Aquinas at 800, Part 7: The Law of Love

Episode Topic: The Law of Love

How is love at work in our lives in a practical way? Contemplate Thomas Aquinas’ thoughts on love, why charity is not just love of God, but also a profound form of friendship, and why the key to understanding love is understanding justice.

Featured Speakers:

• Therese Cory, director of the Jacques Maritain Center and the John and Jean Oesterle Associate Professor of Thomistic Studies at the University of Notre Dame
• Fr. Wojciech Giertych, O.P., Theologian of the Papal Household at the Vatican and Member of the Pontifical Academy of St. Thomas Aquinas
• William C. Mattison ’03 Ph.D., Wilsey Professor of Theology at the University of Notre Dame
• Jean Porter, John A. O’Brien Professor of Theology at the University of Notre Dame

Read this episode's recap over on the University of Notre Dame's open online learning community platform, ThinkND: https://go.nd.edu/fa6403.

This podcast is a part of the ThinkND Series titled Aquinas at 800. 

Thanks for listening! The ThinkND Podcast is brought to you by ThinkND, the University of Notre Dame's online learning community. We connect you with videos, podcasts, articles, courses, and other resources to inspire minds and spark conversations on topics that matter to you — everything from faith and politics, to science, technology, and your career.

• Learn more about ThinkND and register for upcoming live events at think.nd.edu.
• Join our LinkedIn community for updates, episode clips, and more.

Transcript

Welcome and Introduction

1 0:06

Good evening everyone. My name is Therese Corey. I'm the director of the Mari Center and a professor of philosophy here at the University of Notre Dame, and it's my very great pleasure to welcome you to this historic event, Aquinas at 800 ulto, celebrating the 800th anniversary of Aquinas's Birth as we kick off an amazing program for this evening, I want to acknowledge and thank a few people who are the principals of this event. So first, let me thank my faculty co-organizers, bill Madison, Michael Waddell, John O. Callahan, and David Corey. It's truly been a privilege and a joy to work together in conceptualizing and organizing this event, which has sometimes been a little bit like sharing a communal headache. But also a great proof of concept for the amount of electricity that can be generated from philosophers and theologians actually working together. Second, we owe a great debt of gratitude to the proximate efficient causes. Chris in Abnet, the unparalleled program coordinator for the Maritime Center, and Amber Kirk in the back that you've seen already, the Notre Dame event coordinator, whose team has been putting together the logistics behind the scenes for us. Thank you, Amber. This conference grow of a casual hallway conversation and then took on a life and complexity of its own beyond our wildest imaginings, and that would've been completely impossible without Chris and Amber, as well as John Riley, our new graduate assistant. And third, it's a pleasure to thank the many institutions that finance this enormous undertaking as the principles of one of this event's, very necessary material. Cause. And these, these are, we have many of them. You've seen them on the program perhaps already. Um, so I just wanna read them out. The Office of the Provost, the office of the Dean of the College of Arts and Letters, the Office of Mission Engagement and Church Affairs, the Institute for Scholarship in the Liberal Arts, the McMahon Aquinas Chair, and philosophy at St. Mary's College. And I especially wanna thank this, president and provost of St. Mary's College, who are here with us tonight for their generous support of this event, the NanoVi Institute for European Studies, the Medieval Institute. The McGrath Institute for Church Life, the dela Center for Ethics and Culture, the Center for Citizenship and Constitutional Government, the Department of Philosophy, the Department of Theology, and the Jacques Maritain Center. Finally, on behalf of all of my co organizers, we are so honored by the participation of all of you, so many presenters and attendees who give form to this event. The scholarly community has truly outdone itself in bringing forth from its treasure house things old and new to celebrate Aquinas. The topics for this conference range over an astonishing breadth, biblical theology, eism, the actus ascend citizenship, the unity of the church, prophetic knowledge, Christology, Trinitarian theology, legal theory, philosophical anthropology, moral philosophy, metaphysics, and even economics and business. The approaches also cover the full range of approaches that animate the Mistic scholarly community. Today we have papers that examine Aquinas in his historic relationship to thinkers like Proles, ENA, or Albert, and papers that draw on the riches of 20th century thinkers like Joel Soane and others, and papers that explore Aquinas's legacy, for instance, in Byzantine theology or in Peru or Tibet papers that apply Aquinas's thought to ethical problems like subsidiarity in business or bio enhancement and papers unpacking difficult aspects of every part of Aquinas's system using every method at our disposal. And what is beautifully illustrated here is on the one hand, the impressively systematic character of Aquinas's thought, but also on the other hand, the ongoing vitality of the scholarly communicated community dedicated to him. And the many ways in which Aquinas's philosophy and theology retains its capacity to inspire and teach us. Even 800 years after his birth. To think about Aquinas is of course the final cause of this conference. And not just to think about Aquinas's thought, but also to celebrate his thought, which for the last eight centuries has been such a gift to the church and to Catholic education, as well as to lovers of wisdom and truth seekers from every corner of the globe by celebrating his thought. We actively participate in it. I hope participation is not too neoplatonic a concept to start us off with.'cause the only thing better than a four cause theory is a four cause theory embedded in a theory of participation. But to participate in Aquinas's thought is to share in his life because as we know from Aquinas, thought is a mode of life and even a participation in the divine life. And sorry, that was another neo platonic notion. I just can't help myself. So as philosophers, theologians, historians, political science economists, whether we take a historical approach to Aquinas's text or seek to bring his thought into conversation with the problems of our time, we are all collaborating over the next few days in acts of bringing Aquinas to renewed life, new births, as it were of his thought into the light of day. What better way could there be to celebrate a birthday? So on behalf of our organizing committee, we're so excited to welcome you here to share this celebration together with you over the next few days, St. Thomas Aquinas. Pray for us. And now it's my pleasure to begin our academic program for this evening, and to introduce the speaker who will deliver our opening remarks. Father. Father Tic is a professor at the Pontifical University of St. Thomas Aquinas and the theologian of the Papal Household appointed by Pope Benedict the 16th in 2006, and continuing in that role under Pope Francis. He's also a consult to the congregation for the Causes of Saints and a consult for the congregation for the doctrine of the faith. I'm also grateful to be able to serve together with him on the Pontifical Academy of St. Thomas Aquinas. In addition, he's been a member of the Polish Province of the Dominican Order for almost 50 years, coming up on an anniversary of his own and did his early studies in philosophy and theology and Krakow at the time when a certain Carl Tiwa was the bishop prior to his appointment at theologian of the papal household. Father Guek also spent many years in service to the Dominican order promoting formation and studies, including associates for the intellectual life. As an expert on the theology and philosophy of Thomas Aquinas father ish has widely published on topics such as faith, grace, law, and the spiritual life. So I just wanna mention two recent books. The Spark of Faith Understanding the Power of Reaching Out to God was published in 2018 on why faith is important and the Mystery of Love was recently published in 2022, A beautiful book on contemplative prayer and cultivating the moral in theological virtues. Both of these books aptly illustrating father ish wonderful ability to draw very deep theological matters into the orbit of daily Christian life in the best mistic tradition. It's an joy and an honor to have Father ish with us today to open our conference with remarks on the significance of Aquinas today. Please help me welcome father ish.

