Aquinas at 800, Part 9: Participation and Natural Law

Episode Topic: Participation and Natural Law

What is the deep philosophical connection between divine wisdom and human moral reasoning? Professor Rudi te Velde, member of the Pontifical Academy of St. Thomas Aquinas, unveils Aquinas’ revolutionary understanding of natural law as the eternal law profoundly imprinted on rational creatures. Learn how this concept of participation empowers human self-government, offering insight into the source of our deepest ethical principles and the nature of the good life.

Featured Speakers:

• Rudi te Velde, Pontifical Academy of St. Thomas Aquinas

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This podcast is a part of the ThinkND Series titled Aquinas at 800.

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Transcript

Introduction and Speaker Background

0:13

Good afternoon everyone. My name is Michael Waddell. It's been my pleasure to be one of the members of the organizing committee for this conference, and it's my privilege to introduce this afternoon's keynote speaker Rudy Veda. Professor Veda earned his PhD at the Free University Yas, uh, Amsterdam under the supervision of Jan Arten. He has taught at the free University and the University of Amsterdam and held visiting professorships in Taiwan and Columbia. He currently holds a special chair in the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas at the School of Theology of Tilburg University. He's also a member of the Pontifical Academy of St. Thomas Aquinas, and was for many years a member of the TOMA Institute. UREs. Professor Valdis Scholarship has explored an expansive range of themes in Tomism, metaphysics, philosophy of religion, theology, ethics, and anthropology. Though he never strays very far from fundamental questions about God and creation, his first book, participation and substantiality in Thomas Aquinas is, in my opinion, required reading for anyone who wants to understand the neo platonic elements of Aquinas's thought, and everyone should want to understand the neo platonic elements of Aquinas's thought. In this important work, professor Tave provided a compelling reconciliation of what he has described as aquinas's. Basically Aristotelian philosophical orientation with the importance of the metaphysics of participation and Thomas's account of creation. This was no mean feat. His magisterial handling of it earned him a place alongside, or one might even say, ahead of legendary predecessors like Geiger and fau. Since participation in Substantiality, professor Veda has published more than 130 articles in several books, including Aquinas on God, the Divine Science of the Sumit Alogia Metaphysics Between Experience and Transcendence. Thomas Aquinas on metaphysics as a science, and the forthcoming Thomas Aquinas on the Good Moral Life and Happiness Professor TA's addressed this afternoon is entitled Signum Est Ose Participation in Natural Law. Please join me in welcoming him. Thank you, Michael, for this kind of, flattering introduction. it's a great honor to be invited to speak here at this Aquinas at 800. Confidence. 800 years is a long time in terms of human history to outsiders. It may seem astonishing that after such a long time there are still people, uh, reading Aquinas and coming together to discuss his thought. Perhaps the real miracle is that the Thomas we are interested in his thought in this writings remain forever young. one seldom the feeling that his ideas are outdated and coming from far away. This let us read a talk Aquinas. my talk will be on the notion of participation as it is used in the context of Thomas ties on natural law. The in the foundational text on natural law. In the second part of the sum participation plays in a relatively small but important role characteristic of Thomas Synthetic way of thinking. A close look at the use of participation in this context will, I hope, get this access to the general idea of natural law as it is be to be understood both in its relation to court and in its relation to human reason. We find, for example, that in ties on law, natural law is defined as nothing else. The participation of the eternal law in the rational region. In other words, natural law is the eternal law, is the eternal law as participated in the specific region and doubt with reason, which happens to be ourselves. This last word are not important, such reference to the subject for its a purely objective and neutral way of speaking. There's a natural law in Noby, and US human beings. Thomas says, NATO law is this, according to this definition, derived from the eternal law of God and is the normative foundation of practical reason in this role of regulating human acts. It is, I suppose, a familiar definition. The doctrine of law, which has received immense attention in the last 800 years of philosophical and theological engagement with the legacy of Thomas Aquinas. That is why I felt at first a slight hesitation, uh, to talk about natural law here. Perhaps it's just idle pretension to try to add something new to the endless work of interpretation and debate around natural law, and we shall see. but it has struck me that a match of the contemporary literature on natural law ethics, the definition of natural law is rendered in a way that I think is incorrect or at least disputable suggesting a more ian understanding of participation. Rather than authentic, optimistic one. What one often sees in the literature is that the definition has been reformulated in such a way that natural law is said to participate in the eternal law of God. There's not an accidental slip of the tongue. The pre proposition in is used here in the sense of a relationship, of sharing in a transcendent principle. God's law of God's wisdom participation here is understood implicitly, are explicitly in a way that more or less betrays the belief that natural law cannot fulfill its normative role in human life without being related to the eternal law of God. The focus is on the theological dependence of natural law on the transcendent law of God. So participation is understood as being dependent on and receiving from a transcendent principle. I mentioned just one example of this reading of natural law, the well-known iCal splendor of Pope John Pauli, published in 1993. An important theological team in this encyclical role is the dependence of human practical reason on defined wisdom as the source of moral truth. This defined wisdom is found in God's eternal law. The letter argues against, in a quote. A complete sovereignty of reason. And God, with regard to the moral ordering of human life in this world, it criticize, it criticizes the tendency and contemporary moral theology to make natural law a law of human autonomy with denies the fact that, and I vote, NA Law has gold as his order. And that man through the use of his reason, participates in the internal law, which is not for him to establish, end quote, the here we see that the iCal call, uh, speaks of participation, but in a sense that departs from aqua himself and that