Aquinas at 800, Part 3: Self Knowledge and Consciousness

What is the role of psychology and anthropology in the writings of Thomas Aquinas? Contemplate Aquinas’ thoughts on the soul’s habitual knowledge, psychological continuity without personhood, and how we encounter the world through concrete particulars.

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Transcript

1 0:06

welcome to our, current panel Psychology and anthropology, self-knowledge and consciousness. At least that's what I hope we think it is. so the program is a little bit an error. We have, delightfully three panelists, with some, with an event this large. There's always some changes in, reshuffling, but what we're going to do is go with the two that are in the printed version, and then Jeremy Shehe will present, lat. So first up we have Daniel Contreras, who's assistant professor of philosophy at the university, the Andes, he was, pro product of Notre Dame. Yes. And he will be speaking to us on. Aquinas and the light of the agent that inte ECT in the soul's habitual knowledge. Thank you very much. Okay.

2 0:49

In the 13th century landscape of philosophical and theological reflection, Aquinas theory of human self knowledge occupies a rather particular place while harkening to Augustan authority who had famously claimed that the soul always knows itself and in the search to understand itself. It strives after the knowledge of something that had nonetheless always been present to itself. Aquinas refuses as this is known to accept the existence of something like a superconscious self knowledge that is always present to the soul, and that granted the soul some kind of perpetual, though big and confusing knowledge of itself regardless of the knowledge of instrumental objects following ourselves. Cue from the Dima Aquinas things that the human soul is intelligible like all other intelligible, and so requires for the actual condition of itself, of a species of some extramental thing. Nevertheless. Aquinas does think that throughout, does think throughout his entire literary production, but especially from the Veta onwards, that despite not having this kind of super conscious self knowledge that many of his predecessors and contemporaries advocated, the human soul is in fact, in some sense always present to itself, knowing itself habitually and uninterrupted manner. The nature of these habituals of knowledge, however, it's disputed among contemporary scholars. Some author thinks that the soul's habitual of knowledge is a vague and implicit knowledge that merely accompanies all our acts of cognition, but that it's not always cognitively or intentionally presented to itself conveying any kind of real, meaningful content as to the nature and conscious of the human soul. Other authors think that the souls have ritual tools of knowledge is nothing but the potency or capacity to perform acts of cell knowledge. Once the conditions for actualization are met above all the actual knowledge of some instrumental object, but that it is not an actual real knowledge in the sense of providing some essential content. It's merely a capacity or potent potency for actual self knowledge. Others conceive of it in quite the same manner in which other 13th centuries Scholastic Scholastics advocated for a kind of superconscious self knowledge. That is a knowledge that a soul, that soul always has of itself, but that is never thematized or objectified in the sense of being made the direct object of attention or consideration. This means for these authors that when the soul actually pays attention to itself, it actually, it performs an act of knowledge that is fundamentally different from the superconscious knowledge that it always has of itself. Other finance, others. Finally think of the soul's habitual self knowledge in more metaphysical terms, highlighting the unique ontological condition of the human soul. The risk. Cory, for example, recognize, for example, recognizes this when she cleanses that habitual of knowledge belongs to the essence of the intellectual soul, but refuses to explicitly go any further. What I would like to defend here today is precisely a more robust metaphysical conception of Aquinas understanding of the soul habitual knowledge. What a postulate is that the human soul, habitual sub knowledge is the native ontological self presence in which the human soul subsist as an immaterial intelligible substance. The human soul, habitual self knowledge is, in other words, the substantial and immaterial actus emity, in and through which the human soul subsist this radical and intimate self presence in which the human soul immaterial subsist is the very light of the edge and intellect that makes or constitutes the intelligible. And so it is the ground and root of every act of cell knowledge that the soul performs whenever he knows an extramental object. This identification between the agent intellect and the soul ual of knowledge certainly requires explanations and nuances easily lending itself to misinterpretations. The question that leads the following pages then concerns the ontological status. The intell and the soul's habitual self knowledge being both as we human maintain the very same actuality by means of which the soul is radically and habitually present to itself and which makes or constitutes all other intelligible. The first section is habitual self knowledge and the agent intellect in the very question 10, article eight, which is EQU Aquin longest treatment of the Soul's Habitual of Knowledge. Aquinas replies to an objection raised against the idea that so knows itself through its own essence and not by means of a species. And this text one in the handout, the objection had argued that the human soul is a certain S substance that for that very reason subsist in itself, but intelligible forms of which all knowledge and science is made up are not substances that subsist in themselves, but rather accidents. Therefore, if the soul were that through, which the soul knows itself, that is, if the soul acted as intelligible form for the knowledge it has of itself. Then it would be an accident as fallout and intelligible forms are, and this of course is impossible. Aquinas replies that the knowledge whereby the soul knows itself in this text, two, they reply, is not in the genus of accident. With regard to that, by means of which habitually knows itself. Sorry. Yes. Sorry. Aquinas replies that the knowledge whereby the so knows itself is not in the of accident. With regard to that, by means of which in habitually know itself, it's certainly in the of accidents accident, but only with regard to the act of knowledge. If the knowledge were by the soul knows itself. In s noting the genus of accident, the only logical conclusion is that it must necessarily belong to the genus of substance. But then the question is obvious, what's it mean for the soul's habitual of knowledge to be in the category of substance or more generally posed? What's it mean for any knowledge to be in the category of substance? Know Aquinas repeatedly appeals to the authority of Augustine with dealing with this matter. It does so as a matter of fact, in the response just questions, just quoted from the very VE question, article eight e book nine of the di, ate postulates, a fundamental distinction between the soul's knowing itself, eno and the soul's thinking about itself. When the soul thinks about itself, it pays attention to itself. It turns inwards onto itself, and it makes itself the direct object of condition. But when it simply knows itself, that's not objectify itself, making itself direct the direct object of condition, but it's rather simply present to itself, as in Aquinas leader terminology and immaterial intellectual substance. As Aquinas says, at the end of the reply just mentioned Quo Augustine, the knowledge by the sole knows itself is in the sole as a substance substantiate and not as an accident. The soul. S then seems to be for Augustine, nothing but the very essence of the soul as it is continuously self-aware that is in substantial unity with itself. This explains why Augustine's remarks that even before actually thinking about itself, the soul had always known itself for it is always held or retained in its own presence as an intellectual substance, Aquinas willingly adopts a sl of thought, though he compliments it and modified it with, they recently gained Aristotelian insights concerning human psychology and intellectual. This helps explain why even Australia, as in Aquinas, some simultaneously holds that the human soul is intelligible like all other intelligible, and that in nonetheless habitually knows itself in a continuous manner. In the question 10, article eight Aquinas distinguishes between the soul's existential or experiential self knowledge and the soul squi cell knowledge. This second kind of knowledge, the one that is acquired regarding the nature of the soul requires unsurprisingly making the intellective soul the direct object of consideration and is the result of rather intricate philosophical reasoning, which also takes time and is prone to errors. The first kind of cell knowledge, however, is the knowledge the soul has regarding what is particular to itself. Also phrases it in as much as the soul has been in a particular individual. Individual. By means of this knowledge, the soul knows that it exists and one perceives oneself as a subject of one's operations. But this can take place in two waves. Success Aquinas actually and habitually to habitually know itself means for the soul to see itself. By mean of its own essence. That is to be always present to itself through its own essence so that it can proceed to an act of cell knowledge. Just as it similarly happens with the one who has the habit of certain, of a certain science, who can, by the sheer presence of the habit now in, at the things that belong to that science, when he actualizes that knowledge on account of the self presence then, which is characteristic of intellectual substances. We do not know what we are, but we do know that we are. This self presence is characteristic of us as intellectual substances because we subsist in and through intellectual or intelligible being sa inte the human substance or essence formerly constituted by the intellectual soul as it's formal principle, is ent transcendentally order to, its being as to the act that perfects it and bring it, brings it into existence. This being in as much as this Addis is not entirely immersed or and restricted by the conditions of matter, is intellectual being and is following Aquinas reason here, the soul's habitual self-awareness in asm much as he has been in a particular individual. Precisely because this being is always intelligible actuality, and that's the ultimate ground for the intimate and radical self presence of the soul. It is also simultaneously the very light of the ancient intellect that makes or constitutes the intelligible. All these descriptions of intell, of intellectual, intelligible being to sides of the same metaphysical reality pick out the same reality under different names in as much as it brings forth into existence. the human soul, which is the formal principle of a human composite. It is the substantial and immaterial after act of being acts sandy that actualizes the human essence and in and through the soul informs the body in as much as it constitutes the human soul. As an immaturely subsistent substance. This intelligible being is the soul's habitual Self-awareness studies is the continual abiding presence of the human soul unto itself. In as much as it grants the soul, the intelligible actuality whereby to make potential intelligible objects actually intelligible. It is the light of the inate. The soul's habitual self knowledge then is not a super added perfection that accrues to the human soul and in hus in it, in the manner of an accident like the knowledge of all other things. It is rather made possible, as a point says here by the very sheer fact that the soul's essence is present unto itself and it is not. As we saw Aquina saying about in the genius of an accident that is in the mind. this means then that in the case of the human soul, the radical capacity for conscious self possession, which is characteristic of habitual self knowledge, is found there substantially since it is constituted by the soul's, very substantial being for the soul's habit. Habitual self knowledge belong to the category of substance is nothing else, than to be identical with the soul. But this only to the extent that we're in as much as the soul being an immaterial substance that subsists on its own always has in itself intelligible being as sa inte, but not as much as the soul is, which also, and inseparably always is form of a body. In knowing some instrumental object then we're, we realize that we're the ones who perform the operation of understanding. This realization cannot take place without knowing something. But that of which we become aware is not something that is thematically known. That is as a specifying our intellect with a determined form of species. But it's rather an matic or non objectifying knowledge of own existence. Although it is true that the soul behaves as a blank slate tabular with regard to the condition of sensible objects, with regard to the experiential knowledge it has of itself. The soul is always in the proper and disposition. In which a cognitive habit finds itself with regard to the actual connection of its corresponding objects, and this independently of any species received by prosection from the surface. The actualization of this habit certainly requires the cognition of extramental material objects, but not as if the cognition of these objects were to constitute the very structure of intimate self presence that truly defines the spirituality of the mind as such, but rather as the condition required by an immaturely, subsisting soul that is nonetheless the form of a body. Therefore, the soul's habitual self knowledge is not something like the possession of equality, as one could say, the knowledge of all possible instrumental objects or a kind of inherent habit of the soul. The soul's habitual self knowledge is rather the very substance of the soul, but only as much as the human soul is an immaterial form whose being is not entirely immersed and restricted by the conditions of matter. To the extent that the being of the soul exceeds or goes above matter, it is naturally constituted so as to be intimately self present to itself. That is to habitually know itself. In other words, the human soul has in and of itself the radical disposition to perceive its own being before any sensitively received species. Because the disposition is the very immature possession of its being as an intellectual substance. This disposition to move or proceed to the actual knowledge of itself is not an accident. It's does not belong to the category of accidents on a says, but instead, it's the very essence of the soul as especially self present to itself. Since it immaturely su subsist in its inte, that is an account of having being an independence of matter. Now to further clarify the true metaphysical nature of the so habitual self knowledge is necessary to also address the ontological stat of the agent intellect. Since the light of the ancient intellect is the actuality whereby the soul makes the forms received from the sense intelligible in act, and which are for that very reason only potentially intelligible. It's too as the soul habitual self knowledge, the essay intelligibility that actualizes the human soul and can suits the soul radical self presence unto itself. The human soul, according to Aquinas, is the least perfect among intellectual substances. This is why he does not understand any intelligible forms by merely relying on its own nature. But at first is rather an A potency regarding imp potency regarding all of them. Hence, to actually acquire those forms in mat first assimilate or receive the likeness of the things that exist outside of itself by sensitive perception. This conception of the soul brings out the two main reasons for the need of the agent intellect, and namely that the power for understanding the essence of things that is the possible intellect is at first entirely in codec regarding intelligible, and consequently that the acquisition of intelligible forms. Made through sensible forms, which are the of things that they exist in matter to claim as Aquinas repeatedly does that, that the agent intellect is the act of the intelligible and through them of the possible intellect may seem to commit equ to identifying the agent intellect with the very act of the forms which have been immaterial. The important thing to avoid this mistake is to keep in mind that the, that for the agent intellect to be able to bring thes and the possible intellect into that, it must be intelligible act prior to be, to bring them into, since nothing acts in so far as citizen policy, but only as a citizen act, the agent intellect cannot be identified with the act of any given immaterialize form or with the act of the possible lie intellect. When Thomas says that the agent intellect is the act of the intelligible themselves, he should not be seen as referring to the forms which have been in fact been made intelligible unless we taken to denote of the cost by means of the effect. The intellect is the prerequisite act of the actual intelligibility of the natures presented by Phantasms and he, and hence it must be an act prior to the actualization of any of them. Yet if the soul already has before the immaterialize immaterial of any given form present in that phantasm, an inte intellectual power, which is intelligible in art, how can it be said that the so is at first entirely in pot regarding intelligence in intell intelligible like a clean slate on which nothing is written. Thomas was very much aware of this difficulty in the Summa, he says, and this text screen in the handout, but it will perhaps appear to some that this is impossible, namely the one and the same substance that is our soul being pot regarding all intelligible, which correspond to the possible intellect and that it makes them inact, which is proper to the agent intellect for nothing acts in so far as citizen. But in so far as Citizen Act. It seems that the agent impossible intellect cannot coexist in the solves of one substance. This is a problem to Thomas faced numerous times. The solution leads to Aly startle startling conception of the agent intellect, and each summary presentation is found in the sag and this text four, the Intellect is Solve, has something in act regarding which the phantasm is imp potency and it's imp potency regarding that which is found enacting Phantasms for the substance of the soul has immateriality and is evident from what has been said for that reason. It has an intellectual nature because every immaterial substance is of this kind, but this is not just suffice for it to have what it takes to simulate to this or that determined thing, which is required for our soul to know this or that determinate thing. For all knowledge takes place through the sim militude of what is known in the know. Therefore, the intellect of soul itself remains in potency regarding the determinate similarities, sims of things which are knowable by us, namely the nature, self sensible things. In fact, phantasms present to us these determinate natures of sensible things. however, they have not yet attained intelligible being as inte, given that they are simulative of sensible things, not only as to the material conditions, which are individual properties, but they are also material organs. Consequently. Consequently, they're not intelligible in act yet they're intelligible in potency. Thus, they have intelligibility in potency, but they have the determination of this milage of things in act. But the opposite was the case with intellective soul. Hence, there is an active power in the elective intellect soul regarding phantasms, which makes them intelligible in act. And this potency of the soul is called the ancient intellect. There's also in it a power which is potency regarding the determined symbol of sensible things. and this pot is the possible intellect. Thomas think therefore, thinks therefore, that the intellectual condition of a thing requires that the soul and the natures presented by phantasms compliment each other. The soul must provide the natures what they lack in order to become actually intelligible. While the natures provide the soul we but they lacks in order to become actually recognizing of a thing. What these natures lack as a assessing dispatches passages is not an essential determination or specification, but rather a distinctive kind of being, namely, intelligible being as intelligible. This means that what the soul bestows on the natures presented by FMS to make them intelligible in act is not a determination of property that is something that changes what they are. Instead leaving the same essential properties or attributes in place. The soul only provides those natures with the essay that elevates them to be to the immaterial, enhanced intelligible realm. although Thomas does not make it fully explicit, there is an important conclusion to draw from this passage. Namely that the agent intellect itself is as intelligibility. The reasoning behind this conclusion is the following. Every agent acts through its form, and every agent acting through its form produces something similar to itself. For creatures, this means that a substance costs something through its form, and by doing so it costs something to be like itself now itself. And hence, s Inte is itself form repeatedly says that S essay is formal with respect to everything else. And that Ga himself is through his own essence form. Since essay Intele is a form and given that this form belongs to sensible natures only as they're acted upon by the soul, it follows that thee, that accrues to them must be affected by the soul in so far as it operates through its own as inte. And since every agent acts through its own form, and since the as intelligibility that is received by sensible nature is bestowed on them by the agent intellect, the form by means of which the human soul performs its operation must itself be as inte. So's actual intelligibility.