2 8:28

I thank you for the invitation, and I'm delighted to be here. It's my first visit to Notre Dame. I should rather say Notre Dame, but Notre Dame years back teaching in the Angelica. I had an American student who had come to Rome to study theology. She had a degree in biology and was planning to study medicine, but she gave herself a gap year in Rome as she was returning home. She told me that she did not have enough money to pay for extra luggage, so she was not taking the notes of all the classes that she had taken. But she was taking home the notes of my class on fundamental moral theology because she said, now I know what I believe. She came to Rome as a believer, but now she clarified things in her mind about her faith. I told her that it was not made that she has to credit, but St. Thomas Aquinas, who's teaching I was trying to follow, Peter Burke, placed the line. Ignorance is a social creation like knowledge as the motto of his book on the history of ignorance. Ignorance of the truths of faith is a particular social phenomenon. The result of disastrous pastoral practices that have left countless faithful in the fog. As a result, they may, they have maybe an active, an active faith. They have some religious practice. They often attribute their credence to emotions, but they cannot say that they hold these truths since they do not have convictions within their faith. this enables them from making decisions that would include within them a conscious openness to the mysterious, yet real and assisting grace of God. And when one does not believe that divine help is real and can be counted on, then there is the temptation to escape from truth in particular when it turns out to be demanding. Failure to bring in the power of God into action leads to permanent doubts. Skepticism and maybe even finally nihilism. Persistence in ignorance about Syl truths keeps the mind in confusion, and it profoundly wounds the intellectual, moral, and spiritual life. Aquinas whose 800 years, years old, gifts to the church and humanity we are about to celebrate helps enormously in the furnishing of the mind, both on the level of the pure rationality and of faith. Although of course for him, the transmission of sacred doctrine that illuminates the weight of salvation was the most important task. With his precise, clear, and liberated mind, he was able to probe the maximum of what can be known by the thinking mind, both within faith and outside it. In his studies, he was searching for the root of troops, trying to know their underlying reasons, because he knew that a mere presentation of true statements, but without in-depth understanding leaves the head empty. This being said, we have to be aware of some limitations of aquinas's synthesis. In his entire corpus, there are no children. He rarely wrote about women, and when he did, he assigned to them a silent role. Even Mary pondering the mysteries did not have wisdom for teaching because Aquinas said this is not appropriate for the female sex, although she did have the wisdom of contemplation. Also, in Aquinas, there is hardly any reference to development. His vision seems to be static from the highest level, although the scholastic method that he used seriously treating the views of those with whom he disagreed at some point is a great score, teaching how to arrive at a precise formulation of truth. But Aquinas rarely discussed the stages of intellectual and spiritual growth, even though he reflected upon the opposite of virtues, explaining exactly their contrary sins, he did not really teach how to proceed in virtue and how to individuate resistances against the plenitude of faith that will be typical in a given society. He did not offer a pastoral theology that would show how to deal with such resistances, how to undo intellectual and emotional blockages and open up to the flourishing of grace. His regard was not sociological and not that of experimental psychology built upon observation. His psychology also that of moral action within grace or against it is metaphysical aimed at grasping the essential structures of the acting psyche. The noticing of this is not an accusation against our angelic doctor. In fact, the holding onto the essentials that Aquinas gives allows for a subsequent working out of a moral theology that being conscious of the basic structures of being finds in them an important and necessary grounding. And so further work has to be done. In his entire academic career, Aquinas was not observing the world and its challenges. His sight was reaching out beyond the world, towards the living guard. For him, God was the most important subject matter of his study. Not only the question of the existence of God, but also the articulation of the creative salvific and redemptive action of God that transforms everything whenever a living relationship with him is maintained in faith, commenting the scriptures acquiring a studied God. And then with his precise speculative theological fault, he tried to unravel the implications of the divine engagement in human affairs, reflecting upon the line of Saint Paul who said that in the body of Christ lives the fullness of divinity. Colossians chapter two, Aquinas made an important distinction specifying free modes of being of God. First, there is the general creative presence of God by way of immensity, explained not very logically as being through power, presence and essence. Second, there is the presence of God by grace in saints. And finally, there is the third mode of presence of God that is corporal and unique in the hypostatic union of Christ, and by way of extension in the sacraments. Thus, we can say that God being everywhere is present in all created reality, including the metal or wood outta which a tabernacle is constructed in a different way. God is present in the soul of the believer who's praying in front of the tabernacle. And yet in a different way, God is present in the blessed sacrament that inhabits the tabernacle. Aquinas elaborated on this distinction in the de there. He specified that in the first mode, the power of God extends to all creatures, whereby he grants them being and moves them so that they function in the appropriate way. Thus, the entire creation is naked in front of the eyes of God and depended upon him. But in a special way, God is present in saints, meaning those who are receptive to grace. The power of God is then exercised in the minds of holy people who not only are conserved in being an urge to act as happens in all creatures, but are also converted so that they will know God and love him. Thus we say that God inhabits human minds in a special way. And these are then said to be full of God. This divine influence in the human mind may be lesser or greater. And so there is here room for growth. As we use the received graces, we merit a further grace that enables us to know and love God more and more. But the efficacy of divine power working in the human soul cannot be fully grasped by the human intellect. And so God may unite with individuals in the deeper way than their intellect is capable of understanding. And finally, God is united with the human nature of Christ, not only through the inhabiting of his soul, as happens in saints, but in a unique and special mode in which his human nature is that of the Son of God. This mode of being of God is totally ineffable and beyond our comprehension. We can only view it in wonder Thinkers have been led to notice the creator as they view the richness of creation. Spiritual people can perceive something divine in the acts of charitable people, but that the Son of God who from eternity has the divine nature from the Father, the one through whom all things were made from a moment in time, in an astounding way, has assumed human nature and continues to be present in the sacraments. This is something that philosophers could not imagine. Every path of the human nature of Jesus Christ can be said to be that of the Son of God, and whatever he did or suffered may be attributed to the son of God who is God's word. This threefold distinction of the ways of being of God seems to be the rationale for the division of the summa of theology. The entire summa, as is specified in the opening question, deals with God in the prima parts. Aquinas looks into the mystery of God in himself and in free persons, and then he views the creative working of God. Thus, the anthropology that we find in the prima past views humanity as a fruit of the creative action of God. This could be described as a philosophical anthropology, but it is presented in a theological context that of creation. Nature is a philosophical concept, but creation is a theological term. Thus, the discernment of the hand of God in the richness of creation. The bringing of the novelty of existence out of nothing is a source of admiration and gratitude. It invites a concern for created reality. Since we have a spiritual nature that exceeds in its curiosity and capacities any other type of being perceived in the created world, we are anxious when the abundance of God's creation is in some way tarnished, or when some species of plants and animals disappear. If we could see living dinosaurs, we would be happy. Since our perception of the vestiges of the blessed trinity in creation would be more awesome. The discovery that God in a specific mode of being is the subject matter of the Secunda Paris of the Summa theology conditions. Its interpretation. The moral section of the Summa is not just an ethical reflection, even though many parts of it satisfy the interest of moral philosophers. Aquinas's study of morality is not a philosophical ethics nor even a theological ethics. It is a moral theology in the deepest meaning of the term. Aquinas is studying God as he's perceptible in faith in the mature, free, creative and acting person animated by divine charity, who then becomes a living icon of God. This is clear from the start, from the prologue of the second. Thus, whenever Aquinas is discussing. That's whether Aquinas is discussing happiness, the ultimate end moral agency involving the reason and the will, the input of the passions, their coordination in the habits, the virtues, intellectual, theological, and moral, the supporting gifts of the Holy Spirit, the graced acts that are the beatitudes all the time. He's studying God as he has perceived through the prism of the individual moved by grace. The interior divine nudging is also supported from without by the divine law in all its forms. And at the end of the prima sequin, Aquinas reiterates and expands upon the role of grace, about which he has, he has been treating all along the und. Und speaks of the same, the presence of God within the saint who is engaging with God. And this elicits the theological and emerge moral virtues and specific vocations in the church. Thus, the moral teaching of Aquinas can be said to be primarily an annunciation rather than a moralization studying God. As he transforms the mind and action of the believer. Aquinas is showing what the second mode of being of God is capable of doing in the receptive soul and how this may transform life in all its dimensions. The study of the 50 model virtues in the second pass is a depiction of the panorama of graced goodness worked out in the soul. The model, this moral synthesis is not exhaustive. In our reflection, we can articulate new virtues unmentioned by Aquinas, in which generous cha, the charitable, uh, charitable gift of self expresses itself. Thus, we may speak of solidarity. Financial transparency, ecological awareness, synod and other personal social and ecclesial virtues. But it is important that we contemplate them not as the work of pian do-gooders, but as the expression of the Fon of God manifesting itself in the intelligent free choice of individuals. Aquinas certainly would not protest about our formulation of new virtue. The third mode of being of God within the unique body and soul of Christ is the subject matter of the TER path. Here we are called to grateful Wonder for his supreme and ineffable. For this supreme and ineffable gift of God, Christ is the image of the invisible father. In his existence life, teaching example, gifts of self, passion, death and resurrection, and in ascending of the Holy Spirit, the invisible divinity has become visible, imaginable, and applicable to human existence. He is the supreme icon of God, and we are called to become icons of that icon. Access to God, to God through Christ's bodily existence is continued in the sacraments, that, in their corporality allow us to touch the divine, not only by faith, but also through physical, physical contact. It is important, however, that we do not confuse the second and the third mode of being of God when the believer becomes more and more focused on God. The entire personality and ethos are transformed. And finally, bystanders seeing good works are immediately inclined to praise. Not the agent but the father who is in heaven. The image of God may then be seen even in the wrinkled face of a Mother re of Koto. But good acts, even though they are expressions of divine charity, are not sacramental. Some charismatic leaders falling into spiritual pride have started to attribute a unique as if sacramental quality to their emotional and physical gestures. This has led to grave abuses. The theological reading of the UND facilitates a liberation from a purely natural palant understanding of morality. The other extreme of identifying grace within human corporality has of course to be avoided. The theological vision of the sanctified man presented by Aquinas useful as it is, thus sometimes generate difficulties. A young seminarian studying about infused virtues, gifts, and beatitudes wonders, where am I in all of this? Aquinas didn't mention, did not explain the stages of growth and the necessary internal struggles, but as he, as he commented, St. Paul's with the FA of the flesh, he did note the fact that God sometimes permits the falling into sin, even mortal sin, so as to free from hidden pride. The synthesis of Aquinas will thus profit from a compliment deriving from Carmelite theology. In the struggles of life, active attempts at purification need to be undertaken, even though they are not very effective. But what is more important are the passive purifications wrought by God himself, and they can be detected and not rejected. The knight, first of the senses and then of the spirit when everything seems to crash. And then a deepening of faith when they are accompanied with prayer are normal In the spiritual life, people go through crises in their personal life, in marriages and vocations and crisis come about in religious communities and diocese and all this is normal. The universal church also goes through a major crisis about once every 400 years. These times of struggle force a decision either towards God on a deeper level or against God, which leads to spiritual ruin. These difficult phases in life are normal and theological training should prepare for them. Aquinas did however mention stages as he wrote about growth in charity, but he did this very simply individuating beginners those who are progressing and the perfect, the analogate for this description is taken from human life, which may be divided into three stages, that of the infant before the age of reason, the child and the adult after puberty capable physiologically of transmitting life. People who are at the third stage of moral life maybe try to follow the rules, but in fact they are often just pushed by events. In reality, they have not yet crossed the threshold of virtue. At the second stage, the virtuous person becomes creative in doing the good. Not because this is required, but simply because it is good. That is why the truly virtuous person is surprising and unpredictable, and those who have arrived at the third stage of charity contribute to the birth of the supernatural life. In others, they are endowed with a spiritual, maternity or paternity. Their life is spiritually fruitful. Can we engage in such a spiritual pilgrimage in life? To do so, we need the wise teaching of our masters studying St. Thomas Aquinas knowledge of the ultimate end of the itinerary of life and the ways of reaching it may be acquired, and this has to be shown to our students. When clear thinking, arriving at truth precisely articulated is developed. This is a support enabling the having of convictions. Aquinas in his intellectual endeavors always tried to reach the qui, the ness of reality. A clear knowledge of that which is essential is then conducive to good living. There is in the church another tradition, going back to Dan Scotus, which focuses on the he the ness of individual reality. It is true that in pastoral ministry, the individual also the one who in many ways is complex, has to be noticed, encouraged and loved. Pope Francis is constantly reminding us of the necessity of openness towards people, whatever has been their way of life. And in the prime contact, people do not like to be pigeon pigeonholed according to some categories. They want to be noticed in their uniqueness, but if we are really to help them, we need not only to charm or express warmth, but we also need to explain, and this is what Aquinas teaching us, teaches us then our students, the students of Aquinas will know what they believe made a study and transmission of the speculative teaching of Aquinas continue at.

