, how would that fit into, your, your own account? I'm just imagining that now perhaps one could imagine the ability to now make a new moral choice might arise since now the soul is united to a body again.

2 23:19

Yeah. So thank you very much. another thing that I skipped in the paper, but the explanation I think for Aquinas is fairly straightforward if we understand the resurrected body to be obedient to the soul in the right way. So if people continue to have that same mode of cognition, the resurrected body doesn't add, doesn't change that kind of intuitive cognition we'd have of God and ourselves, then it wouldn't change the cognitive state. That would be the relevant thing that would allow us to revise our desires. So it doesn't look like the resurrected body adds anything. Aquinas says that specifically, but I think all you have to see is the explanation is supposed to be the new body doesn't change the cognitive state. And it would be a change in the cognitive state that would be required to revise the desires. So that would be my response.

4 24:06

Thank you. so this is just for clarification. I was wondering, so the pre-fall angels, supposedly were also luminous to themselves. And I am wondering if the fall of the devil is a kind of change of desire, or you would spell that out differently.

2 24:21

Yeah. So my, thank you very much. Good question. So the way I would understand it, which I think is one of the things Aquinas says when he says, could the, did the devil sin in the first moment of his creation? And he says, no. Because he would need at least one logical moment in which he likes tos, the facts.'cause he had no desires against or for God in the relevant sense. So the way I would think of it is we have, as I mentioned incidentally, I understand that the angel situation to involve a situation like faith, where they're presented with evidence of what God wants from them, they consider that evidence and then they form a desire. the desire would either be meritorious or it would be sinful. And so in that circumstance, they had no pre volition, they had no desires prior to the decision, and that would be morally relevant. So that's how I would think of it. And then after they make the decision in light of the evidence, then they're gonna be, they'll fully intend that desire that they have formed. So I dunno if that answers it, but I hope it's, yeah.

5 25:20

It strikes me that one of the features of a lot of the best literature about the damned the Inferno Paradise lost, the Great divorce and so forth, is that the dam do seem to be deceiving themselves. I think of the speeches that some of the characters Dante encounters in the Inferno make to him, and it seems like they're just fundamentally in the dark about what they desire and so forth. is your account compatible with that sort of self-deception amongst the damned and the fallen angels?

2 25:53

thank you. so that's a very good question and, in good istic fashion, I will distinguish. Okay. so on my account, what keeps people in this situation of fixity of Will is that they know what they desire. And are transparent to themselves. Now, being transparent to yourself in this sense means understanding what my cognitive states are, not why I have them. So it might be the case that one is confused, and in fact one is necessarily confused on Aquinas's view because you don't understand that these reasons are not actually good reasons, for action, right? you think my desires are good for me. That's why you have them. So you understand that you have these desires, you understand what my desires are, but you don't necessarily understand why you have them. And so it seems like if we distinguish those two things, we can understand self-deception as I know I want these things, but it's not clear despite the pain and the bad stuff happening, This might be bad for me. I don't understand all that stuff. So we could understand, and on my account that is in fact what's going on is a kind of self-deception. They're voluntarily ignoring things that are clearly accessible to them, but they just don't care about it the right way. And so that is, that's pretty clearly a kind of self-deception. Thank you.

1 27:10

I know that there were some other questions, but we are unfortunately bound by time still, so we are going to move on. Thank you very much Professor

7 27:19

Rooney.

Introduction to Professor Catalina Vial

1 27:20

our second presenter. Is Professor Catalina Vial. She's an assistant professor at the Pontifical University of the Holy Cross in Rome at Santa Croce. She works in the areas of theological anthropology, soteriology and eschatology. Her presentation is titled integrating the Various Human Dimensions into the Vision of God in Heaven. Thank you for joining us, professor Vial.

8 27:49

Okay. Thank you much.