1 20:36

You're cutting into it, Kayla. Okay,

2 20:37

sorry,

1 20:38

just,

2 20:39

I've just one, two more paragraphs. the so's actual intelligibility, the fact that it always has as intelligibility is fully consistent with the salt's potentiality regarding all determined intelligible forms for Aquinas intelligibility is inextricably linked to immateriality as he repeatedly affirms something is intelligible in act because it's immaterial. The human soul is a spiritual, immaterial substance whose essay exists exceeds bodily matter in so far as it is not mixed with the body vent is intelligible in act. Given that the mine is immaterial and that intelligibility is inextricably linked to immateriality, it shouldn't be no surprise that for Aquinas, the mine itself is intelligible in act intelligibility and immateriality go hand in hand to the point that Thomas describes the very operation of the ancient intellect that is making intelligible in policy. Act as a conferral of immateriality. What's exactly, what's it exactly which that which the sole grants to sensible forms of that into composition with them so that they acquire actual intel intelligibility. In general terms, EQU distinguishes six ways in which something can enter into composition with something else, one as parts of one body, two as forms and matter. Three as nature and subject four as Saia, five as genus and difference and six and substance and accident. I'm gonna skip some paragraphs, some lines given that the so is potency regarding all determined intelligible forms, what it bestows and sensible forms to make them intelligible in ACT cannot itself be a determined form, otherwise the sole would be intelligible in act precisely with regard to that determined form. It seems then that the only possible composition is that of essay and asencia, but since determined forms are not themselves essay, but asencia. The sole effects on these forms and what interesting to composition with them must be some kind of essay that makes them intelligible in act, namely as intelligibility. Any actually intelligible form is not just a determined form, but then is not just a determined form then, but rather a composite of both determined form and as inte just the conclusion. But the human intellect lacks for perpetual actual self-awareness is intrinsic intelligibility. The human intellect is not itself informed by its own essence, whereas the intellect is intrinsically intelligible. That is its own essence In informs its intellect as a specifying intelligible species, the human soul does not by the she fact of subsisting, immaterial inform its intellect. The human soul informs the body precisely because of it. because it does not subsist perfectly in the genus of the intelligible. This ultimately means that the actuality by means of which intelligibility is granted to sensible species is the same actuality by means of which the soul is habitually present to itself. In other words, the cio by means of which the human soul not only returns to itself, but also and more importantly subsist. Immaterial in itself is also the very same light which makes or constitutes the intelligible one and the same as Intele considered and described on a different perspective grounds the soul's capacity to both be cont continuously present to itself and to render material objects intelligible act. After all, if the intelligible actuality of any species that informs our intellect, we're not something connatural to the soul, how will we, how would we be able to recognize ourselves in the knowledge of everything else? If this actuality would not come natural to our soul as its very own act ity, it would be impossible to recognize ourselves as the ones who understand.