Dr. Jean Porter Keynote Address

1 32:45

Thank you Father Tik for that wonderful map of all of the ways in which Aquinas can provide resources for our thinking in moral psychology. I'd like to call Bill Madison up now to the podium to introduce our first keynote speaker.

3 33:05

Well, good evening everybody. Uh, my name is Bill Madison. I'm a the Woolsey professor of Theology and Moral Theology, in particular here at the University of Notre Dame. Uh, welcome to all of you. What a spectacular event. tonight it's my tremendous honor and true privilege to introduce to you this evening, my mentor and doctor, mother, and now colleague and friends, Dr. Jean Porter. So Dr. Porter is the John A. O'Brien, professor of theology here at the University of Notre Dame, where she's teaching in her 35th year on the faculty. She's the author of seemingly countless articles and seven books, uh, beginning with the 1990, the Recovery of Virtue through books on Moral Action, on Natural Law, on Habits, and more recently, justice is a virtue, a mistic perspective. Dr. Porter's trademark is precise, historically attuned and meticulously argued scholarship. She's a scholar, scholar as an indication of the impact of her work on Catholic theology and on the church. Another one of our keynote speakers fathers, Tomas Panino, wrote recently regarding the influence of Dr. Porter's Nature as Reason a Mistic Theory of Natural Law on the International Theological Commissions 2009 document on natural law, which he led as a subcommittee chair. Jean Porter's book was Bedside reading and a major inspiration for that Group's project. Dr. Porter's the only contemporary scholar whose work he describes as such, along with her scholarly excellence. Another trademark of Dr. Porter is her outstanding formation of and generous commitment to her graduate students who litter the field today and litter this room actually tonight from Father Michael Sherwin in Free Borg and now the Mistic Institute in Rome. And Dr. Joe Capi, who's now Dean of the School of Theology and Religious Studies, a Catholic university to faculty here at Notre Dame, where four of her students are her colleagues on the Moral Theology faculty to our Maurice Student students, some of whom are speaking here today, including Kate Lemos and Father Dominic Vener. Uh, Nick Ogle, a perusal of the names of her over 30 doctoral students, reveals that Dr. Porter not only teaches excellence in scholarship. Enables those students to become not clones of her, but their own scholars as to their areas of expertise and their positions on various issues. For these reasons, I would dare to say that no educator of doctoral students today has had more impact on the formation of scholars and moral theology than Dr. Jean Porter. I'd also like to PO tonight an overarching feature of Dr. Jean Porter's work and her impact on our field and the church, and that theme is faithfulness. Dr. Porter's relentless precision is a faithful trust that the true precedes the good, and that the truth will set us free. The patience of her scholarship and contradistinction to a shrillness and immediacy that characterizes so much scholarship today that is subordinated to advocacy, ultimately reflects a trust in the tradition, and most importantly, a trust in God's agency. Her shepherding of her students to their own scholarly projects and excellence reflects a trust in God's non-competitive agency. Dr. Porter's theological scholarship not only ultimately points to God, but is done in a manner that reflects faithfulness to the living God. Tonight we're blessed to see this instrument of God's providence at work doing what she does best, careful scholarship, contributing to a living tradition with a faithful trust in God's providence at work. In that tradition, Dr. Porter's eighth and forthcoming book is tentatively titled The Law of Love, charity and Justice and Aquinas, and tonight she'll provide us a glimpse of that book in her talk, the Law of Love Aquinas, and the Renewal of Moral Theology. So please join me in welcoming Dr. Porter.