The Role of the Body in the Vision of God

9 27:51

Hans Burma, author of Seeing God. The FIC vision in Christian tradition affirms that the istic doctrine of the vision of God in heaven suffers from a certain christological deficit. As a result, the FIC vision does not have a transforming or effect on the different dimensions of the human person, both spiritual and corporeal. Therefore, the denial of the possibility of seeing God with bodily eyes, even if it is a glorified body, in other words, inverse MA's opinion, Aquinas doctrine of the vision of God while presenting a certain christological deficit also presents a certain anthropological deficit characterized by the reaction of matter in a kind of gnostic intellectualism. As is well known, Aquinas affirm several times that the most important faculty of the human person is the intellect, and that the vision of God in heaven will consist mainly in an intellectual operation. However, he does not mean to minimize the importance of the other human faculties. The aim of this paper is try to explain how the different dimensions of the human person intellect will. Affections and ality are integrated in the vision of God. According to the istic doctrine, the study of the fic vision has tended to focus on the great systematic works of Aquinas. While Le commentaries have been little studied, they will be specially considered as a source of the meic thought. So I go to the second point, A Christological and Trinitarian perspective of the vision of God in heaven. The full glorification of the Christian, which will take place with the vision of God in heaven, and then with the resurrection of the body, has a christological and Trinitarian dimension. The coming of the son of God into the world marks the beginning of the process of the Christian ification, which culminates in glory. As Aquinas points out in his commentary, the Gospel of John. We become sums of God by being made like God. This likeness to God takes place on three different levels. First, by the infusion of grace, second by the perfection of our actions, and third, by the attainment of glory. The light of glory is received by the soul in heaven after death and will read down to the body at the moment of the resurrection. When the Christians identification with Christ will reach its full fullness. While we are on earth, we know God in an obscure way, but in heaven, if we remain united to Christ, we will know the Father openly. Only God knows himself fully and completely. However, this does not mean that we will not be able to know the divine essence for the scripture of affirm that we will see God face to face. Rather, it means that we will truly know the divine essence, but without exhausting it. This knowledge of God through grace on earth and glory in heaven is a participation in the communion of life that exists between the divine persons of the Trinity. when we speak of seeing the essence of God. we are referring to the vision of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. The kind of knowledge we refer to is not merely theoretical, but experiential because the Holy Spirit and charity play a fundamental role uniting us with the divine persons in a relationship of mutual friendship and love. To know the Father while we are on earth, we have no other way than to listen to the Son who sees him directly and openly Although Aquinas in his commentary in the gospel of emphasizes that the Son knows the Father in an EM way through his divine nature, he also refers to the superior human knowledge of God that Christ enjoys on earth. Therefore, it is Christ who, with the sending of the Holy Spirit, introduce us here on earth to the OB knowledge of the Trinity, the knowledge of faith, which will be open and immediate in heaven through element. Gloria. The Christological and Unitarian character of the personal relationship that the Christian will have with God in heaven allows us to affirm that when we speak of the immediate vision of God, we are referring to a reality that involves the human person in all its dimensions. This explanation seems to contact with some statements of Aquinas in which he relay it, happiness of heaven, almost exclusively to an intellectual operation, as I will explain now. So I go to the third point, the vision of God in heaven as an intellectual operation a few hours before his death. At the Last Supper, Jesus explains that eternal life is identified with an knowledge of God. In his commentary, Aquinas affirms that the substance of eternal life consists in seeing God. The TUI refers strictly speaking to the act proper of the sense of, to the sense of sight. Only by analogy does it extend its meaning to the to other kinds of knowledge, whether sensitive or intellectual. An intellectual vision excludes this cursive or indirect knowledge. Perhaps the word that best expresses this kind of knowledge is to intuit. In this sense, the FIC vision consists in the direct intuition of God without the me mediation of any creator, but by direct contact with him. Vision. Since it is a kind of knowledge which implies the direct influence of the object perceived is incompatible with faith as knowledge of an absent object, aquin as affirms that we cannot see the divine essence with our bodily eyes, nor with any sense or sensory faculty because none of them can go beyond what is their proper object. For example, the air cannot smell God in as much as his pure spirit completely transcends the physical order, which can only be perceived by our sins. Neither can we know the divine essence through a created concept because it is not possible to know the essence of something through a likeness that does not conform to the nature of what is known. For instance, Aquinas says that we cannot know the essence of a human being through the concept of horse. Even less can we know the essence of God who's distant is in infinitely greater through creation. If this were it would follow that the happiness of the human person would be fulfilled in something created not in God's himself, we must keep in mind, then we will refer to God. Something happens in him that not happen in other intelligent beings. In the case of God, when he knows himself, the knower, the known, and the means of knowledge are one and the same thing, because God's being is identified with his operations. Although a says in the commentary that the intellect enact is identified with a thing understood in action, strictly speaking, this happens only in God. According to Adonistic commentary, God in knowing himself attains a perfect knowledge, which is not possible in our case. The fruit of this perfect self-knowledge is a generation of the eternal war in which the Father perfectly communicates the divine essence to the Son. And the Holy Spirit is a link between the two. Thus in the Trinity, in some way, the intentional level and the personal level could be identified in the one true God. This is important because our vision of God in heaven takes place as a participation in the eternal loving knowledge or glory that exists between the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. That is as an assimilation to the eternal life of the divine person made possible by the lumen glory. So now I am the, in the fourth point, the light of glory. I have said that we cannot see the divine through a created species, therefore are going next place in Summa Gentiles. I quote, if the essence of God is to be seen at all, it must be that the intellect sees it in the divine essence itself, so that in the vision that the divine essence is both the object and the medium of vision. This is possible because as we have already explained in God, the act of knowing the means by which He knows and what is known coincide, so that in the case of the fic vision, it is God in his divine essence, who unite himself with the human intellect, exercising the function of the intelligible species that's showing himself in any immediate and direct way to our intellect. This does not mean that God informs the created understanding in a subjective way, because if this were the otherness between God and the human person could be lost. The divine essence informs our understanding in an objective way. That is the Son assimilates as to himself in his knowledge of the Father through the Holy Spirit in an intentional way. For this reason, the union that we will have with God in heaven will not be a haptic type. We'll really know the divine essence without mixing with it, and this knowledge will be transformative or divin as Aquinas explains in the polling commentary that you have in the papers. I'm not reading the quotes because it would be too long. Aquinas describes human reason as a participation in the divine light, a participation intensified by the light of grace and the light of glory. The possibility of seeing God in heaven implies That exists the natural capacity for knowledge that the human person possesses. Therefore, if the human person does, in fact, see God in heaven, this new romanizing act in turn regards the corresponding capacity to be realized. This is how we understand the statement that the lumen, Gloria strengthens the intellect beyond its natural capacity. I explain how in the istic doctrine, when we speak of the vision of God in heaven, we are thinking of an intuitive knowledge of the trinity that is primarily related to the operation of the intellect, the emphasis that Aquinas places on the operation of the intellect in contrast to, for example, Bonaventure who places it on the will could lead. One to think that is in an overly intellectually conception of what happiness in heaven will be, a conception in which there is little room for love, freedom, and history, which would seem to play a secondary role. However, it's a very imbalance in domestic teaching is not really such for at least two reasons. The first one has already been explained in the previous pages. Aquinas relates the lu glory to the intellect because the intentional person of the trinity allows us to maintain the ontological alterna that exists between God and the human person as to distinct subjects who are nevertheless united in a very intimate way. In this sense, the