1 24:11

Just about six minutes left for a question. Do you wanna field your own question? Who would you like me to keep this again? Stevens here.

4 24:17

Thanks Daniel. Very interesting. I've got a couple of historical points that might, support your case. But I'll just mention one here and I wondered if you had thought about it. So in an aerosol saying a three five Aristotle says the active insect and is a hexis like light. Yes. And I believe it's probably translated into LA hobby to, yeah. So I was wondering if I could support your idea here that the source of habitual knowledge, whatever it must be, is this kind of hobby to, in the agent inte select is called the hobby to, does that help your

2 24:53

case at all? So he pointless usually sort of. Whenever he talks about souls habitual of knowledge, he compares it to a habit. He doesn't sort of describe it directly as a habit, but compares it. So it's similar to what a habit of science, for example, does for the one who has it, that by the she presence of the habit, he cannot can ex exceed it. So he can proceed to the knowledge act of that which belongs to the science. And similarly by the fact of having an immaterial soul that is though the form of a body, we can sort of have the, that disposition that can be actualized and so that we can actually be aware of a soul. So it behaves like habit, but he doesn't directly describe, it describes as a habit, but it's it helps. Yeah.

5 25:34

John. Okay. this is not a sophisticated historical question. I just, I'm wondering about how the. This idea of the mind knowing itself or the soul knowing itself fall knowing itself. how that, that I exist, that knowledge that I exist is similar to or different from the knowledge that I have that some particular human being exists. you know, I didn't know David and then I met it, so I came to know that there was David. Yeah. in the, for all right. the world was richer. Now I could have known Uhhuh, somewhat principal, you know, in the version of this idea that we get from the tradition that follows from Decar. It's the knowledge that some particular individual exists. And then there's the question of reasoning out from the knowledge that particular human individual exists with. Its thought that substance exists to the existence of other substances. Yeah. But there's this other tradition that maybe Steven knows very well, where, you know, thought knowing itself isn't the knowledge of someone being among others or something that could be someone being among others. It's just thought knowing. It's very general character thought. So maybe that's not a helpful division. Steven, that I'm wondering how it's important

2 26:49

because, so Aquinas, when he talks about the whole habitual self knowledge, it's always a, I don't know how to say this in English, kind of a non thematic or un thematic knowledge. It's not the knowledge of sort of some essential content. So when you know somebody else's, the existence of somebody else, there's always some content, some essential content that as associated with the knowledge of the existence of that thing. So I know that to be a human or a dog or some other thinking that is so the knowledge of a nature of an essence, but the soul, habitual cell knowledge is the sheer fact of knowing that I exist. the sort of the formulation that I wanted use to usually, chooses is. As much as the soul has being in that individual. so it's a very existential experiential knowledge that I exist. I am in being so kind of knowledge and it's not, and he very, carefully and sort of constantly distinguishes it from i kind of qui or essential knowledge that this soul can have itself. Because that's require, that requires not sort of just knowing that I exist, but sort of turning actively to my soul as an object of intellectual. and seeing why is this thing that I am. So they're very two separate knowledge. Distinct knowledge. But the knowledge and the knowledge, the kind of existential experiential knowledge is always present in the knowledge of some other thing, but not thematically, sort of, I'm considering it, it's sort of objectifying it.

5 28:06

So as you're reading it, this eye that I know to exist in this habitual way is something that I can then turn around announce Yes. Is a matter of decar what it is? Yes, Anna. Okay.

1 28:16

Jump in, which I can't, if you're stripping in of all this essential content, why doesn't this become like an denker that accompanies, So that's what I,

5 28:25

that's where I wanted us to, yeah, to go.

1 28:28

I don't know if, because it's also the basis, isn't this also the basis for what they knew later? You later use that to have the science of the soul. Yes. So if it's just merely like an denka, then it seems like a very difficult to make the basis of the

2 28:42

science. its, it is, it is an existential knowledge sort of, or experiential knowledge in that sense. but the way that it takes place, and this is why Aquinas follows ourselves very clearly, it's that it takes place per, so the Soul Seeds itself, cent, which is the title of the paper, so the soul itself by its essence, but sort of that knowledge is actualized in every single knowledge of every other thing by means of a species. And by knowing through a species some other thing, I also become aware of myself sort of in act in a sense. I could become aware of myself and the knowledge about, of that other thing. So enforce me about what I am in a sense as well. So I have the knowledge so that I am, and I have the knowledge that I can, that I'm capable of knowing cats and what tell that tells me something vaguely and ly obscurely, however that is. But it tells me something about myself, but it always happens in the knowledge of mother thing.

1 29:33

Thank you. I, appreciate it. yeah, we're moving right along here. This, so our next speaker, in case you've missed it, is, father Great Mary also. oh. Thank you. Also, another, Proud product of Notre Dame and also Ley, you know, our West Coast Dominican representative for our conference. And he'll be talking about psychological continuity without personhood. Aquinas on the separated soul.