4 37:32

Thank you. Sorry, nave. The introduction went too often. Where you out?

The Order of Charity According to Aquinas

Justice and Its Relation to Charity

5 37:37

Thank you so much, bill for that excessively kind, introduction. thank you to all of you for being here. And I, and I want to thank the committee, the organizing committee for the extraordinary honor, uh, of inviting me to speak here. I have been reading St. Thomas for my entire adult life, which is, uh, coming up on 50 years now. My adult life, mind you, not my whole life. I've had the tremendous privilege of working with some of the finest graduate students I, I think you could ever hope to work with. Working with students on every level, with colleagues, uh, and, uh, this is just a wonderful event. I love St. Thomas. I can't help myself. I, you know, I, I know St. Thomas is not perfect, but he's good enough for me and I, and, and I hope in my own very small way, I'm good enough for him too. And, uh, as are we all. So, I'm delighted to be with everyone tonight. I, I'm delighted to be a part of this conference where we're coming together to talk about St. Thomas. So let's talk about St. Thomas. Okay. As I think all of you probably know, Aquinas views charity as a kind of friendship, a friendship with God, first of all, but also, and depending on that, a friendship that extends. Based on the love of God to other people, to everyone potentially, but at least to the people who come into our sphere of life. and that's wonderful. You know, I, I, I think Aquinas's discussion of charity and its practical meaning is one of, not only one of the most profound, but one of the most appealing parts of the summa. But that being said, it also raises questions because Aquinas takes the human and particular character of friendship very seriously and devotes a lot of time to it. And what that means is that contrary to our expectations, the love of charity is a love which in many, which, which really in, in most cases is particular contextualized oriented to an individual's perspective. Uh, and for that reason, unequal. and, and of course if you study ethics in general or Christian ethics in particular. That's going to raise a red flag because we're accustomed to think of morality and also in a different context, Christian Love as quintessentially equal forms of love. So Aquinas takes the primary form of love, which is charity, and he not only admits, but embraces a view according to which this is an, an unequal way of loving. So what are we going to do? Well, Aquinas has a sim, as he generally does, has an answer to the question. And the answer is we look at justice, because for Aquinas, the virtue of justice in contrast to the virtue of charity is a virtue which both presupposes and in a different way aims at equality. Uh, it presupposes that the people involved in an interaction are equals in some fundamental way, and it also aims at maintaining that equality through an equality of exchanges. And if you want to know what that means, practically Aquinas is going to tell you and 124 brief and burning questions in the summa. there's a, and, uh, I can't say I've read them all, but I've read a lot of them, and there's quite a bit there. So, you know, no worries. Right? But there is a worry. and that's what I want to talk about a bit this evening. and my worry is this, that precisely because Aquinas views charity and justice in two disparate ways, one focusing on inequality, the other focusing on equality. He has a version of the old problem of the conflict between love and justice. And I want to emphasize that. I really think this is a problem for Aquinas himself in contrast to a modern problem that we bring to his texts. You know, you, you can bring all kinds of problems to Aquinas. But this is a problem that I think Aquinas's own inner logic generates for him and a problem therefore, that he needs to serve to, to solve for Aquinas. The good cannot be opposed to itself, and for that reason, no virtue can be opposed to another virtue. More specifically, justice is necessary to the operation of charity, while at the same time, justice cannot attain the final end of true love unless it is, I'm sorry, of true virtue unless it is informed by charity. At the same time, charity and Justice are both virtues of the will and as such, they are both other regarding and key part or entirely. For this reason, it is at least plausible that charity and justice might come into conflict since each virtue is concerned with other regarding norms in part or completely nonetheless, given his overall understanding of the virtues and the good more generally. Aquinas cannot admit that there is any real conflict between these other regarding norms. To do so would be tantamount to admitting that he cannot offer a coherent account of the moral life grounded in the principles that he himself identifies as central to his project. Given all this, why should we take Aquinas's account of charity and justice seriously as the central elements of a viable moral theology? Today, I hope to answer this question in a longer project, which Bill mentioned and to anticipate. I will argue that the key to understanding Aquinas's reconciliation of charity and justice lies in the claim that these two virtues represent distinctive developments and expressions, or as he would say, distinctive, perfect of our natural love for one another. Seen in this light, charity and justice offer different perspectives on the ordering of love and the value of equality. They represent two distinctive yet complimentary ways of actualizing our natural inclinations to love ourselves and each other, and of course, ultimately God himself. Obviously, I can't develop this line of argument in this paper in any detail. After all, I'm going to write a whole book on it, so you know, it will take a while. Uh, but I hope at least to say enough to indicate why Aquinas's treatments of charity and justice merit sustained attention. Now, I'm not going to go over the basics of Aquinas's theory of, of the virtues and what he says about charity and justice in that context, because I'm pretty sure with this audience, I don't need to do that. Uh, so let me go immediately to the issues by developing a comparison by charity and j uh, of Charity and Justice. Charity and Justice are of course similar in many important respects. Most fundamentally, both are virtues of the will. As such, they pertain to what we might call the agent's relational. Good Aquinas makes this point in the context of explaining why justice and other similar virtues are necessary to the will. And I quote, since the object of the will is the good of reason, proportionate to the will. The will does not need to be perfected by virtue with respect to this object. But if a good confronts, the one who is willing of such a kind, is to go beyond what is proportionate to the one willing, either with respect to the whole of humankind, such as divine good, which transcends the limits of human nature or with respect to the individual such as the good of the neighbor. At this point, the will needs virtue and therefore these sorts of virtues which orient the desire of the human person to God or to the neighbor, are in the will as their subject and as such, such as charity justice and other virtues of this kind. A client is a point, depends on the claim, depend defended earlier in the Summa that the will, which is the appetite corresponding to the intellectual powers, is naturally oriented towards the agent's overall good and perfection in accordance with whatever the agent takes that to be. In contrast, the sense eight appetites, namely the desiring and irascible passions are naturally oriented towards particular goods as perceived through the sense eight intellect. In other words, the per the passions are innately oriented towards per pursuing particular satisfactions and avoiding particular noxious objects. Whereas the will is oriented towards pursuing the agent's own overall good. In accordance with some reasoned idea of what that means at each level. Virtuous formation of the appetites has the effect of directing them towards a more comprehensive good at a stage beyond the good towards which they are naturally oriented. Thus through the virtues of the passions are oriented towards the overall good of the agent, whereas the virtues of the will of the will direct the will, which already is oriented towards the person's good towards right relations to that which lies outside the good of the individual. Not only are charity and justice similar in this way in their orientation and effects they necessarily operate together, charity cannot operate effectively unless the faculties of the human person are shaped in such a way as to be responsive to its promptings. For this reason, as I'm sure you all know, all the cardinal virtues are infused together with charity in order to provide the charitable will with faculties that are responsive to its commands. At the same time, I would suggest that charity is especially closely interlinked with justice since justice like charity is in other regarding virtue oriented towards right relations with others. Hence, charity and infused justice cannot be inconsistent with one another. It must be possible to harmonize them in such a way that charity can act effectively through infused justice. Moreover, even acquired justice cannot be, uh, incongruent with charity since if it were charity and infused justice might lead to a violation of the demands of acquired justice, or else it might distort the natural appetite of the will in some way. And of course, Aquinas cannot admit either possibility. Co. Relatively Aquinas argues that injustice is a mortal sin because by its nature it violates