sum underlines the fact that this light united, they created intellect to God not in being, but only in understanding. The second reason why Aquinas emphasizes the intellect operation is that just as the intellect is the faculty by which we conform ourselves to the nature of the thing known. The will on the other hand, moves us toward the thing itself as a good that makes us happy and allows us to enjoy the good. when it is obtained. This means that ultimate happiness is the object of the will, but not its actual act. This is because love implies desire when the beloved object is absent and joy when the beloved object is present. If the act of love itself were the content of human we would be happy whether we had what we desire or not, In fact, in the case of the vision of God, it is only through the intellect that will reach the content of the spiritual good. the will, instead goes to it and enjoys it once it is obtained. In brief, while the substance of eternal life consists in knowing God at the same time, eternal happiness also requires the love and joy of God as the consummation of the happiness obtained. Therefore, one cannot speak of eternal life without the three acts, vision, love, and joy, because the divine essence is not only truth, but also goodness. So now I'm going to discuss the role of the will authority in more detail. In the sum ology, Aquinas ask himself whether the will is a higher power than the intellect. In his answer, he follows a result in affirming that the intellect is the highest power of the soul when considered in itself. On the other hand, If it is considered in a relational way, sometimes a will is more eminent than the intellect. Aquinas presents the case of charity. He objects that the habit by which the will is perfected is more important than the habit by which the intellect is perfected. According to what Saint Paul says in the first letter to the Corinthians in chapter 13, it was seen then that the will is superior to the intellect Aquinas replies, and in this case, we are reconsidering the will in relation to something that is superior to the soul. That is we are considering in relation to the beauty of charity by which we love God. This is why, although as a faculty in itself, the intellect is superior to the will. If it is considered from the point of view of the relationship of the whole person God. It can be said that love is more important than knowledge. Charity plays a phenomenal role in our vision of God in heaven. In fact, as Aquinas explains, the greater or lesser participation in the lumen glory will depend on the degree of charity, a person attains on earth. The explanation is simple. Where there is more charity, God is desired with greater strength and intensity and desire makes the lover more apt to be united to develop it. The greater his or her desire is. God responds to human desire by loving more than one who loves him more. That's giving him a greater capacity to deepen him in eternal life. Having analyzed the role of the intelligence and the will in the fic vision I will now discuss the corporeal dimension as fundamental for the eternal happiness of the human being in heaven. So optimistic doctrine emphasizes that the soul continues to exist after death in a personal, unconscious way, which allows you to fully enjoy the vision of God in heaven from the first moment of his separation from the body. On the other hand, it also emphasize the importance of the resurrection because of the incomplete state in which the soul finds itself when separated from the body. Both statements, according to Hans Burma, seem to be intention with each other. If we add to this the fact that Aquinas also affirm that here on Earth, the body is an obstacle to our vision of God in heaven, which will be overcome once the soul is separated from it. The obvious question then is, how does Corporality contribute to our happiness in heaven Must view Xi solution involves two difficulties. First, it seems strange that if the body was an obstacle to the scientific vision on Earth, it ceases to be so after the resurrection. On the other hand, the contribution of the body to happiness in heaven seems to be of little importance, almost incidental. Philip Blonde also expressed himself in this sense to respond to birth man and subjection. It must first be noted that when Aquinas points out that the body is an obstacle to the vision of God. He's referring to the corruptible body that is the body in its historical condition after original sin. This is a meaning, for example, of the statement he makes in the commentary to the Gospel of St. John. I quote, as long as the human intellect is in the body, it cannot see God because this is weighted down by the body so that it cannot attain the summit of contemplation. So it is that, that the moral soul is free of patience and is heard from affections for earthly things. The higher it rises in the contemplation of truth and tastes how sweet the Lord is. It is important to distinguish the dimension in which Aquinas is speaking when he refers to the body in relation to the vision of God in heaven. In some cases, he refers to it in its ontological dimension, in others in its existential dimension. In the second case, he affirms that after original sin, the body is an obstacle to the contemplation of God, but only insofar as it has been historically weakened by sin, a weakness that will be finally overcome in heaven. When this distinction is made, it is clear that the domestic doctrine of the vision not only does not suffer from a certain intellectualism, but on the contrary is even more conscious of the intrinsic value of human corporality than other proposals seem to be. In this sense, the solution offered by Burma to overcome the apparent difficulty he perceives in the istic doctrine in valuing corporality does not seem to be adequate according to Burma. I quote one solution to this problem. though perhaps a bold one is to say that the resurrection will intensify our happiness because the vision of God will be in part physical. That is to say, perhaps we should take seriously the notion that we will see God with physical eyes. Burman proposal does not take into account the intrinsic nature of the visual organ. Therefore, his solution does not seem to respect human corporality, which would have to be completely transformed, losing its specific identity in order to achieve an end that is not its own. On the other hand, Burma overlooks the fact that SaaS explained in the polling commentary, God as God does not have a face, and therefore the expression face-to-face is metaphorical. This does not mean that for Aquinas, the physical eyes of the holy, glorified body in heaven are irrelevant in the commentary on the sentences. He affirms that with them, the saints will be able to contemplate the effects of the glory in the different bodies first in Christ. Then in the other sense, and finally in all creation, he also expresses himself in this sense. In the commentary on top, he says to indicate that the body will be a participant in that vision in its own proper way. He adds and my eyes will behold him, not because the eyes of the body would see the divine essence, but because the eyes of the body will see God main man. They will also see the glory of God shining resended in created things. In conclusion, the music doctrine of the FIC vision being profoundly christological is also a perfectly unified and harmonious anthropology. When Aquinas speaks of the vision of God in heaven as the ultimate goal, he's not thinking of aesthetic vision that makes the believer happy because he or she can now look at the Trinity as if it were something to be understood. He thinking of a much richer and deeper reality, which consists in the fact that God himself feels him or her with his own life, sharing his Trinitarian intimacy with the light of glory, which brings with it a love that is impossible to describe here on earth, and that joyfully permeates all the dimensions of the human being united to Christ. In Aquinas teaching, the divine missions are at the heart of the economy of salvation. The presence of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit in the soul of the Christian is not only the beginning of grace on earth, but also of glory in heaven. As Aquinas points out in the summat, the invisible vision is directed to the blessed at the very beginning of the beatitude, the christological unitarian dimension as fundamental for understanding the istic doctrine and the vision of God confirms the fact that the whole human person as a corporeal spiritual unity will enjoy the divine persons in heaven. The other sense and the transf creation, I dunno if I, I have one minute I can read a final quote. that in same way I think that summarize what I have said if I found it in this pages. Okay. It's the last quote that you have in the paper, but I really like this quote, so I'm going to read it, is of the symbolism. Aquinas says, in everlasting life, man is united to God. God himself is the reward and the end of all our labors. This union with God consists in a perfect vision. It also consists in the highest pray. Then two. In everlasting life is the full and perfect satisfying of every desire. For the every blessed soul, we have to overflowing what we hoped for and desired. The reason is that in this life, no one can fulfill all his desires, nor can he created thing fully satisfy the credit of man. For only God satisfies and infinitely exist man's desires and therefore purpose, saity is found in God alone. As Augustine says, you have made us for yourself all Lord, and our heart is less restless until it rests. In you because the blessed in the father land will possess God perfectly. It's Ed, that their desires will be abundantly filled and their glory will exceed their hopes In heaven, there will be the happy society of all the blessings and the society will be especially delightful. Since each one will possess all good together with a blessing, they will love one another as themself and they will rejoice in others. Good as their own. It will also happen that as a pleasure and enjoyment of one increases. So will it be for all? Thank you very much.