6 29:57

Yeah, there's actually one other West coast Dominicans who's speaking as well. Okay, this it Daniel. Alright, John Locke asked us to imagine a situation where the conscious awareness of a prince and a cobbler is exchanged. The cobbler wakes up to find himself in the body of the prince, and the prince wakes up to find himself in the body of the cobbler. And the way I've described the imagined scenario already suggests the conclusion that Locke thinks we should draw from it. Namely that after the exchange of conscious awareness, it is the very person of the cobbler that wakes up in body and it the person of thes up in cobbler's body. The person then who appears to the world with the body of a prince after the exchange is numerically identical to the person who before the exchange appeared to the world and the body of a cobbler. However, the man of the human substance that was, or perhaps the housed the person of the prince before the switch is still according to Locke, the same human, human sub substance after the switch as before. Thus, Locke's thought experiment suggests that the concept of a person is not essentially bound up with substance in this. He goes beyond Descartes in that conceivably even the soul of a cobbler understood as a Cartesian thinking substance might remain in the cobbler's original body when their conscious awareness gets swapped. Hence, what is essential to the person is not that it is a thinking thing for if law. The thing can come apart from the thinking such that the Dia chronic identity conditions for a person are purely psychological, cobbler's Cartesian soul stays in his body while the cobbler's center of consciousness migrates into the princess body slash soul composite such that the person who lives in the prince's palace truly is the person who formally made and mended shoes. Now much could be and has been said about Locke's view, but I'm not here to talk about Locke's view. what I want to highlight is that Locke's central intuition about personhood is widely shared today among philosophers and non philosophers Alah. It is very hard for us to deny that Locke's imagined scenario is correctly described as the cobbler waking up in the prince's body and the prince waking up in the cobbler's body. Granted, there are a few ways in which a Thomas or someone broadly sympathetic with Aquinas of RIS might wanna push back against this accounted personhood. For instance, one might wanna draw the distinction between different kinds of conscious awareness, such as that which is associated with the senses and that which is associated with the intellect. We can then distinguish rational consciousness from non-rational consciousness, and we may want to limit our concept of personhood to rational con consciousness, or at least to beings that have the potency for rational consciousness. Thus, a human infant would be a person because of its as yet un actualized potency for rational consciousness, whereas an adult dog would not be a person since it lasts such a potency, despite its having senses, imagination, emotions, et cetera. Thus, we can qualify a broadly Lockean account by tying personhood specifically to rational consciousness and not consciousness as such. Further, we might wanna say that rational consciousness is not strictly necessary for personhood, nor in continuity of rational consciousness necessary for continuity of personhood. For Thomas might wanna say that even a human being who seems definitively to have lost consciousness has not thereby ceased to be a person since there's still living human substance and indeed the same living human substance. Similarly, Thomas might say that someone with radical memory loss, or someone in whom non vertical memories of the past have been implanted is nevertheless the same person he always was, despite having lost continuity of consciousness. And so someone sympathetic with Aquinas will probably want to qualify any concept of personhood that links it closely with consciousness. By on the one hand, limiting the connection between consciousness and personhood to rational consciousness. And on the other hand saying that rational consciousness is not strictly necessary for personhood. Be that as it may, I wanna suggest that hardly anyone these days, even an Aris Thomas, will easily abandon the intuition that rational consciousness, conscious awareness is sufficient for personhood. And that continuity of rational conscious awareness is sufficient for continuity of personhood. Consciousness, at least rational consciousness tends to be, for us modern people, the distinctive feature of what a person is, even if there are cases where we wanna affirm personhood in. This is where our modern concept of personhood, one that is to some degree shared by, I think nearly all of us, is in deep tension that aquinas's concept personhood, or it's pretty clear that Aquinas would acknowledge there is continuity of rational awareness, rational consciousness between the living human substance and the postmortem separated soul. Yet he denies that the separated soul is a person. Hence Aquinas would reject both the claim that rational consciousness is sufficient for personhood, and that continuity of rational consciousness is sufficient for continuity of personhood. And as I have suggested we that is we modern people find both of these claims at least highly intuitive, if not self-evident. My purpose in this talk is to suggest that first. This conceptual tension between us and Aquinas exists. And second, that it is deeply relevant, both for correctly interpreting Aquinas's thought on human nature and for determining whether or to what extent it's true. I wanna begin by saying something briefly about the claim that there's continuity of rational consciousness between the living human substance and the separated soul according to Aquinas. Now I think this claim is rather uncontroversial, so I won't dwell on it. The first two texts on the handout are meant to deal with what I take to be one possible objection to sub continuity, which has to do with the significant difference in the soul's mode of understanding in a separate state as compared to its mode of understanding in the body. Nevertheless, the soul itself is still the same subsistence entity that was once united to the body. Its power of understanding. Two is the very same individual power that acted during life, which is what Aquinas asserts in, the response to object to objection eight there in that, that first set of texts, given the identity of the soul and its powers across the boundary of death, I think it is very hard to deny that for Aquinas, there's going to be contin continuity in intellectual consciousness and understanding between the life of the human person and the conscious life of the person separated soul, even though the way in which the soul understands, is quite different. Yet despite this continuity of consciousness, Aquinas famously den denounced that the separated soul is a person. He does this because he follows vaus in defining a person as an individual substance of a rational nature, according to Aquinas's understanding. This is the true definition. This is a true definition. Both the criteria it gives for personhood are essentially and absolutely necessary for something to be a person. In particular, Aquinas interprets Bo's definition as entailing that the individual substance of a rational nature must also be a complete substance. It must be complete in a species. And it is precisely because the soul, including the separated soul, is by his essence only a part of a complete species, that it fails the completeness criterion. And he says this, very straight straightforwardly in the said of the passage from the sentences that I quote there, A person has the rodio of complete and whole, but the soul is apart. Therefore, the soul does not have the R of a person. and you can find that sort of argument all throughout this court. Now, this denial of personhood of the separated soul has been known to make aquinas's commentators uncomfortable. Intuition, that rational consciousness experience is the distinctive markup. Personhood is deeply ingrained in us. It may be in part due to the dis, this discomfort that some authors go to great lengths to emphasize the similarity between the separated soul and a person suggesting in various ways, thatas thinks the soul is, as it were, almost a person. The soul is claimed to be personal or person like an incomplete person, or semi person. The general thought seems to be that it is kind of only on a technicality that the separated soul fails aquinas's test for personhood. But really, the soul has all the important features of a person. And those important features are the psychological ones that we modern people value behind. This thought is the idea that of the two criteria for personhood, that Aquinas enumerates, the more important one. The one that makes the soul positively person like is rationality or intellectuality. Whereas the completeness criterion is at best seconded. But does this reflect aquinas's own understanding of personhood? I think it does not. In fact, I think we should be suspicious about the tendency to minimize the importance of the completeness criterion for personhood. Suspicious that we are reading Aquinas through the lens of our own post lockian intuitions about what a person is. Consider the text from the sentences commentary from the corpus there at the bottom of the front side of your handout. So this is my translation. It must be said that concerning the union of soul to body among the agents, there were two views. One that the soul is united of the body as a complete being to a complete being as though it were in the body as a sailor in a shed. And he goes on to explain the platonic views. The view of Aristotle is otherwise, which all modern thinkers follow modern meaning his time that the soul is united to the body as formed to matter. Once the soul is a part of human nature and not a certain nature in itself, and since the razi of a part is opposed to the razi of a person, as has been said, the separated soul cannot therefore be a curse for although being separated, it is not actually a part. Nevertheless, it has such a nature so as to be apart. Now, we could perhaps interpret this as simply indicating that in order for X to be a person, X must be a part. But it seems to be saying something a bit stronger than that. Namely, the very idea of part hood, the rato of part hood is incompatible with the idea of personhood that suggests and think he has its contrary to, to the rato of a person. This suggests that by aquinas's lights, the separate soul does not fall short of personhood on a mere technicality. Rather, it has a nature that is fundamentally incompatible with the very rcio of personhood. Moreover, on several occasions, Aquinas compares the human soul to bodily parts, often using a hand as his example, in order to illustrate his point that a part cannot be a person consider the next text on the back of the handout. So this is a response to an objection. It must be said that the soul is a part of the human species. And although it may be separated yet since it retains the nature of inability, it cannot be called an individual substance, which is the hypo, the hypothesis or first substance, just as neither can the hand nor any of the parks of men. And this way, neither the definition nor the name of person belongs to it. So Aquinas is repeating comparison of the human soul to bodily pars tends to puzzle moderate commentators for a variety of reasons, but set that aside for a moment on a straightforward reading aquinas's argument. Here goes something like this. The soul is a part of a rational substance, not a rational substance itself. Likewise, a human hand is a part of a rational substance, not a rational substance itself. But no one would think a hand is a person. Therefore, neither should we think that the soul is a person. What's striking is that Aquinas makes the point by comparing the soul to another part, a part that does not even have an intellectual power. Thus, a post lockian thinker might justly respond. This is an unhelpful comparison because a hand is not person like in any way. Thus, if our intuition is that the human soul is almost a person, this is a terrible argument, but Aquinas doesn't usually make terrible arguments. Moreover, he makes this argument for one very much like it over and over throughout his corpus, and so I think a more charitable interpretation is that Aguas just has different intuitions about what a person is than we do in particular. For him. The fact that the soul has intellectual powers does not make it very person like at all, because it is mine. The completeness condition is every bit as important for the concept of personhood as the rational condition. Hence, Aquinas sees the hand on the soul as more alike than different with respect to personhood. Both are parts of a rational sub substance. Since the Rato part, who is positively opposed to the rato personhood, neither of them is very much like a person. In short, the psychological features of the separated human soul do not impress Aquinas when it comes to the question of personhood in, in the way that they impress us. Although he recognizes that some who skew towards a platonic anthropology might think the soul is very much like a person, Aquinas simply doesn't. And this is because he is intuitively thinking of personhood along bow lions. Whereas in contrast, our modern concept of person puts much more emphasis on a psychological, and this is true even for those of us who are sympathetic with aquinas's anthropology and not with locks or day cards as modern persons, our intuitions about personhood just tend to be different from Aquinas. And so likewise, our intuitions about whether the separated soul is person life also are different. So where does that leave us? it leaves us with what I take to be the most important question. What is the correct concept of personhood? Do? To use a rather overused metaphor, you might say, which concept of personhood cuts reality more closely at the joints? Now, I don't have a subtle view on the answer to that question. However, by way of conclusion, I wanna respond to what I take to be attempting objection to Aquinas's Boian view of personhood. So the objection goes something like this. Look, consciousness and the first person perspective of the subject, it's not a theme in Aquinas. He didn't consider it because it hasn't been, hadn't been explored by thinkers in his time, in the way that it has been explored in the modern era. So it isn't something he took particularly seriously, or based his arguments on this. So the argument goes is a. One that needs filling because the first person conscious perspective is important for philosophical anthropology. It gives us real insight into who we are, hence Aquinas's concept, the persons that aren't to be enhanced by our modern sensitivity to subjective experience. Since it was something Aquinas did not seriously reflect upon, incidentally I that John Paul II held a view, something like this. Aquinas's philosophical topology is very much still relevant, but it needs to be updated and augmented by insights from the modern conception of personhood. Now, I don't think this view is entirely mistaken. It is clearly true that Aquinas does not treat consciousness as a theme and is also true that it plays a far smaller role in his anthropological thought than it would it does in our minds today. And it might be that is a shortcoming, however. It would be a mistake to overlook the important role that first person experience does play from time to time in Aqua is thought. One of the most striking examples of this can be found in question 76 of the first part of Summa Theolog, where he argues that the part of us through which our intellectual powers operates is a form. Take a look at the last text there in your hand, Aquinas says, but if someone says that the intellective soul is not the form of abide, they must find a way to explain how understanding can be the action of this man for each one experiences that it is he himself who understands. But an action is attributed to someone in three ways, et cetera. And the first indeed cannot stand as has been shown because it's the very same man who perceives himself both to understand and to sense. Same man perceives himself to understand and to sense, but sensation cannot occur without a body. Once the body must be a part of the human being, it follows then that the intellect by which Socrates understands is also a part of Socrates, such that the intellect is in some way united to the body of Socrates. So the cornerstone of this argument is a first person subjective experience that Aquinas thinks all of us have. It is the experience that both the action of sensing and the action of understanding is mine. It's I myself, Huan, that I myself, who understand both of these operations are operations of one single substance. And this Aquinas seems to think is an undeniable datum of subjective experience that we all share. This appeal to conscious experience is crucially important for Aquinas's anthropology and for his argument for that anthropology, since it's the way that he excludes the views of those of Abna and Aveos that he claims entail, that it is not really the individual human substance. Is the true subject of understanding since they outsource parts of our understanding to separate substances. So what does this show? it shows that Aquinas does give an indispensable role, which is objective conscious experience in its philosophy of human nature, and it at least qualifies the claim that Aquinas has thought does not take conscious experience seriously as a philosophical data. Of course, this doesn't at all show that aquinas's concept of personhood does not need updating. However, it at least calls me to question whether and to what degree it does, and this has great implications for if, and I mean, only if it turns out that aquinas's concept of personhood already adequately takes into account first person experience. that would call into a question whether the modern emphasis on such experience is on the whole leading us towards or away from a true understanding of what a person is.