charity. He says, immortal sin is that which is contradictory to charity through which the soul has life. For every injury inflicted on another is repugnant to charity, which moves us to will the good of the other. And therefore, since injustice always consists in a harm to another. It is clear that to do what is unjust is by its species immortal sin. Clearly, Aquinas is led by the logic of his sources and his own inclinations to interpret charity and justice in such a way as to link them closely together. In fact, each is interpreted in the light of the other, at least to a considerable degree. At the same time, he also distinguishes them the object of charity. That is to say the act towards which charity is oriented is primarily the love of God and secondarily, the love of the neighbor. For God's sake, the object of justice is the use, the right that to towards which the neighbor has a legitimate claim. The virtue of charity is expressed immediately and directly in a comprehensive and unified love for God, oneself, and another, whereas justice is expressed through a, a respect for the critically important, yet limited and ambiguous realm of strict obligations. In the next section, we will try to draw out the main lines of this comparison. So I turn to the second section, charity and justice intention. Here we will focus on the differences and the potential tensions between charity and justice. As Aquinas understands them, we have already noted the key similarities. Both are virtues of the will. Each is an other regarding virtue in the sense that it orients the individual towards right relations with others. Uh, at the same time, they're importantly different and found in fundamental ways. And let's focus now on those differences. Aus together with most of his immediate predecessors and contemporaries, holds that charity implies a uniquely close personal union with God. Aquinas does not take Peter Lombard's view. I by Aquinas this time, I don't think anybody was taking Peter Lombard's view that charity is in fact the Holy Spirit dwelling in the soul. He, he, he identifies it as a virtue. and in order to explain what that mean, he turns to Aristotle and specifically to Aristotle's analysis of friendship. He begins by observing that according to the philosopher, not every love of has the character of friendship, but that love, which is a con accompanied by benevolence when indeed we love someone in such a way as to will good to him. Aquinas goes on to explain that friendship is distinguished in this way from concupiscence, which desires some good for one's own sake, or for the sake of someone else to whom? One wills the good thing. Roughly, the distinction between one's love for a friend and one's love for a great bottle of wine. Aquinas goes on to say that benevolence is a not a sufficient condition for friendship, but it requires a certain mutual love because a friend is friend to a friend. Now, this mutual benevolence is founded on communication of some kind since therefore, there is some communication of the human person to God insofar as he communicates his happiness to us. It is necessary that a certain friendship be established, founded on this communication. Now, the love founded on this communication is charity. Hence, it is clear that charity is a certain friendship of the human person to God. It is worth pausing to consider the logic of Aquinas's argument here. He begins by reminding us that friendship stems from mutual communication. He goes on to remind us that we do in fact enjoy mutual communication with God, grounded in the fact that God has shared his happiness with us. Where is this coming from? You might act well, Aquinas has already defended it in his discussion of grace, which as he says, not only prepares us for the supreme happiness of union with God in the next life, but also confers a share in God's happiness even in this life. Aquinas does not say that God bestows his happiness on us in order to generate a kind of friendship, nor does he say that we exercise charity in order to enjoy God's happiness. Rather given that God has in fact bestowed grace on us in order to enable us to attain union with him. Therefore, we will inevitably enjoy a, a degree of friendship with him even in this life. The friendship that we enjoy through charity is the ultimate expression of grace, while at the same time as the keystone of the infused virtues, it is the habitual principle of love, which brings grace to bear on every aspect of our lives. This brings us directly to the question of inequality. in the questions in the Sauna UNE 26, the question devoted to the order of charity. Aquinas begins by asking whether there is an order in charity and he responds affirmatively, as a philosopher, says, prior Im posterior, are said in accordance with the relation to some principle. Now, the order includes within itself some kind of prior and posterior, hence, it is necessary that where there is some principle, there will be an order. Now, it was said above that the love of charity, which tends to God is to the principle of happiness, is the communication of which the friendship of charity is founded, and therefore it is necessary that those things which are loved through charity follow an order in accordance with their relation to the first principle, which is God. Aquinas just establishes that the love of charity is ordered by its relation to God. Who in who initiates that fellowship and happiness, that grounds the friendship of charity. And everything that he says about the order of charity follows from this point, as we would expect through charity. We love God above all else. Uh, next, the individual loves herself more than any other person. and then Aquinas goes on to consider the claim that the love of charity should, whether the love of charity should be extended equally to other persons. In response to the question whether one neighbor should be loved more than another. He replies that there are two opinions on this question. According to one view, all neighbors should be loved equally from charity with respect to affection, but not with respect to the exterior effects. He goes on to say that this is unreasonable. For the affection of charity, which is an inclination of grace, is no less ordered than the natural appetite, which is an inclination of nature. For each inclination comes forth from divine wisdom. It is necessary, therefore, that the inclination of grace, which is an affection of charity, be proportioned to those things which are done externally in such a way that we have a more intense affection of charity to those whom we appropriately benefit more greatly. And therefore, it should be said that even according to affection, we ought to love one neighbor more than another. And the argument is because since the principle of love is God and his love for himself, it is necessary that those who are closer than others to this principle should be loved with a greater affection of love in accordance with what was said. Above that, in all things in which we find some principle, the order follows by reference to that principle. Reading further, we see that Aquinas adds a further complication. He has just established that the order of charity implies that we love some neighbors more than others. The argument is that we should have a greater love for those neighbors who are closer to God and therefore more greatly loved by God. In other words, we should love saints more than ordinary people because their sanctity reflects their greater closeness to God. And that is what Aquinas does say. But he goes on to qualify this claim in response to the question whether we ought to love those who are better, more than those who are more closely connected to us. He responds to this question by drawing a distinction between the object of an action and the power of the agent. And on this basis, he distinguishes two ways in which the act of charitable love can be said to be greater or less. Now the diversity of love, which is in accordance with charity in accordance with its species, is considered with respect to the neighbor who is loved in comparison to God. In this sense that from charity, we will a greater good to the one who is closer to God, because granting that charity wills are good to all. That is eternal life, which is one in itself. Nonetheless, it has diverse grades in accordance with diverse levels of participation and beatitude. And this pertains to charity, that it wills that the justice of God be preserved according to which those who are better participate more perfectly in happiness. And this pertains to the species of love because the diverse kinds of love correspond to the diverse goods, which we wish to those whom we love. But the intensity of love is determined by comparison to the person who loves. Accordingly. The human person loves those who are closer to him with a more intense affection, with respect to the good with which he loves them, then he loves those or are better to whom he wishes a greater good. This is a kind of a difficult text actually. I, well, nevermind. It's, it's, it, it's a little bit of, it's, it's not Aquinas at his clearest, but that's okay. But I think his general point is clear enough. The charitable person loves those who are more holy with a greater love in the sense that she wills that they enjoy a greater share of that good, which is foundational to charity, namely be attitude. However, she loves those who are close to her with a more intense affection, more warmly with more intensity and whatever we make of the details of Aquinas's argument here, that seems right. Uh, I, I think most of us would agree that whatever. Feel in our more spiritual moments. Practically speaking, we love