Q&A Session: Exploring Aquinas' Views

7 48:05

Thank you very much Professor Vial. we will open up to questions.

10 48:09

Thank you very much for that. I would imagine that Thomas's assertion or attribution of the beatific vision to Christ in his earthly life would be a strong argument against Burma. That what we do, that our participation in that beatific vision would be making us in that resurrected state most and that we would finally see what Jesus was onto when he taught what he taught and did what he did. but I didn't see you mention it. Is that something that, you bring up, in a larger project, or is it not really relevant like I would think it would be.

9 48:45

Yeah. Thank you for your question. if I understood the thing, the point is the ification of Christ and how Yeah. I have one quote that I think I didn't read. The thing is that Aquinas, speaks about the fic vision of Christ Comprehensive. And, and yes, and after reading the Book of Father Gain about the fic vision of Christ, because, it is true that it's a very complicated argument. And, in my paper I didn't get into that, but it's true that, this helps us to understand this christological dimension. So I didn't, explain it, profoundly, but it is supposed, there is one quote in which you can see more. It's not very explicit, but it's a quotation of, I don't have here the paper, the quotation of the commentary to the Gospel of St. John. Because in the commentary to the gospel of St. John, Aquinas is. It's more, explains more in detail the knowledge of the son, in his divine nature. But there are some quotations in which you can see that he also is speaking about the human knowledge of the father. and because of that, he's a mediator of our vision. yeah. and he's a mediator, not only here, but also in heaven, for example, as a holy priest, this is very, for me, this is very important when he says that, there are not many quotation in Aquinas speaks about the role of Christ, in our beatific vision. But there are some of them that allow you to say that he really thinks that our vision of God in heaven would be in Christ. But thank you.

5 50:26

Thanks very much for this. I'm definitely gonna hang on to this list of quotations. There. some really nice ones here. one that, I especially love is this one from the job commentary that you read at the end. there's a few texts like this where Aquinas speaks about seeing the glory of God, respondent in created things, which I really love. but I'm a little unsure what Aquinas thinks is going on there. Exactly. So I'll just ask you, when we see the glory of God shining re respondent in created things with our resurrected eyes, how does that sort of vision relate to the way that we see the glory of God declared in the heavens, in the way that the psalmist says. in this life. And how does seeing the glory of God resplendent and created things in a post resurrection state relate to the beatific vision itself, which is a sort of intellectual vision, I take it.

9 51:25

yes. I don't know if I can answer because it's very difficult. Usually I haven't getting to that point But yeah, I think that there are two levels of knowledge, the superior knowledge and the inferior knowledge, or the superior part of the soul and inferior part. So also in Christ. And Father Gaines explains it very well in his book about the ti vision. because if you take the example of Christ Earth, it's more clear to see how was compatible the FIC vision. And at the same time. The normal knowledge or the knowledge, of created things. yeah. I think that it's a very complicated, point. I would say that these are different levels, but they can go together, because they work in a different way. because they are, they have a different object and they function in a different way, they can go together. That will be a very fast, a very quick answer, but yes, in this book, father again, I will, it's very well explained. I

8 52:24

suggest you to read it.

1 52:27

I have a question and I'm gonna use the opportunity to jump in. you talked about Aquinas distinguishing The glorified body the body that, that we have now, in the resurrected state, when he talks about the bodily reality of it, could you talk about the continuity that exists between them and not just the distinction and how Thomas might see a certain continuity of that dimension? Of our personhood?

9 52:49

yes. Yeah. I will say, for example, all the argument, all what is about the history of the person, all the historical dimension, all your life in earth, how that is related with, with the glory. So it's, for example, Guarini. He speaks about that. He links corporality with your history. And I think that in an Aquinas, he doesn't speak about, he speaks about, the corporeal dimension of the human person in glory, but he doesn't get into this argument of all your historical life in earth how he, it is related to the glory, but he doesn't do it explicitly. But I think that it is there if you understand that the framework that he uses is Exodus Radius. So there you can see that all your history is related to heaven and will be glorified and your body will be glorified showing all your history in some way. I don't know if, but thank you for your question.

11 53:49

Please join me in thanking Professor Vial.