1 49:02

We have 10 minutes for questions in which I hope we hear more about the cobbler, formerly known as Prince.

5 49:08

immediate contemporary philosophy and the modern philosophy, the concept person is supposed to do this really important work, right? It's supposed to be like a locus and that moral value and a locus of moral responsibility and so on.

3 49:18

Yeah.

5 49:18

And the concept person, as I understand in Aquinas, is didn't know such work, right? He doesn't put another way in, in, in contemporary philosophy and philosophy since law, we're supposed to be able to say these are the persons over here and these are the persons over here. So it's a kind term, and it also gives us a sort term. We're like, there's this thing and this thing, and are they the same? there's one question. Are they the same body? Are they the same human being? And there's another question, are they the same person?

3 49:44

Yeah.

5 49:45

And. A person isn't doing that kind of work in Aquinas, Aquinas wouldn't be happy saying that I'm both a human being and a person. I mean, you can say that I'm a person, but that's a kind of secondary. Like

6 49:58

I, there's another way of putting a human being and a person a different concepts.

5 50:02

I

6 50:02

think you

5 50:02

could say that I'm both human being

6 50:03

and being on person.

5 50:04

I mean,

6 50:04

you could,

5 50:05

but you're saying default from, You say those two things are, when you say those two things because one of them is saying something about the kind of thing. I'm, it gives the conditions for the existence of this thing over time and so on. And the second one does no such thing. The second one that the, to say that I'm a person really just says something about what it is to be a human being. Right? whereas I think for the modern tradition, the tradition that comes from lock, to say that something is a person is to say something that's on its own significant, it is a way of carving the. The person things from the non-person things. And then to say that something's a person then raises the question whether it's the same person and so on. and I just don't see the concept doing that kind of work in. And so one, one suggestion is, and I think for this, be sympathetic to you, yeah, we should stop letting person do that kind of philosophical work at all. Whereas I think you're right that the tradition that we get after JP two invites us to make person central in just the way that the

6 51:08

Yeah. I mean, that could be one takeaway. And another takeaway could be that like we have just, it's like we have an ation going on really that, that be person one, person two. And I mean, the connection between them is in some ways tenuous or you could argue that it's tenuous. if you're arguing from the perspective of how much work it's doing throughout. Yes. You know, other parts of philosophy. I, I guess, I, no, I think that's a really good point. I guess my, my, I kind of broadened that, my, my shot at the end. but my main, the main thing I'm targeting is this idea that, I don't think people should be so surprised that think separate soul is not a person. I think it just follows. I don't think it's a radical position. It's all human be. Yeah. Yeah. There's a, there were a different concept going on there, but I do think there is still a question of there is something common to our modern conception of personhood and his like, there, it's there, they're continuous with each other. And we have this idea of, I mean, of course for Aquinas and Forus, right? It comes from the understanding of Trinity. That's right. In some ways, that's backwards from Ris understanding the thing we best know first. yeah. No, it's a really, it's a really interesting point I have to think about. Stephen is a.

4 52:15

Student has. Thank you. Yeah, I was just gonna say something similar to John and just point out that it doesn't seem like there's actually a disagreement so much about person here as it is about the concept of a human being.'cause that's really what's central to Aquinas's argument. that's what's getting him this stuff about the completeness criteria, right? Because he's got the Boi end definition of a person, which doesn't, it doesn't like actually make his case on its own. he has to pull in this stuff about substance and what kind of substance is it? it's a substance of this kind of nature, and that's what leans in and say, this isn't, it can't be a person because it's not a human being in the human system because it's not

6 53:00

complete. Yeah. So

4 53:01

I think the debate is really more about like John is saying, the connection that personhood with human, with what it takes to be a human being. Maybe not so much. Like we've got these two radically different conceptions of personhood and now we have to figure out which one is true. it's really more about is personhood inex inextricably tied to natures in this kind of way that Aquinas thinks that they are?

6 53:27

Yeah. so which is a little bit of a different question, the question of what a human being is, right? Because I think for Aquinas, it's clearly what a human being is what's telling the card.

1 53:35

Exactly. Yeah.

6 53:35

It's not, it doesn't decide ahead of time what a person is. yeah, exactly. yeah. exactly. But, and although there might be disagreements with various modern points of view, I mean, we don't disagree with on what a human person is, what a human being is. but I take it that the second part of your point was a little, put it a little bit differently, which is that,

4 53:53

I'm losing track of it. there, there might be a way of gaining some traction in the debate. If you think of it as a debate between modern conceptions and Aquinas is conception, personhood way of gaining some traction? If you say, you guys over here, the moderns, do you think of human beings in the same way as Aquinas does? Yeah. And if you do, then that should push you to this kind of conception about, about,

6 54:15

yeah. but you, I think it doesn't push you there because I'm really not, I'm really not talking to people outside the domestic tradition with this talk. I mean, my, my point is that I too feel this, the pull that you know, conscious awareness is really important to personhood more than appliance makes it. But I guess I'm trying to acknowledge that he doesn't agree, at least it doesn't seem like his intuitions go the same direction. because he has a different concept of personhood Maybe. Certainly the concept is different. But the question is what, you know, what to do about it? You know, what, whether it's whether we should stop using, see, I think stopping, using personhood for like ethical things and stuff like that is downstream of the concept of person itself. and ultimately I think we, we have to first figure out what we mean by a person or what we should mean by a person before we can decide whether what it put to, to use in those ways. I'm not saying every I, people may have recent top derby sometimes too, on side. Yeah. No, thank you. Okay.

8 55:15

I'm sure if I add anything useful to this conversation, but I will say it anyway. so far the discussion on perfectly has evolved around self-consciousness and things like that, right? There's another aspect attached to personhood, which has to do with re being relational and as something that is constitutive of who you are. And now I'm sure if that in any way helps to make Yeah. Share the discussion and the different way that might be more fruitful. I don't know. I'm just throwing this here.

6 55:43

Yeah. I think that the aspect of personhood is much more emphasized in, in the modern context. and I think that gets thrown into the bin of things that have to be evaluated is to, to what extent should we understand the person that's related? I mean, human being is to live in relationship with each other, right? that, that's clear, but should be separated souls right. In a different way. so how does that play into this? I'm not sure, but I do associate it more with a modern conception.

8 56:15

I was ty it with actually Trinitarian theology. So with what? Trinitarian theology. Yeah. I mean that was my kind of Yeah. Point of the puzzle. So not so much what more competition is about.

6 56:25

Yeah. We have to be careful with that too though, because the relationship define the persons in that case, that's not the case for us. Individual, individual substance. yeah,

1 56:34

I think we should cut it because we have Okay. We have a little bit of

6 56:38

time. There's a lot of relief, but thank you. Lemme just say one thing, I am a little suspicious of the belief in definition for precisely the reason. It seems to come from the trinity down, which is the wrong way of, which is just logically an unsafe way of arguing sense. Thank you.

1 56:55

Yes. so our final speaker is Jeremy Schick is assistant Professor of Philosophy at Ohio, Dominican. He received his PhD in philosophy in St. Louis in 2016. He works in medical philosophy of religion, focusing especially on the Aristotelian theory. S the thought of Thomas Aquinas, and he'll be presenting today. this paper is called Bundle Up or Lay Low, Thomas Aquinas on Concrete Particulars.