most, those we are closest to. And Aquinas would say, yes, that's a greater intensity of love. Uh, not necessarily a greater love in all respects, but, but an important respects in the following articles of this question, Aquinas goes on to analyze the ordering of charity by reference to the diverse ways in which we can be related to one another through Caral origin, family affiliation, or civic and social connection. These relations and the obligations that they generate are complex, as we might expect. Different kinds of affiliation give rise to distinct spheres of love and preference. For example, we ought to love fellow citizens more with respect to those things that pertain to civic society, whereas we ought to love comrades in arms more with respect to military matters. The relations generated by Caral origin. Are more fundamental than either of these. And yet Aquinas says that our obligations to family members are not always, and in every respect overriding Aquinas goes on to work his way through the relations that structure, family life, and the wider society as he understands them. In order to identify the mode of charitable love property to each one, he quickly moves beyond a simple metric of greater and lesser love. Identifying the different respects in which natural relations give rise to loving relations. A father is, in a sense, a principle of origin, and therefore he is more like God, but the son is more a part of the Father, and as such, in this respect, he calls forth a greater love from the Father than he the son has for his father. By the same token, Aquinas says that the father considered as such is more lovable than the mother considered as such, although he is quick to add that in some instances, once Father might be so lacking in virtue. Friendship with him is dissolved or limited. Don't you wish you knew the backstory on that one? One's wife is to be loved with greater intensity than one's parents, but one's parents deserve greater reverence and all these relations of priority can be overridden in cases of extreme or urgent need in which it may be permissible to come to the aid of a stranger before meeting the lesser needs of one's relations. When we turn from aquinas's analysis of the ordering of charity to his treatment of justice, we may think that we are in a different world. We have already touched on some of these differences, but it will be helpful to review them at this point. First and most fundamentally, the virtue of justice, so-called both presupposes and aims at equality. The object of the virtue of justice is the other's use her right. The right is honored through an exchange which preserves the equality of the two parties. It is not always clear what this means in practice, especially since Aquinas extends the scope of justice to include every kind of relation between individuals. Nonetheless, it is clear that justice in contrast to charity, is centrally linked to ideals of equality of both persons and exchanges. And this leads us to another first feature of this virtue, as we have seen. Charity is perspectival in the sense that its proper expressions depend to some extent on the ways in which the agent is situated in relation to others. Justice in contrast is not perspectival. Aquinas makes this point in the context of explaining why justice, unlike the more other moral virtues, aims at a real mean. He says, justice pertains to operations, which consist in exterior things. Where whereas, and in which the right ought to be established, simply speaking and in itself. And therefore, the mean of justice is the same as the real mean, insofar as justice gives to each one, that which is its due neither more nor less. Another point seen in comparison to charity, justice appears to be a distinctively institutional virtue. I don't at all mean to say that justice appears only in institutional context. Aquinas makes it clear that the demands of justice only operate, uh, that the demands of justice arise and operate in every sphere of human life. Nonetheless, justice is distinctively suited to institutional context in a way that charity is not, because justice, in contrast to charity is fundamentally impersonal. For this reason, it is especially relevant to the duties and practices. Attached to the legal and political institutions that dominated western society in Aquinas's time, the prince, the prelate, and the judge all function within a system of interlocking roles and the duties and oblig and obligations attached to each one. The charitable individual, seeks the good of the neighbor without qualification and therefore takes account of the indefinitely, many ways in which a particular interaction might promote or hinder the good of the other justice in contrast response to claims of right, and in some context, this requires the agent to disregard considerations that would otherwise be relevant to the exercise of charity. I don't mean to suggest that the exercise of justice overrides or contradicts the claims of charity, however, the claims of justice do enter into moral considerations of are relevant to the practice of charity. In such a way is to shape what it means to be charitable in a particular situation. I offer an extended example of this in Aquinas's treatment of fraternal correction, uh, seen in contrast with repression of wrongdoers through coercive force. we can talk about that if you like, but I think at this point we'll just skip it. I think you're getting the general idea. And let me turn to my concluding remarks. The line of analysis developed so far would seem to imply that the exercise of justice might be incompatible with charity. The charitable individual motivated by love and friendship to the center, admonishes her with the aim of leading her to repentance. The pre laid in contrast corrects and if necessary, coerces the sinner with the aim of protecting the community as a whole. He does not aim at making the sinner spiritual condition worse, but neither does he allow this kind of concern of concern to stop him. Considered from this standpoint, his action may seem to be, if not contrary to charity, at least indifferent to charity. The same can be said about other activities of someone who is responsible for the wellbeing of the community, especially those activities which involve the use of coercive force to restrain or punish wrong deals. But this conclusion is too quick. Aquinas does recognize that those impositions of authority are sometimes required to use coercive force, but his his point is that those who do so on behalf of the community and its innocent members act justly because they're motivated by concerns for the common good and the innocent. This kind of motivation is proverb to justice and not charity. But the critical point is that it is not contrary to charity either, and therefore charity can command it. This line of reasoning may offer a too easy way to justify violence against one's enemies in defiance of the Lord's command, to love those who hate us. This objection I think would be compelling if Aquinas placed no limits on what can be done in defense of the common good. But Aquinas does place limits on what can be done, even in supposedly just causes. just to mention a couple that seem to me particularly timely and relevant. Uh, in his discussion of warfare, he says that we can never lie to the enemy because we are always obliged to be truthful and to keep faith even with our enemy in times of war. Uh, in his discussion of vindication, he says that it is never permissible to kill the guilty if by doing so, one also kills the innocent. in other words, we're never justified in going into a situation in which we're killing down, in which we're killing innocent people in order to get at the guilty people who may be bound up with them. and I don't need to elaborate on the relevance of that example, I think. so the point is that for Aquinas, justice and charity can work together because considerations of charity enter into our reflections on what counts as justice. Justice, and they allow for us to acknowledge the hard necessities of life, but they also keep us from holding that just because life is hard, therefore anything goes, and, and therefore there are no limits on justice at all. I believe that at the end of the day, Aquinas is able to reconcile the tensions inherent in charity and justice through a careful attention to the proper object of each virtue and the overlapping context within which they operate. He is only able to do so, however, because he regards both charity and justice as perfections of inclinations of natural love that are proper to us as rational creatures. We are naturally inclined to love ourselves. Those who share in our natures the social order, and ultimately, in some way, divine being, charity and justice are oriented towards different ideals. But these can be harmonized because they are grounded in the natural inclinations of the human creature, which are innately in harmony with one another and innately oriented towards the perfection of virtue. The forms of love proper to charity and justice are grounded in and responsive to that which is most fundamentally lovable in the human creature. That is to say the individual and instantiations of human nature and the divinity that it reflects. Believe me, I am in no way denying the necessity and the transforming power of grace. But at the same time, we should never forget that grace both presupposes in the subject and responds in its object to simple humanity. For better or for worse. Aquinas's position is very far from interpretations of Christian Love, which detach it from our human capacity to love and to be loved, and the contingencies through which that capacity is expressed. Thank you very much.