Professor Jennifer Hart Weed's Presentation

1 53:51

Our final paper this morning will be presented by Professor Jennifer Hart Weed. She is an associate professor of philosophy at the University of New Brunswick in Canada. She's the author of a number of publications, including articles on Aquinas, Maimonides, and Jewish Christian Relations. She's a member of the editorial board for the Judaism and Catholic Theology series at Catholic University of America Press and past President of the Canadian Society of Christian Philosophers. Her paper is entitled, the Fittingness of Including Animals in the Glorified Universe. Please join me in welcoming Professor Weed.

12 54:36

Thank you, father. I do have a handout. the full text of the paper is quite long. I won't read it in it's entirety, but I wanted to provide you with all of the texts, and they are divided up according to the sections of the paper. In the contemporary secondary literature, some attention has been paid to aquinas's views on the treatment of animals. Less attention has been paid to his views on the absence of animals in the afterlife. Carlo Leger includes a discussion of this subject in his book, arguing that Aquinas thinks plants and animals cease to be in the glorified universe. Since service to human beings is no longer necessary, and since the old world passes away. In this paper, I examine aquinas's arguments for the absence of animals in the glorified universe. In response, I argue that although animals are no longer useful to human beings who are enjoying the beatific vision, it is possible that God would include animals in the afterlife as an aspect of his redemption and restoration of creation. And so arguing, I will present aquinas's arguments from Fittingness for the incarnation, and I will argue that it would be fitting for God to include animals in the afterlife. So in order to get to that part of the paper, I will just summarize, the other sections. So in the first section, I look at, how Aquinas argues, for the exclusion of animals. And the first barrier to the inclusion of animals in the glorified universe is their corruptibility. So if you look at text a for example, Aquinas begins by arguing that the world's renewal occurs for the sake of man. And so what must conform to man's renewal? And when he explains that, he argues that anything that has an order to corruption will be excluded from the renewal of the world. And that will include plants, animals, and minerals, any kind of composite that has an order to corruption. However, the heavenly bodies and the elements of earth, water, fire, air, will be included in the renewal of the world and they will be glorified. So in the case of animals, both their bodies and their souls are corruptible. The sensitive soul of an animal does not survive the death of its body. And Aquinas argues that since the renewal of the world is for humanity, the world's renewal must conform to the renewal of humanity. So the first and primary barrier to the inclusion of animals, is their corruptibility. But the second thing that he says is that, corporeal things are supposed to serve humanity. And in the case of animals, they serve humanity in two ways. They maintain physical life and they advance in the knowledge of God. Now, the maintenance of physical life, fairly straightforward, material support, food. the second thing, advancing in the knowledge of, God animals, insofar as they are things visible point to God. And so this is how Aquinas interprets the scripture. the invisible things of God are made visible by the things that are seen. Now, of course, in the glorified universe, according to Aquinas, human beings do not eat. They don't need material support, and they're enjoying the beatific vision if we're talking about the lives of the blasted. And so they don't need animals in order to, point to God. So lack of usefulness or lack of utility is a second barrier to the inclusion of animals in the glorified, universe. now there is a text, and I'll point you to text B and text D because they relate to the question of this gentleman. Aquinas actually thinks that part of the glorification, of man, involves a glory that should be disposed to or bestowed on the whole universe. And that actually includes, he says physical things, however, he doesn't mean animals by that. He actually means being clothed in more splendid robes. And so the idea of, clothing as something that is somehow glorified and points to God in a physical manifestation is something that he, discusses. But of course, he's not talking about animals in this case. A third barrier is the lack of heavenly motion. Aquinas thinks, that the heavens will cease their movement, that, time will end and that night will also end. And so in text g on your handout, he talks about how, day will continue and time will stop Now. Aquinas associates the movement of the heavenly, of the heavens with the generation and corruption of animals. And so insofar as the heavens no longer move, generation and corruption of animals will no longer be possible. So then again, the inclusion of animals in a glorified universe, would not make sense to him. there's another thing that he says, and that has to do with the nature of the corruption of fire. So he thinks not only in, in the renewal of the world are corrupted, things that tend towards corruption, not included, but anything that remains at that point. So in the day of general resurrection, for example, anything that, any animal that would be alive at that point, Aquinas thinks that God will destroy those plants and animals by fire. that's text f where he talks about the cleansing of the world. So it's not just, the eradication of corruption, but a kind of a cleansing where he thinks that the infection of corruption will be removed from the world. so there is this sort of grand, destruction then of corruptibility, by fire. another barrier to the inclusion of animals in the glorified universe is the fact that Aquinas believes that God designs animals to be corruptible. So if you were in the previous, session that had harm, gore, for example, presenting, there was conversations there about original sin in the fall. Aquinas thinks that human death is a deficiency brought about by the fall. But animal death is not. Aquinas thinks that God, orders animals towards corruption, and so therefore, animal death is something, natural to them, not a consequence of the fall. And therefore, Christ's, passion and resurrection, the, is not a remedy for animal death. He says that dying is a deficiency brought to human nature by sin, Christ through the merits of his passion, repairs the deficiencies of nature. That's text I, but this redemption does not extend to animals. So the fact that God orders animals towards corruption, of course, would be another barrier to Aquinas in including, animals in the, renewal of the world. And he thinks that although this, corruption in animals is a kind of pervation and therefore an evil, he still, argues that God has wielded it, and that there is a diversity in creation such that some things have certain, lacks of perfection. but that this is something part that's part of God's design and part of God's plan. So in the second section of