9 57:21

Okay, thanks everybody for coming. in this presentation, I'm gonna offer some brief thoughts on civil interrelated topics, St. Thomas Aquinas's views on material substances, accidental forms and accidental unity, contemporary theories of concrete particulars, which is sort of contemporary theories about sort of substances and substance like things. And Aquinas was placed among these contemporary theories. My focus here will be on Aquinas's Hypomorphic theory of material Substances as a contemporary theory of concrete, particular sort of inserting him into the contemporary debate, to see, where he fits in there and whether he offers some interesting insights. while I will be highlighting some key interpretive disagreements between scholars of Aquinas, I won't be doing any of the actual interpretive work here. The goal of the paper is twofold to try to better determine where Aquinas views fit within contemporary debates on concrete particulars, and to try to argue that there are some potential problems for one common way of interpreting aquinas's views once we transfer that inter interpretation into the contemporary debate. So it's mostly Aquinas sort of as a contemporary theorist on this debate about, concrete particulars. I have some other papers where I sort of go deep into the text to try to figure out sort of interpretively where should we, put'em in here. And so what I'm sort of thinking about what I'm puzzling through is, let's say right at least two, Interpreting Aquinas on isomorphic theory material substances. I'll explain sort of the difference between these two models that I'm calling them. You have some nice colored pictures in the diagram. If you got one of the colored, diagram. I'll explain the difference between these two ways of interpreting Aquinas, but I'm less interested in this presentation on the interpretive task of figuring out which diagram better maps his view. I'm just saying, these two models, let's think of them as sort of like contemporary theories of concrete particulars and let's see, Setting aside sort of the interpretive sort of motivations, which one should we want to be aquinas's view if we want him to have the right one, something like that. So let's begin with a map of the contemporary debate on concrete particulars. So in the contemporary debate on concrete particulars, a constituent ontology is any theory of concrete particulars that says the properties or forms exist within the objects that possess them, and the objects that possess them do so by including those properties or forms among their metaphysical parts or constituents. In contrast to relational ontology, as any theory of concrete particulars, it says that properties or forms exist outside of the objects that possess them, and the objects that possess them do so by being related via exemplification or instantiation, or even adherence to something outside of themselves. There are two main varieties of constituent ontologies, bundle theories and substratum theories. Bundle theory says that concrete particulars are composed of nothing more than their properties. Substratum theories says that concrete particulars are composed of their properties as well as an underlying substratum in which those properties in here, and there are different views about what that substratum is, whether it's a bare particular, whether it's something else. It seems pretty clear to me that Thomas Aquinas is at least some kind of constituent onologist. According to Aquinas material substances, our best understood is composed of form and matter and form and matter are in turn. Best understood is metaphysical parts or constituents of material substances, right? As we already saw, from Father Redfield talk, right? That he uses the language of powers and totem right to describe the relationship, especially between sort of soul and body and the human being composed to both. So I'm not sort of, that's not doing violence to his work yet. Not yet, we'll see whether I do violence to, Aquinas view later on, but not yet. No violence yet. Okay. So where exactly does Aquinas, has Hilo Morphe theory material substances fall within the contemporary debate then he is Aquinas a bundle theorist or is he closer to a bundle theorist, or is he kind of substratum theorist? Is he closer to sort of, kind of a substratum theory? Is his a pure constituent ontology at all? Or are there elements of a relational ontology in it, even though I think it's clear that he's sort of predominantly or primarily constituent ontologist? Are there also elements of a relational ontology? As it turns out, there are two main models for understanding Aquinas's hi amorphic theory of material substances. The two models diverge on the placement and the mode of possession of accidental forms According to what I'll call the simple model material, substances are composed of prime matter and substantial form and possess their accidental forms by serving as the substratum in which they, in on this model for every accidental form possessed by a material substance, there is some further accidental unity composed of just that accident and the material substance in which that accident adheres. For example, the accidental unity Pale Socrates consists of Socrates and is accidental form of paleness and exists only as long as that accidental form in adheres in Socrates. so proponents of this sort of model that I'm calling the model include folks like Jeffer, Robert Ow, David Berg, Chris Brown are in this camp. According to what I'll call the expanded model. So this is sort of the competition. So one of the things I'm, I've been trying to, uncover is that there is this debate going on what to do with accidents, whether they're inside as parts or external, as sort of like attachments from the outside. And I'm trying to sort of sort this out, lay out the terrain. And here's this really interesting debate that I think everyone sort of appreciate this. This is a big sort of substantive debate, that you guys are having. Okay, so what about the other view? The other main model, and it doesn't mean that these are the only two, but these are sort of like the two main ones that I see. So according to what I'll call the expanded model, material substances are composed of prime matter substantial form and each of their accidental forms. And so possess their accidental forms by having them among their metaphysical parts or constituents. On this model, a material substance possesses both essential metaphysical parts, its manner and metaphysical. Where the essential parts compose the core or the nucleus of the substance, its essence or nature. And the accidental forms surround that core, and I'm imagining, and trying to fill out the model, imagining the accidental forms kind of surround that core in concentric circles. Their proximity to the core determined by their relative importance to the identity, the substance. So to place accidents as parts doesn't mean that they're sort of as core as sort of like the substantial form of prime matter. It also doesn't mean that all accidental forms are have the same degree of importance for the identity, of the substance. So I'm imagining sort of concentric circles, right? So you've got like the proper accidents, the right, right outside the core, and then you've got the, in the nons separable accidents right out that then you go way out here, right? Until these sort of the really sort of like on the periphery accidents, right? the particular outfit I'm wearing, right? Or particular location of the hair's on my head or something like that. Okay. All, so on this model a material, okay. Okay. According to the simple model, Aquinas's Hypomorphic theory of material substances is a kind of substratum theory. Indeed, it's actually a two-tiered substratum theory. There are two sort of layers of substratum, though it also contains elements of a relational ontology from this model. Accidental forms are external to the material substances that is that possess them. Material substances possess such forms by serving as the substratum. In which vein here, according to the expanded model, Aquinas's Hypomorphic theory material substances is a kind of substratum theory in that prime matter serves as the ultimate substratum for all the material substances forms, but it also shares certain similarities with certain varieties of bundle theory, especially nuclear bundle theory, championed by Peter Sinus and shoe. Any elements of relational ontology from this model, accidental forms are internal to the material substances that possess them. Material substances possess all of their forms by including them among their metaphysical parts of constituents. So now, so that's sort of laying the terrain. It's two ways of interpreting Aquinas. they sort of have, and I'm sort of sketching out the pictures of the different models. They disagree mostly on where the accidental forms go, and it's gonna place Aquinas in different, views or different place in the spectrum in contemporary theories of concrete particulars. So we've got there. So basic understanding of the model where that would place Aquinas in the contemporary debate on concrete particulars. Now I'm gonna try to argue, that for as a theory of concrete particulars, there's some reasons to prefer the expanded model over this simple model. Okay. So as a contemporary theory of concrete particulars, I see two potential problems for the simple model. The first major concern is called the problem of extrinsic. And I'm basing both of these problems by problems that are sort of well rehearsed in the literature and theories of concrete particulars. And so what I'm doing is applying them is this is the, if this is Aquinas's view, then he's gonna be susceptible to these sort of other problems that are being discussed in theories of contemp, concrete particulars. So what's the problem of extrinsic ality? So here's the generally how the problem is pitched for other relational ontologies. So according to relational ontologies, properties exist outside of the objects that possess them and the objects that possess them do so by being related in some way to something outside of themselves. What follows from this is that objects possess each of their properties extrinsically. An object is a certain way or has a certain character, not by virtue of itself or anything within itself, but by virtue of how something else is and how the object is related to that thing. For pure relational ontologies, this means that objects possess no intrinsic features whatsoever. There is no way that an object is in itself on its own, separate from its relation to other things. On the simple model of Aquinas is ontology because it's not a pure related ontology, it's only got some elements of it. Material substances are not completely lacking in intrinsic features. Material substances possessed their substantial forms intrinsically and indeed they're prime manner. So any material substance is of a certain essential kind and has a certain essential nature. Intrinsically, however, use an interesting sort of, complication of the simple model. On the simple model, it is still the case that material substances possess no intrinsic accidental features. for example, in a simple model, while it's true that a human being is intrinsically human by virtue of possessing a distinctively human substantial form as one of its metaphysical parts or constituents, a human being is only extrinsically a certain size, shape, and color. This is especially problematic as an interpretation of Aquinas because aquins that material substances are at least in individu by their story. And so we'll follow on the simple model that for individual human beings, the fact that they are particular human beings and that they're the particular human beings, that they're, is an extrinsic fact about them. They're particulars and they're the particulars that they're not in themselves or on their own or separate from their relations to other things by virtue of things outside of themselves and their relations to those things. To put it in another way, on a simple model, human beings turn out to be not only intrinsically very similar to one another, but intrinsically identical. There is no intrinsic difference between one human being and another. Notice that this is not a problem faced by the expanded model. From that model, material substances possess each of their properties or forms what their substantial forms and their accidental forms as metaphysical parts or constituents. As a result in the expanded model, material substances possess each of their properties or forms intrinsically, assuming that to. A human being is a certain color, size, and shape is a certain kind of person and is a particular instance of the kinds human being by virtue of something within itself, and that is a account in favor of the expanded panel. So that's the first major concern. The second major concern is the problem of too many possessors. According to substratum theories, every property of a concrete particular bears a relation to two different things. The concrete particular of which it is a metaphysical partner or constituent, and the substratum in which it adheres. Now, if adherence and constituency are both ways of possessing and thus being characterized by a property, then for every property possessed by some concrete particular, there are actually two things that possess and are thus characterized by that property. The concrete, particular, and it's substratum, for example, for every apple that possesses the property of being red, there are actually two red things there. There's the apple and it's substratum. And for every human being that possesses the property of being human, there are actually two human things there, the human being, and it's substratum. That seems like too many red things, too many humans. We want just one human in your chair. That's enough. Now, substrate theorists can get around this worry by denying that adherence is a way of possessing and thus being characterized by a property. So if an adherence in both, the problem is that if adherence and constituent constituency are both ways of possessing and being characterized by property, so you can get around the worry bite, but denying that one of them is a way to possess a property or be characterized by it. So you can deny that adherence is a way of possessing and thus being characterized by a property for, in that case, only the concrete, particular, and not at substratum will possess and thus be characterized by the relevant property. But for the simple model, this response is unavailable for, according to the simple model, there are and must be two ways to possess accidental forms or properties along the lines of a constituent, ontology and accidental unity possesses its accidental form by constituency, by having that accidental form as one of its metaphysical pars. So Pal Socrates is pale. Along the lines of a relational ontology, a material substance possesses its accidental form by adherence, by serving as the substratum, which that accidental form adheres So pale Socrates. so Socrates is also pale. So Socrates and pale Socrates are both pale to deny that adherence as a way of possessing and thus being characterized by a property would be to deny the material substances possessed and are thus characterized by their accidental forms. It would be to say that strictly speaking, material substances possess no accidental features or properties whatsoever, not intrinsically, not extrinsically, not in any way. Material substances would bear certain relations to other things which possess various accidental features. They would be part of the accident unity, which bear or possess those properties, but they would not possess any of those features themselves, and that seems like the wrong result. It. So it seems like proponents of the simple model should say that for any accidental form or property possessed by a material substance, there are r and d two things that possess that property. The material substance in which that accidental foreman hears and the accident accidental unity of which it is a metaphysical part or a constituent. And so it looks like the simple model faces a too many possessor problem. Notice once again that this is not a problem faced by the expanded model. From the expanded model. There is just one way to possess and thus be characterized by a property, by constituency. A material substance possesses both the substantial form and its accidental forms by having them among their metaphysical parts or constituents. And once again, it doesn't mean that they, that those are the constituents in the same way or sort of like the same degree, or they're in the same location within the interior structure of the substance, but they're both owned by constituency. And so it's both sort of, there's one simple analysis for how it owns or possesses or is characterized by both the types of forms that it possesses on this model, substantial forms in here in prime matter, and accidental forms in here in essences or natures understanding the essence or nature of material substance to consist of its prime matter, or more precisely its common matter and its substantial form. Here adherence is not to be understood as a mode of property possession. proponents of the expanded model could sometimes talk about adherence, but it isn't gonna be understood as that's a way of owning the property. Here. Adherence will merely be a mode of placement, a way of specifying the internal structural of material substances right on the expanded mile to save the accidental form in heres in the substance or in heres, sort of with respect to any of sort of the other sort of parts, within the substance. It's just forced to sort of identify its location within the internal structure of that substance. You know, like the leg bone is connected to the hip bone, that sort of thing that's all in here means on the expanded model. Importantly, the expanded model need not be committed to the claim that adherence is a about of property position. It's just sort of a locational not notion for, unlike the simple model, it can account for all required instances of property possession in terms of constituency. And because the expanded model avoids both of these concerns for the simple model. That gives us two good reasons to prefer that model as a contemporary theory of concrete particulars. That's like holding all the interpretive claims. if there's a stalemate in terms of what aquinas's texts actually say. Here's like some contemporary reasons to hope that he sort of like he, that his view is actually sort of the experimental, it would be better for all of us, if you were proponent of the expanded model. that's what I'm sort of trying to push is there are sort of like these, counterintuitive implications of the simple model, which aren't, I've argued aren't counterintuitive implications of the expanded model. Okay. Lemme do it another time.