4 1:09:38

A generous amount of time for questions. She's gonna field, uh, questions herself. You think there's two microphones here also. Van has questions. Please, uh, just sign a different felonies and Dr. Porter will, uh, thank you.

Q&A Session: Exploring Aquinas's Views

5 1:09:50

Well, Dr. Porter will try to answer them. Don't over promise. Can, can you get to the microphone, sir? I know it's a bit of a stretch, but it might be hard for me to hear you otherwise.

6 1:10:18

a good question to break the ice. what's the relevance of the distinction between political justice and domestic justice in this, reflection the relationship between charity and justice? I'm sorry, could you repeat that? I, yeah. Justice, Aristo device Justice in Political Justice and Domestic Justice, and Aquinas agrees with that. So what relevance does that have in this reflection? The comparison between charity and justice? That's the

5 1:10:47

right, I, okay. Thank you. I think I understand. I don't think it fundamentally, how can I say? I, I don't think that what the distinction you're pointing to fundamentally undermines the thesis. Uh, it complicates it. Uh, of course Aquinas thinks there are two forms of justice. particular justice and general are, are legal justice, both of which, here's where it gets really fun, both of which are actually particular virtues. Uh, Aquinas refuses to admit there's such a thing as a comprehensive virtuousness of, of general justice. Uh, but they have different objects. Uh, the object of particular justice is the indivi is the right of the individual. The object of general justice is the common good of the community. However, Aquinas also says that the individual who acts in defense of the common good acts in defense of the individuals whose lives are, are bound up in the community. so even though there are two distinct kinds of justice here. They are not so disparate, uh, that you're taking two different attitudes towards people in the process. and concern for the common good is linked to concern for individuals. So I I, I think, I mean actually in the, in the earlier version of the paper, which I, I mercifully spared you, I, I, I, I do talk a little bit about this. I, I do think it works. You just have to sort of keep the co, keep the different complications a little bit straight. Yes, please. Uh, I'm sorry, I think you were next. Please forgive me and then I'll come to you.

7 1:12:19

thank you. so I was wondering about the, in the relationship of the justice to charity, when you have like a pret who is like condemning a sinner to death.

5 1:12:31

Mm-hmm.

7 1:12:31

Um, doesn't Aquinas say that, that's also like, can be done out of charity for the center, because it could. Like act to like call them to repentance, but it also like puts an end to their sin, which is good for their soul.

5 1:12:47

I don't recall any text that says that, but now there's a lot I don't know, and there's a lot I don't remember, you know, so I mean, I'm the easiest person in the world to find Porter dot3@indy.edu. So, you know, send me the reference. What I recall Aquinas is saying is that the individual who commit, who condemns a sinner to death acts out of charity because he loves the common good and the good of the community. He doesn't say that he acts out of cha charity towards the sinner. he's not violating charity. If he did, his act would be immortal sin. But I don't recall any case of Aquinas saying that condemning a sinner is an act of charity to the person being condemned. But as I say, you know, I, I, I could be wrong. So, you know, pop me the text.

7 1:13:42

Okay. I'll, I'll look for it.

5 1:13:43

Right. Thank you. Thank you very much.

8 1:13:45

Yes, please. What would Aquinas say about a spy? Like a spy working for another country?

5 1:13:53

That's a very hard question. And, you know, I've actually talked with people who have conducted pastoral ministry in Washington, DC and no, I mean, honest to God, I have. And, uh, yeah, I mean, one of'em is actually here tonight. I won't name names, but, you know, it, I think this is a very serious, moral and pastoral problem. and I think the devil like Spycraft is in the details. I have to say, I mean, this is me and not Aquinas, uh, you know, we're, we're living in a different world. I have to say that there are some things that we do in pursuit of our security and in defense of our foreign policy that I think simply are not consistent with charity, and should not be done. but there are other more gray areas. Um, I, I've heard people try to explain what goes on in the kinds of deceptions proper to check to spycraft. I maybe it can be made to work, maybe not. God in his mercy has not put me in the position of having to hear the confessions of spies. And so I can't go into more details and I don't want to rule out the whole practice, but I, I, I do think it's very problematic. Yes, father.

2 1:15:25

Three weeks ago I was in Ukraine preaching a retreat to Greek Catholic seminarians. There's many of them because they don't have celibacy. So they were preparing for priesthood and MA and marriage. And some of them came to me asking questions. And this issue was the question which was most often, uh, addressed, um, how to relate the defense of their country. In a moment of terrible aggression with Christian charity, I tried to explain that both virtues are necessary. The defense of the country is justified, but we need to treat the enemy also with charity. And I record what Cardinal, um, KKI told me who had visited the frontline, and he's seen. Doctors who were operating wounded soldiers from both sides. And the doctor was caring also for the wounded of the enemy. Uh, so this question is very, very real. You mentioned the killing of the innocent. I think that is a often, uh, a, a a a thinking that only the military are culpable, whereas the civilians automatically innocent. John Paul II wrote about, um, social sin in the penitent where people are held responsible. For a great evil, which is some sort of ism, communism, capitalism, whatever we may call it, some great, uh, uh, uh, social evil, which is a sum of the individual choices of individuals who support it, either by, silence or by unjust prophet. Huh. What would you say about this understanding of the innocent and the guilty? Huh? The culpable in the context of people who are not directly involved in military action, but yet by their way of being, they support a terrible regime.

5 1:17:34

Regime? I would say that it's wrong. Uh, I, I mean, with all respect. I don't know if you have read, you probably have, how many of you have read John Ford's famous article, the Morality of Obliteration Bombing? Yeah. yeah. I, uh. I think the point that Ford makes and the point that the just war tradition is as it's developed makes on this, is that warfare and, and acts of violence generally are pegged to the act of the person. you responsible for the acts that you carry out. But once you move the zone of responsibility away from individuals, acts, things begin to get very fuzzy. And if guilt and for that matter merit are tied simply to attitudes or to one's place in a collective way of thinking or something of that sort, uh, I think at that point the concepts of of intention and responsibility are just going to start breaking down. and so. No, I, I do not think it is morally justified to attack the innocent. And I think the innocent should be understood here, not in terms of some sort of general standard of moral innocence, because if that were the standard, we, none of us would be innocent ever of anything. innocence is tied more directly to the question of who's a combatant and who's a non-combatant. and I think that is a fundamental tenet of the just war tradition that we should hold onto however difficult it may be. I know you, you work in our office. You bring me my boxes, please.

9 1:19:24

Hello, Dr. Forney. I had a question about the how are we should explain, especially in istic tradition, the institution of human authority, especially as it pertains to tyrants. as it pertains to what, I'm sorry. Tyranny, tyrants. Tyranny, yeah. Um, as Paul says, all human authority comes from God, and Thomas does not seem to separate tyrants from this, and he sees, tyrants as sometimes punishment for the, evils within a particular community. How do we explain how this, aligns with charity as, how do we explain God is acting charitably in this, when he institutes a tyrant or allows a tyrant to be instituted?

5 1:20:07

Well, you know, Aquinas thinks that all ills, natural and moral in some way come from the permission of God. although not, he doesn't think that God directly wills evil. Uh, so, you know, you can say something like, well, if you have a toran, a tyrannical regime, you know, God has permitted this. But what Aquinas is not going to say is that God directly institutes tyranny and that this is his purpose. uh, in fact, Aquinas says, and, and he is not the only one. I mean this, this is a, this is a very important issue in the middle to late 13th century, and a lot of people are weighing in on it. Uh, but Aquinas says that, a tyrannical regime is, is not legitimate. it can be opposed by force of arms if necessary, by the same token. And to take a parallel point, an unjust law does not bind. Uh, so, you know, he's going to take a series of, of pretty, he's going to take a series of pretty strong stands here. Now, how you may ask, or you should ask, so I'll ask it for you. How do we know the difference between a tyrannical and a not tyrannical tyrannical regime? And Aquinas is going to say, well, the difference is that a Tyra, a tyrant is pursuing his own private good, whereas. Someone who is legitimate, a legitimate prince or pre laid is pursu is pursuing the good of the community and the individual. And then he is going to add other things about, the conditions for just authority. I mean, it isn't that simple, but, but that's going to be the key for him. and so that I I, I, have I answered your question? I think I've lost my thread of thought.