the paper, I move to other considerations. So obviously Aquinas is not an animal enthusiast, but he does have some positive things to say about animals. He talks, for example, in text m that God loves all existing things, that he wills goodness to all existing things. And so God loves animals. he talks about how, animals are actually ordered to God as a final cause. So even though someone might think that a service to humanity is the, final cause of animals, Aquinas additionally says that they all, creatures are ordered to God as to their final cause. And he talks about how the animals desire God and how in their, their life and their existence, and even in their possibility of knowing, he says they are somehow, participating in the divine likeness. So there is a final causality for God or for animals, and they are ordered towards God as to a final cause. however, they don't participate in the beatific vision. So this, in Text R he says, the way in which an animal acquires its last and is not by, the beatific vision, but insofar as the animal shares in the divine likeness and in as much as they are, or live or even know. So these are the reasons why, Aquinas, excludes animals from the glorified universe. And what I wanna do next is turn to fittingness arguments. So Aquinas uses Fittingness arguments to establish that the incarnation is consistent with God's nature. And as he explains in the third part of the summa, that which is fitting is that which belongs to a thing on account of its nature. And so that's text s on your handout to each thing that is be fitting, which belongs to it by very reason of its nature. So to reason Befits Man, since this is belongs to him because he is of irrational nature, but the very nature of God is goodness, as is clear from DiUS. Hence what belongs to the essence of goodness befits God. But it belongs to the essence of goodness to communicate itself to others, as is plain from DiUS. Hence, it belongs to the essence of the highest good, to communicate itself in the highest manner to the creature. And this is brought about chiefly by His sojo created nature to himself. That one person is made up of these three, the word, a soul and flesh, as Augustine says. So it's manifest that it was fitting that God become incarnate. So in this passage, Aquinas identifies God's very nature is that of goodness. And consequently, that which belongs to the nature of goodness will also belong to God. And this would entail communicating itself to creatures. Aquinas identifies the incarnation as the highest manner in which God could communicate himself to creatures. But in the same article, Aquinas makes two further points about fittingness. He argues that it's fitting that a creature, which by nature is mutable, should not always be in one way. and then he also argues that every mode of being wherein any creature whatsoever differs from the creator, has been established by God's wisdom and is ordained to God's goodness. So from Aquinas's, understanding of fittingness, we can yield premises. First, it's fitting that God communicates himself to creatures. Second, that the highest communication of God's goodness is the incarnation. Third, it is fitting that immutable creature change. And fourth, it's fitting that all creatures are ordained to God's goodness. So from premises one and two, it looks like it's fitting that God communicate himself to animals through the incarnation. Now remember, as I said before, Aquinas does not think that animal death is a result of the fall, and he doesn't apply, the, incarnation as a remedy to animal death. But if we look at his fittingness arguments, then it looks like it would be fitting that God would communicate himself to animals through the incarnation, because the incarnation itself is the highest communication of God's goodness. Also, one might want to consider the scriptural reasons for taking this position, for example, in scripture when it talks about God's love and care for animals. for example, the text in, St. Matthew, where Jesus talks about how God cares for the birds by feeding them. Also in the Book of Job, God Rebukes Job's, ignorance of the care with which God treats animals and how he feeds them. So although Aquinas doesn't believe that the fruits of the incarnation are communicated to animals, it looks like it would be fitting for God to apply Christ's redemption to animals. And this seems to be supported by Jesus's words in the Book of Revelation. Revelation 21, 5. Behold I make all things new. A wider application of the fruits of the incarnation is also implied by the gospel according to St. John. In the verse, God so loved the whole world that he gave up his only begotten son. So while the remedy for human death is the resurrection and glorification of the body, the remedy of an animal death, he says, is the destruction of all remaining animals at the day of resurrection by fire. And this is despite his familiarity with scriptures cited in the sumo contro gentil, where, for example, he talks about Isaiah 25, 8, the Lord shall cast death down headlong forever and in the apocalypse, death shall be no more. And in a previous passage, the well-known verse from Romans, by one man, sin entered into this world and by sin, death Aquinas interprets that as applying only to human beings. Aquinas cannot conceive of animals being delivered from death because he holds that animals are ordered by God to corruption. But one can grant that God ordered animals to corruption in this life and still argue that it would be fitting for God to remove their corruptibility as part of the renewal of the world. The renewal of the world and the defeat of death are fruits of the incarnation. If God were to exclude animals from the renewal of the world, they would be cut off from God's goodness whose very essence is to communicate himself to others. It's worth noting that Aquinas thinks that even human beings who suffer God's judgment after death are not subsequently destroyed, and so they too are part of the renewal of the world. Those who die in mortal sin are resurrected and their bodies are glorified, but they do not participate in the beatific vision. Aquinas associates this outcome with the last judgment. Aquinas asserts that animals insofar as they lack freedom of the will, don't merit a reward for serving humanity. And even if they did merit such an award, they're still ordered to corruptibility, but one can grant that animals do not merit the reward of being renewed. Just as those who die in mortal sins do not merit the reward of resurrection, but it would be fitting for God to renew animals who merit neither reward nor punishment, since he also renews human beings who merit punishment. And since animals don't merit punishment, It would not be fitting for God to destroy the animals who are still alive at the day of general resurrection. Again, it would be fitting for God to renew those animals as part of the renewal of the world. In text Z as my American friends say, he writes, although properly speaking in sensible bodies will not have merited this glory yet, man merited this glory be distorted on the whole universe. And so far as this conducive to man's increase of glory. Now, the crucial part for