1 1:12:31

Four minute left.

9 1:12:32

Okay. I'll talk a little bit about, I'll respond to then sort of like I've sketched out the distinction between the models. I've violently inserted the coin this into contemporary debate on concrete particulars. and then I've talked about some reasons to before the expanded model and a few of the minutes I have left, I'll talk about a little bit of, a few responses. I've received to these arguments and some of which I think I have a good answer to, some of which I'm not sure that'll be interesting. Okay, so here's the first rejoinder. The extrinsically objection operates on an understanding of irin of intrinsic according to which only that which is included or contained within a thing is intrinsic to it. And that understanding any of the accidental forms of material substance on the simple model are indeed extrinsic. But there's another way of understanding intrinsic, according to which anything that is caused or produced by the internal principles of a thing are intrinsic. And indeed, I'm interested if there are other sort of understandings of intrinsic, which is gonna avoid the worry that I pitched for the simple model. And on that understanding on the intrinsic, as produced or caused by the internal principles of the thing, some of the accidents of a material substance would indeed count as intrinsic on. So that's gonna help a little bit, but I'm not sure that it's gonna count for all of them. Maybe even sort of like on that account, you could only say that the proper accidents would be caused or produced by the internal principles of the thing. Some of the other accidents are still sort of gonna be sort of, they're gonna come from the outside. They're gonna remain on the outside on the simple view. And so a lot of those accidents are still gonna count as extrinsic. Okay, here's a second. Rejoiner. Here's another sort of, reply I've received. So while on Aquinas's account, a material individuation, certain accidents falling under the category of quantity do play a role in the individuation of material substances. The role that they play has been mischaracterized. this is the objection. These accidents individuate the material substance to which they belong, not simply by inhering in them from the outside, but by reaching in and individuating the very matter of which the substance is composed, which matter is even on a simple model, a metaphysical part, or a constituent of that substance. So properly understood. A crime says account on material individuation does not have the result that on the simple model material substances belonging to a common species are intrinsically identical. They will be numerically distinct by virtue of the numerically distinct as their matter, which as a metaphysical compar constituent is intrinsic to that. I think that's a nice sort of, reply. here's my response to the objection. First, because of the matter of which a material substance is com is composed, is individualized by something outside of that substance. There's still a sense in which on the simple model, a material substance owes its individuality to something outside of itself. And so in that sense, material substances are the same species are still extrinsically nu numerically distinct from one another. Second, even if it turned out that on the simple model two material substances are the same species are intrinsically, numerically distinct, it's still gonna be the case that they are intrinsically, qualitatively identical, unless we want to say that other accidents reach in and permanently alter the matter or form of material substance. It'll still be the case that any particular material substance is the size, color, shape it is, thinks the particular thoughts that it thinks and performs the particular actions that it does only by virtue of things that are strictly speaking of sight of it, and that these accidental features turn out to be extrinsic facts about material, substance strikes me as the wrong result. I have a couple other, objections, that are featured both in the handout and here we're about to jump to the conclusion. Then we can talk about the other ones on the handout, if you think those are good ones, that I shouldn't have jumped over. Okay. So to sum up everything that I've tried to discuss in the paper, I've distinguished between two competing models for how to understand Aquinas as hypomorphic theory of material substances, which diverge on the placement and the mode of possession of accidental forms. According to the simple model, material, substances are composed of prime matter and substantial form and possess through accidental forms by serving as the substratum in which they, in here according to the expanded model, material substances are composed of prime matter substantial form. And each of their accidental forms and so possess their accidental forms by having them among their metaphysical parts or constituents. With respect to the contemporary debate on concrete particulars on the simple model, Aquinas theory is a kind of substratum theory, though it also contains elements of relational ontology and on the expanded model, Aquinas theory remains a kind of substratum theory, but also has some similarities with certain varieties of bundle theory and issues. Any elements of relational intelligence. I've argued that the expanded model is the preferable model. All all the interpretive issues sort of being equal due to the fact that it successfully avoids two major worries for the simple model. As a theory of concrete particulars the problem of extrinsic in the too many possessors problem. I've also responded to several key rejoinder to my arguments. There's obviously much more to be said here, more to be said about how each model squares with other elements of Aquinas metaphysics. I'm sure you're ready to point out some of those things to me. How it accounts for the inner complexity of accidental unity and things like artifacts and the human soul, and more to be said about which responses to the rejoinder of the objections are the best way to go. and whether after all of that, the expanded model still comes out ahead, but my modest goal here is to have pushed several of these debates forward, even if just a little bit. Thank you.

1 1:17:28

About nine minutes.

7 1:17:30

That is, thank you very much, Senator. That was super insinuating. Appreciate that. Cool. Thanks man. but I'm gonna try to defend the simple model. Cool.