4 1:21:54

I think so. Thank you.

5 1:21:55

Well, I appreciate it. Thank you.

4 1:21:57

I think time allows, we have two questions waiting. So now you both asked the board, you address some, you took an out. If you,

5 1:22:05

I think you were next, and then you, okay.

10 1:22:12

So thank you for your talk, in your section on whether man should love other men, more or less. I was wondering. Does God love some? Does God love some, uh, more than others? if so, in what ways does he love them? and uh, more or less so, and if not, how can you love the worst sinner as much as the greatest saint? And then finally, I was wondering the same about angels and whether or not God loves some angels more than others, and, uh, then angels in comparison with, humans and whether he loves men more than angels.

5 1:22:51

Well, professor Corey is doing a paper tomorrow on Angels. So let me defer the angel bit of this to her. I don't know what to say about Angels, but, I mean, there's a lot to be said about the love of God. Everything that we have and everything that we are comes from the love of God. but in this context, what people are referring to usually is the love of God, is expressed to the grace of God. And the basic point is that the greater the grace you receive and the greater the charity that you have, uh, the more God loves you. And the greater charity is not the cause of God's loving you more. It's the result of God's loving you more. This is what it means for God to love you more. Uh, God loves a sinner. consider just as sinner, insofar as God maintains her in existence and, you know, keeps her efficacious, moving in the ne in the causal network and all that sort of thing. But qua sinner, God does not. Love the sinner in the same way as he loves someone in grace. Now, God can rescue you from this. I mean, this is what happens when you repent. but God's love as such is tied to charity and as an effect rather than a cause of God's love. So, I mean, this is the, you you've asked as, as Luther said to Erasmus the one critical question. I mean, this is the deeper layer at which people do get a little bit uneasy about this, because it's tied to Aquinas's views on predestination. but there you are. Uh, as I said to the other young lady, I'm the easiest person in the world to find. So email me if you want to follow up on this.

10 1:24:35

Thank you.

11 1:24:37

Yes, thank you very much. this is just a follow up on the question from that young lady, which is, I was wondering if, um. Something of what she said might just follow logically from some of the commitments you took on. So this is sort of a, a thought about the way in which justice and charity can't be opposed in principle, but you might worry that coercive force that a judge orders to be taken against a vi, you know, offender and all that kind of thing, or in warfare, looks like doing harm to somebody, right? I mean, that's obviously, you're, you're putting them in prison, you're taking away their, their goods, you're killing them. Same thing with soldiers. But you might think for instance, that willing, the common good, loving the common good indirectly includes the good of the people in it. Because you wanna say that the judge or the soldier, even though they're intending to harm somebody, it's not for their ultimate harm or something like that. Right? Punishment is somehow good, in some way. it can't be it because it would look like it would be non beneficent. To intentionally harm another person. Right. And so you might, you might end up being able to have some sort of claim that the harm doesn't set back their ultimate good or is like harm of amputation or something like that. So I was just wondering what you would think about some claim like that. Maybe this is the, God loves some people more than others. Maybe the judge loves the victim more than the other person, but he doesn't love, he doesn't not love either of them. He just loves them in terms of the common good or something like that.

5 1:26:10

Well, yes, I, I, I'm smiling because, I, when I wrote my book on justice, I, I, I started working through everything Aquinas says about harming others. And I can't claim I got through everything, but I hit a lot of it. And, Aquinas will never admit that actions that, that he considers to be in some way due, for example, just punishment. He just won't admit that these are harms. Um, and the reason is, I mean, he understands that, that it's the infliction of a material evil. But the reason he won't admit it's a harm is I really, I mean, this is what I think. Okay. I could be wrong, but what the heck? I'm the one talking. I think what is happening is that Aquinas understands harm in quasi terms, the language he uses for harm in, with respect to justice is the language of, of legal infliction, of a penalty. So when a, so Aquinas has a distinction between true harms and material evils, which are not harms, but it's a, it's a kind, it's this kind of quasi-legal, distinction that builds in some notion of Jew and undue, I, I, I still have to say I have never seen an example of a text in which Aquinas says that punishment or something of that sort is for the good of the person being punished. This is a very popular view in, in some circles today. So it's, and it's by no means a ridiculous view. It's a, it's a view that a lot of people hold. I just don't see it in Aquinas. And, you know, I, I could, as I said to the young lady, I could be wrong and I'm, I'm very happy to be shown text that suggests otherwise. But I think what Aquinas says is that the act in question is an act of justice and charity on behalf of the community or, or the individual. But he's not going to say that it's an act benefiting the individual who's being punished. What he will say is that it is not an unjust harm and therefore it's not contrary to charity. But he's not gonna quite go all the way and say it's an act of charity. And that's how I read what's going on. Okay. Thank you. thank you to everybody for your attention.

4 1:28:31

Lean over here so I can, pardon? Actually switch over here so I can grab the computer.

3 1:28:36

I'm here. So I'm gonna ask you to thank, um, professor Porter one more time with me in a minute. But before we do, uh, just a quick announcement. So many of you may know, and of course many of you may not, that Professor Porter has announced her retirement at the end of this year. So bringing to beautiful culmination a wonderful career in service to the church and the academy and, and so many of us personally. So it seems like a really fitting occasion to, to celebrate her. Um, it's also occasion where we have some of the best optimistic scholars in the world here, this auspicious audience. Um, I'm hearing her opening, keynote for this conference. So, in line with that, I wanted to announce tonight that, oops, this always happens, right? the, the publication in the next couple of months of a fess for Dr. Porter, entitled, as you see up here, love and Virtue, nature and Grace, uh, engaging the work of Gene Porter. So, uh, congratulations. Thank

4 1:29:30

So

7 1:29:43

we go.

3 1:29:58

When this project was conceptualized a couple of years ago, in one sense it was the easiest thing to do in history because we had such great material to work with and so many people who wanted to do it. In another sense, uh, Joe Capi, who's one of the editors and myself, had a very, very difficult job because of course, we could have filled several volumes with just the work of her students who are fantastic and yet even more volumes with, uh, the various interlocutors that she's engaged so robustly and generously throughout her career. So, to try to provide some very small tokens to honor the career, uh, of this, uh, great scholar, we tried to choose a, a small sample of students, a sample of interlocutors. We tried to respect some of the other different, uh, distinctions that G always has done in her career between applied ethics and foundational issues between Catholic scholars and those of who she engaged ecumenically. So here they are up here, including thanks to fathers Tomas, who generously agreed to do the forward, and from where. By the way, the quote from the inter introduction appears tonight. Uh, so thank you to all these scholars and to the many more who've supported and been affected by Jean, uh, and all her work, and most importantly, Jean, thank you for all you've done. Thank God. Bless.

5 1:31:24

Well, I just wanted to, I, I won't prolong this because it's a late night, but I, I want to say thank you, to everyone who is sharing in this moment, and especially thank you to those who contributed. God has given me a great blessing in my students. I, no one could have had better students than I have had and continue to have. And, this is a great life. Really, don't we all know it? To work together as scholars and as teachers, and as stu students together. it's the closest thing to be attitude in this life, and I think we should all be very grateful, to the God of Thomas Aquinas for sowing it on us. Thank you all so much. Goodnight.