Aquinas is that the renewal, animals are not included in the whole universe because their renewal would not conduce to God's glory. But, apart from that, if you're talking about the whole universe, animals are part of the universe and you would think that they would probably be part of this renewal. And furthermore, if we go back a little bit, remember that Aquinas thinks that the elements, even though they are insensible, they are glorified and they are present in the renewal of the world. Whereas animals who we know for sure that God loves because scripture tells us this, they are not included, presumably, God loves the elements too. But you wonder about that comparison. Okay. premise three. It's fitting that immutable creature change. So Aquinas's account of fittingness is that which is in accordance with a thing's nature, a thing that can change, could change, and that would be fitting Aquinas reasons. It's fitting that God and the second person of the Trinity take on human nature and unite humanity to himself in a new way. Aquinas cannot conceive of animals becoming incorruptible in their souls and bodies. However, as in the case of the incarnation, Aquinas recognizes that God can do what has not been done before and that creatures can be changed in new ways by him. And he also acknowledges that God can act outside the order of nature, and this is text aa. In this text, Aquinas explains that since God establishes the nature of creatures, if he does anything outside this order, it's not against nature even granted, that God established the order of corruptibility of animals. If he were to glorify them in body and soul, it would not be outside of nature. Indeed, such animals are mutable creatures according to Aquinas, and it would be fitting that they be changed by God. in text bb, he says, to be united to God and unity of person was not fitting to human flesh according to its natural endowment since it was above its dignity. Nevertheless, it was fitting that God by reason of his infinite goodness should unite it to himself for man's salvation. So it's fitting for God to become incarnate for man salvation, bringing about a change in human nature for whom it was not fitting to be united to God. The purpose of this change was salvation and the renewing of the world. The purpose of changing the nature of animals from that which is order to incorruptibility, sorry, order to corruptibility, to that which is incorruptible is a fitting change so that animals might continue to exist in God's presence in the glorified universe. Also, of course, we know from Aquinas that the glorification of a human body is a miracle, which is not against nature, but beyond it. And in text cc, he talks about that. Such things nature is absolutely unable to do, and those hold the highest rank among miracles. So in removing corruptibility from animals, God would be acting in a miraculous way, just as he does in the resurrection of a human being. If it's fitting for God to renew and glorify the elements so they may exist in the renewed world, how much more fitting would it be for God to renew and glorify animals so that he might continue to communicate his goodness and love to them? Just as the salvation of human beings is the result of God's grace. So the renewal of animals would be the result of God's grace. And in text Aquinas talks about how the arrangement of renewal is neither natural nor contrary to nature, but above nature. Just as grace and glory are above the soul's nature, and it will be from a perpetual agent who will also preserve it perpetually. So remember that one of the barriers to the inclusion of animals is the cessation of heavenly movement, because then there would be no generation of corruption. But in this text, he talks about how a perpetual agent preserves it perpetually. So the movements of the heavens are not needed for the continuing existence of human beings or animals because God will preserve them perpetually. And this seems to be grounded in scripture according to the epistle, to the Colossians. Yet in him, all created things took their being heavenly and earthly visible and invisible. What are thrones and dominions? What are princetons and powers? They were all created through him and in him. He takes presidency of all, and in him all subsist. So the glorification of animals' bodies would be above nature through grace and would require God's preservation. While Aquinas cannot conceive of God, doing so, one can argue it's equally difficult to conceive of God resurrecting a human body. And yet Christians believe that Jesus was raised from the dead and that he will raise all departed human beings at the day of general resurrection. Aquinas would strenuously object to my arguments and my appropriation of his, fittingness, arguments. He cannot conceive of the renewal of animals In the sentences commentary, he provides a fascinating, argument as a said contra. This isn't aquinas's respondio, it's in the said contra. And he says, if plants and animals will remain, either all of them will, or some of them, if all of them then brute animals that previously died will have to rise as men rise. This can't be said because their form gives way to nothing. It cannot be resumed as numerically the same. So if not all, but some of them remain since there's no greater reason why one rather than the other should remain forever, it seems none of them will remain. Et cetera. Now, while I grant that Aquinas and others might not be able to conceive of any way in which an animal could be renewed, I would argue by analogy that some kind of animal renewal is conceivable in the way that the glorification of animals is conceivable. Further, the renewable of animals is at least somewhat similar to the glorification of human bodies, but I am not in this paper defending animal resurrection, only arguing that it would be fitting for God to include animals in the glorified universe. In the longer paper, I draw, an analogy between Aquinas predestination and the difference between the blessed and the damned of human beings, and, a possible distinction God could make between different kinds of animals. I didn't get to premise four, but I would argue it's fitting that all creatures are ordained to God's goodness. But I'll just wrap up by arguing. in conclusion, Aquinas is very clear that Fittingness does not entail necessity. So it's possible that something could be fitting and God could elect not to, bring it about or to bring something that would be equally fitting about. So while I am not arguing, that is necessary, that God include animals in the renewed world, I highlight what Aquinas says about those hypothetical issues of which we, know little. That's when we look to scripture. And in the conclusion of the paper and you do have those texts, I do look at some scriptures that seem to support, the renewal of the whole universe that would include animals and while acknowledging that God might not do I have presented this in other scriptural evidence that animals are included in the renewal of the world and following Aquinas's strategy and the reasons I have given I include it would be fitting for God to include animals in the glorified universe in whatever matter he deems best.