1 1:17:39

Good. So

7 1:17:39

please switch back on it, but so I, my worry is that you might be, there seems to be maybe too much of a dichotomy between the, the simple model and the expanded, expanded model. So it sounded like you were taking intrinsic and part is meaning more or less the same thing. Yeah. and I'm not sure that's right. So like I were trying to defend a simple model I would wanna say. accidents are intrinsic. If what? By intrinsic you mean? If not something that's kinda like stays outside the substance but rather gives it a new secondary accidental being Belong to the substance, diffuses the substance, goes into all that good stuff. Good. But I would not wanna say it's a part, at least not an integral part because understands part is right. You put a part together with another part, then you got a third thing which is not, predictable of either of those parts. So I would think that you would want to say that accidents are intrinsic in a way that like saves the things that you wanna save. Yeah. But are nonetheless not parts in the sense of being building blocks. And I worry that the analytical approach to this sort of thing may like lead to predisposition to think of things in terms of building logs. Yeah. So that'll be my

9 1:18:37

yeah. Proposal shoot there. Oh, there's some really great things there Francis. Thank you for that. a couple things and I should I should be clear on this, right? Sort of like when I use the language of parts, usually sort of the alarms go off'cause it sounds as if Material substances are almost like secondary beings that you start with sort of like these forms, these like these little building blocks, and then you put them together in sort of particular a way, and then you get the material substance that's not entailed by the language apart. it's perfectly consistent with calling them parts that they're sort of like they're posterior or sort of ontologically derivative of the hole, right? So you could say that what is primary is the hole, and actually you have to speak of the accidental forms as parts does not entail, That there's some sort of instance ontologically prior to that substance. no. You could have sort of parts that the inside that are there are parts only almost a, from a decomposition relation, right? It's sort of like you can you start with sort of the primary being the whole substance and you can sort of like divide and distinguish sort of within it sort of these various elements of this being And so that on the one hand, right? So yes, if you're worried about sort of the speaking of accidental forms as parts. Seems to suggest that it gives sort of material, substances, sort of the, secondary being that they're built up out of these, the primary things are really the accidental forms, not entailed by the view. but I should be clear about that. that's not entailed by the language of apart hood. And I don't have in mind that the accidental forms are in some sense sort of like primary or prior to the substance in that sort of way. But your other proposal was a really cool one because I sort of understood, I gave a couple ideas for what it could mean for something to be intrinsic. One thing I said is, if something is apart, then it's intrinsic That at least seems like, a sufficient condition. If something is apart, then it's intrinsic. That seems okay. but then I started are there are other ways sort of which something can be intrinsic without being a part. And I sort of proposed that maybe it's caused sort of by the internal principles of the. is something like, is it's really cool because what you're suggesting is maybe the accidental form. It sort of never enters into the composition of the substance, but in some way it does sort of reach in and modify that substance. Just like the way I said, the individuation is sort of gonna kind of gonna go, maybe each accidental form actually reaches in, right? And I mean, noticeably absent from my approach here, right? Is all this stuff about the actus ascend and sort of how that stuff is gonna go, right? Not that I'm sort of meaning to exclude it, it's just that things would get really complicated if I bring this stuff in. But Francis is that complication is like crucial, right? Because there is a way in which it becomes intrinsic because it does modify the inside of the substance even though it never enters into its composition. That's a really cool suggestion. It would be another way to get it, get the accidents to be more, intrinsic and less on the outside. Because what I'm sort of like worried about on the idea of having the accidental forms on the outside and hearing in, they become more like garments or outfits, right? That the material and those all things seem like extrinsic to me, right? Sort of. but you're right. If they can reach it a little bit more and alter like. In some sense, the very being, not the essential being, but the sort of the some aspect of the things being that makes it much more intrinsic. I really like that suggestion. Thank you, Vincent. Thank you.

4 1:21:27

Excuse. Thanks Jeremy. so I've got a question about the expanded model. And I, so one difference between the models is that in on the expanded model, I am composed of the accidents. but if you're thinking of accidents, in this more contemporary way, it's just like all the extrinsic properties that I might have then, it looks like I might have an infinite number of these. And there does seem something weird about being composed of an infinite number of things. Not just, you know, so you might say, look, you're not com you're not nuclear composed of an infinite number of things. You're not most importantly composed of. But it still seems a little strange. Yeah. That I'm composed by an infinite number of things.

9 1:22:10

Yeah, that's really interesting. So you think that we have an infinite oral vaccine?

4 1:22:14

Yeah. why would it be infinite? because all of the relational properties are gonna count as accidents on your view, Sharon?

9 1:22:20

Yeah. relations are funny. so it depends, you're right. If it depends on what

4 1:22:25

we do with relations, if infinity bothers you, you could just say I'm composed of a shit ton of

9 1:22:31

things to use a technical term. Sure. Yeah. Okay. yeah, Steve. That's right. That's right. It's yeah.

4 1:22:35

Indeed. Seven from David. That's right. You know,

9 1:22:38

that's right.

4 1:22:39

Two feet from John and

9 1:22:41

Oh, yeah. since you really, you are a myriad. That's right.

4 1:22:44

All of those things. Yeah. Yeah. It doesn't seem nearly as weird to say I'm composed of foreman. I'm just saying you're a more complicated guy than other people have appreciated.

9 1:22:52

Don't you just wave

6 1:22:53

your hand and say near came to buffer. Just go away.

9 1:22:56

Yeah. So you're only gonna get an infinite if there're like, I don't think you get an infinite number of parts unless they're an infinite number of other things that does rare relations. That's what I was worried about too. It's depending on, it depends on what we do with relations. you could just say it's sort of like the truth maker for several of the relational sort of predication about me. It's just one, one sort of form that I have. Which you could do it that way. you can severely sort of reduce the number.

4 1:23:23

Yeah. But it's still gonna be a real

9 1:23:24

high

4 1:23:25

number that my particular

9 1:23:26

height. My particular height Is going to make me taller and shorter than all the

4 1:23:30

qualities. All the qualities.

9 1:23:32

That's

4 1:23:32

right.

9 1:23:32

Yeah. There's gonna be lots.

4 1:23:33

I've got a lot of qualities.

9 1:23:34

Indeed. That's right. Yeah. Yeah. So I did not include all your concentric circles on the diagram. That's true. That's true. You're missing some. But

4 1:23:41

does it, and I mean it certainly seems that Aquinas does things like you're composed of form of matter. Yeah. But I guess you would wanna just say, he is just talking about the ways in which you're nuclear composed.

9 1:23:52

Yeah, that's right. That's right. and indeed, right? yeah. If anyone's interested, I got this on the interpretive side of things, there are all these other cool passages where you use the languages of powers to describe the relationship between an accidental form and the substance that possesses it. They're usually not sort of as right out in the open, but there are a lot of other passages in when she does this sort of thing. or it could be sort of a shorthand, you're composed of form and matter and what he means by that, as well as you're composed of al forms and matter at the core, and then also the external forms.

6 1:24:17

So I have a question about this first with joinder. So it seems like this person is,

9 1:24:22

imaginary interlocutor.

6 1:24:23

Yeah. Yeah. So the imaginary interlocutor, so the, I take it what's really different about the two views is first of all, that the forms are internal to the thing and the extended view, and also that they're structured in a way Yeah. They're layers. this seems to change the meaning of intrinsic so that it no longer means internal to it means caused by the principles of it. Yeah. Which results in the structure. And I guess I'm just wondering how is this view still the simple model? I mean, I guess if you just assert, I guess you have this view has extrinsic principles by its definition of extrinsic an intrinsic one. So like rationality will or my rational power That's right. That's right. Will be, an intrinsic principle. That's as it flows from my, to my essence that my air color will be. Extrinsic principle, your

9 1:25:12

visibility, according Yeah. will be intrinsic in the sense it's caused or produced by sort of your internal principles. But it's extrinsic in the sense that it doesn't enter into your composition.

6 1:25:22

But isn't that, I mean, can't the extended model person just say, that's just my view?

9 1:25:25

No, because you're using,

6 1:25:27

now you're using extrinsic differently. Here it was being used as external to the thing.

9 1:25:30

Yeah. That was

6 1:25:31

what differentiated what the, because now you're using it is I agree that some of my

9 1:25:34

yes. So the expanded model can say is, and I have them intrinsic in both senses. Yes. I have the accidental forms as intrinsic in both senses, and I can do that actually with all the accidents. Whereas you have to bring in two senses of intrinsic to even account for some of the accidents as being intrinsic. And even after that, you can't sort of, make all the accidents. So the question is whether the complication of the structure is on the inside or whether it's on the outside, you see in the diagrams, right? You'll get a complicated structure in the simple model because the substance is a part of various, sort of structured individuals. Yeah.

6 1:26:06

I just think both people should use intrinsic tric and in one way

9 1:26:11

Yeah.

6 1:26:11

Stick to it.

9 1:26:12

Oh, yeah. I'm just sort of like that. It seems like this. Yeah. I just want, didn't want it to be the case that I have, like unfairly defined a term. I said, okay, here's the way to define the term, so therefore you have a problem. I wanted to be open to other, I mean, 1, 1, 1 sense of intrinsic is if sort of, if everything else in the universe sort of like no longer exist, would you still have that feature if it's caused by the internal principles of you? Either perhaps. But if it's not, then no.

6 1:26:39

hair color, I mean, yeah, I don't know. I mean, wouldn't I still have a hair color? I mean, I, it's. To exist. It's hard to imagine.

9 1:26:46

Yeah. Yes. And the simple model, right? The point is, it's not a relational property. My hair

6 1:26:50

color be least if you're

9 1:26:51

constituent. But on the simple model, it is relational. It's sort of like you wearing a garment or you wearing a hat. Even your hair color is like that. Yeah. So really right. If we do get rid of everything but you, then you wouldn't have those excellence anymore on the simple model. Yeah. Expand.

1 1:27:09

So unfortunately, I'm gonna have to interrupt you. Let's thank our panelists.