7 1:14:24

Thank

13 1:14:25

you.

7 1:14:25

We'll now open up to questions.

14 1:14:26

thank you for your talk. I really liked it. this is perhaps a naive question, but if animals were there in the new creation, what would they do?

12 1:14:34

Okay, so that's not

14 1:14:35

meant to be a trap. I'm obviously curious. no. And

12 1:14:36

I'm glad that you asked it because it gives me an opportunity to talk about premise four. So insofar as God, ordains animals, towards him as a final cause, and he talks about how they achieve that final cause through, being or living, or he says even knowing. one of the things you might think is that insofar as animals exist and they participate in the divine likeness, this is a way of glorifying God. And we have the psalmist that says, let everything that have breath praise the Lord. So maybe there is a possibility that through existing and breathing and being present in this glorified community, animals participate in the worship of God. As a way of cashing out animal flourishing.

15 1:15:14

Thank you. This was, great and I'm very sympathetic to the argument. I always thought this was a very weird thing that Aquinas does, but I wanted to put forward, so one reason why I think it's odd that maybe doesn't show up so much in your, argumentation, but I thought might compliment the argument that you're making is the line of reasoning that shows up in text. P which has to do when he says plants and animals pertain to the perfection of the universe according to the present state. So there's a limitation on there pertaining to the perfection of the universe as he states it in the sentences commentary. But in a lot of other texts, when he's talking about the perfection of the universe, he tends to just very straightforwardly say, God's, glory is manifest in a variety of creatures. and so that's why we have to have the universe that has the kind of diversity of creatures that it does. so it's a little odd to me that he just gets rid of that in the glorified state. So that's one thought. And then the other thought is, maybe, a appointed aquinas's favor, that I don't really know how to get around, which is that he's, the idea of preserving a corruptible body from corruption. He talks about this in connection with, Adam and the fall as being something that's a grace that's proper to human beings precisely because of their intellectuality. And I'm wondering if part of the resistance in extending that to animals would just be that. what about animals would make it fitting for them to be incorruptible according to their nature as opposed to the order of the universe or other kinds of considerations that we might have? And it might seem like just too profligate to give that kind of, so that's where I can see where Aquinas is coming from, but I also wonder what you had to say about that.

12 1:16:50

the perfection point is a good one. Aquinas rejects the notion that there's anything lacking in the glorified universe. So even he thinks even if animals are not present, we are not lacking anything because of course, we are in the presence of God. And so nothing is lacking. And so you don't wanna make an argument, that, animals, need to be in the glorified universe because there's a lack or because God, there's something lacking in God that would be problematic. So you don't wanna, you don't wanna go there. on the other hand, part of the problem that I diagnose in terms of what, Aquinas is doing and it moves towards a theological mistake, is that he, is articulating the glorified universes for the sake of man for humanity. And, what about scriptures that talk about the throne of God? I. And worship of God. there's a text from Isaiah that I include at the very end. it's really not all about us. It's not all about human beings. It's actually all about God. I don't think Aquinas disagrees with that, but if one moves, one's focus to that. I think that one is perhaps more open to the possibility that God's love would be more expansive and that he would therefore, insofar as it's all about him, be more interested in having all of these creatures in these, varieties of creation represented in the glorified universe. Now, how to get around the corruptible body, it's interesting because, you've got these Old Testament figures that are translated. you've got the case of Enoch, for example, and you've got Elisha, is it Elisha or Elijah? Yeah, I forget. one of them, who, somehow are here and then they're translated. And so you've got these cases where it looks like, they don't die. so you've got this corruptible body and God's gonna have to glorify it in some way in order for them to be part of the glorified universe. So perhaps animals that remain, at the day of resurrection instead of being destroyed by fire, he has a way of translating them. I think what I'm moving towards is to understand by analogy how grace. heals nature. And again, in the previous, talk in harm Gore's talk, when he talked about grace and original sin, grace heals the wounds that one has because of sin. And so perhaps by analogy, this is what God could do then with an animal, in terms of repairing any kind of, wound that one might have through corruptibility. Now, I do think that we probably should have a conversation about whether Aquinas is correct in arguing that, human death is the only kind of death that is the result of the fall. Perhaps it's the case that animal death is part of it as well. I think that's a worthy conversation, but my purpose in the paper was not to dispute that, but to grant it and then to argue that for other reasons God could, fittingly include animals in the glorified universe.

13 1:19:15

regarding the said contra argument that you, quoted, that kind of gets at what I have always taken to be aquinas's main reason for rejecting animals was the, philosophical, supposed impossibility of, bringing an individual into existence once it has passed out of existence. And that seems, I was reading some literature on Aristotle from a book on ancient commentators on Aristotle that, convinced me that. Idea is Aristotelian, but that Aristotle is not actually, properly supported. It seemed to be based in his ideas about individuation, which although Aristotle does make reference to matters in individuating principle, he never tells us what Individu matter. So according to this article, I think I agree with this. Aristotle seems to be treating individuation as something just basic in itself, and flowing from that, once this individual has passed out existence, according to his view, there's metaphysically, a metaphysical impossibility, which even God could not transcend of bringing that, individual into existence again. so basically after considering these things. I came to believe that Aristotle doesn't properly support this whole framework, which leads me to no longer be certain that it would be impossible for God to bring something back into existence, therefore, not necessarily impossible for an individual animal that's already died, to be brought under existence. That of course. Again, as you said, that doesn't tell me whether or not God actually would do it. It's just a question of possibility. So I'm just wondering if you have any thoughts about that.

12 1:21:02

Thanks. so a couple things. One is I can sidestep the question by saying that, it, it could be fitting for God to include some animals in the glorified universe. And so what about the animals that are alive at the day of general resurrection? Instead of destroying them by fire, he somehow, through grace is able to perform a miracle and he's able to, transform them into something that is incorruptible. And by analogy again, it, the idea of the resurrection of a human being, and a corruptible body or the remains of a corruptible body being resurrected and transformed into a body that will never die again. Now, in terms of matter individuating, I think you're right. Aristotle thinks, and Aquinas sometimes says that too. I believe he says that matter individuates, But it's not just any kind of matter, it has to be prime matter under a certain kind of a dimension. So it has to be some kind of, extension in space that you're talking about. And then what you can talk about is the substantial form that would, bestow on the, prime matter, all of the different, properties, that, the composite would then have. again, if God can do this in the case of a human being, or if he can glorify an element, I just don't think it's a stretch to think that he might be able to do that. But that's, it's not essential to my argument because I am arguing that I think that, God could just choose, to, transform those or translate those animals that are alive at the day of resurrection. The thought that I had was, what if in the case of animals, when you're talking about a sensitive soul, you're not talking about an immortal soul. and consequently, what if you're talking about something that is an emergent property out of matter? So in that case, the problem really is your matter. So if you can get the matter into the right, configuration, you would actually get a soul out of that. You would get an emergent property out of that, and it would be sufficient for a sensitive soul. And it's not the case for human beings.'cause the human beings, insofar as they have a rational soul, that it's immortal, it's created by God. Aquinas doesn't think that sensitive souls, are separately created in that sense. But maybe it's the case that an emergent property could come in here and help us out. Thanks.