it emphasizes the dependence on of natural law, the law of human reason on the eternal law of God. The iCal quote, Leo. Leo the 13th, who assert the doubt I quote, the prescriptions of human reason cannot have the force of law unless it where the voice and interpreter of higher reason to visit our spirit and our freedom must be subject. The same text is quoted in the catechism of the Roman Catholic Church in the chapter on the Natural Law of Morality. I must confess that I find this feel problematic, not only as an interpretation of Aquinas, but also as a philosophical position in his own right. It betrays a certain lack of trust in human reason. I think. Of a weakening of the normative force of natural law as the law of practical reason and what follows? I'll propose in the reading of Thomas View of Natural Law with a dual focus, on the relationship between the eternal law of God and natural law on the one hand, and the relationship between nature. That is the nature we are, and the reason on the other, the difficulty of arriving at a satisfactory interpretation of natural law has, I think one of its main causes and how to formulate the precise relationship between the three constitu dimensions of natural law. It is, first of all, a law of a reason, or the first principles of practical reason, and I search the normative foundation of human law, andm. It is also a law of nature that is of human nature, human rational nature, the nature we that we are with the specific theological orientation towards the human good and at the same time is a law of God as creator and governor of the universe. Natural law is therefore law of reason, the law of nature and the law of God who moves every creature from written towards its end and its good. The point I want to make in this talk is that these three dimensions of natural law should not be seen as external to each other to one another, as if reason. Which is in itself a formal principle for ordering. Human action must consult nature in its in tendencies in order to formulate its first precepts, and then to acknowledge God's law as a higher normative function with high enough normative source of the order of nature, which reason must obey. There are rather, I want to suggest different depth dimensions of one law, which is the law of reason through which nature speaks in a certain sense, the nature that we are, and also God, the creator of nature. Now let's just begin with clarifying the meaning of participation in the defining formula of natural law. This formula is introduced in the Circuit article of Question 91. And, uh, the sum, where the question is asked whether there is a natural law in us, huh? In Noby. What Thomas wants to make clear in this text is that there is indeed a natural law in us, and innate moral consciousness call it not so much as distinct from the eternal law, but rather as a sort of modification of the eternal law in the rational re that we are natural law is not so submittal law that comes after the eternal law, as if it were a second in a series of different kinds of law, to explain this modification, the way in which the eternal law is set to be in the human creature. Thomask votes from P for. Many say, who shows us good things to which question, the psalmist replies the light of your faith or Lord is signed upon us. Do this text very dear to Thomas. Eh he mentioned it often and always with particular emphasis on the word Atu, uh, word whose meaning is closely related to Thomas use of participation. Atu, at least participation in this context, has heard a sense of market impressed. The passage from Psalm four is used to illustrate the relationship between the divine light, the light of the divine mind, and the natural light of man one derived from the other. Human nature receives written itself and reflection of the divine light, not in a superficial or external way, but in a form of a natural light that constitutes us and our own intellectual nature. Characteristic of Aquinas position is that nature, in this case, a rational nature, is established in its own imminent order by way of participation. So the impression of God's light, and this becomes our own light part of what we are, and by this we are able to know the truth by ourselves. It's not without reason that Thomas refers to the same text of, uh, Psalm four in his critical reaction of the Palestinian notion of enlightenment, of Illuminatio. he is not so much concerns with dependence or such does not a problem, but with the dependence that of what he is aiming at is a dependence that constitutes the human mind in his own natural light. I quote The light of your face, Lord is written on earth. Uh, this means that the light of natural reason by which we discern what is good and what is evil, which is the function of the natural law, is nothing other than an imprint of impression. And the Latin has impression. Nothing other than precio oppression of the divine light on us. It is evident then that the natural law is nothing other than the participation of the eternal law, in the Russian creature end of French. This is his in rationale. You can see it in the handout. it is not said that CHE participates in the eternal law as if PARTICIP stands for in relation of transcendence. Participation is used here in the sense of receiving an oppression, uh, that becomes part of our created nature. Impressio, that is Thomas translation, translation of the word atu. It is important to see that participation does not mean here only dependence of merely dependence. It is dependence creation, a total dependence that leads to an imminent nature to what we are, to what, what we are in ourselves, to our own reason by which we are able to dis discern what is good and what is evil. It's the light of practical reason that constitute man in his moral aging. She acting by himself and ordering his acts in relation to the human goods. The use of participation in the context of Thomas Aqua Thomas account of natural law entails a complex relationship between transcendence and m and s. There's indeed a full and total dependency on the transcendent principle called the Eternal Law, but not at the expense of what things are in themselves, the nature of their substance. Uh, what I see in Thomas is first of all, an downward movement, a participation in the sense of an impression received from a higher course, whereas as much, whereas a much domestic literature on natural law, the accent is on the opposite avert movement. From the moral law, from the moral law in us, to the eternal law of God on which it depends and from which it is derived. And often a critical agenda is involved. One is interested in showing that in natural law, in human morality based on it, cannot stand on its own. That is not the law of human suffering. Freedom, a freedom which is itself a source of moral norms, but has this theological foundation in God's law. Some speak, some even speak of in disconnection of, of a participated. The since man's free obedience to God's law effectively implies that human reason and will participate in God's wisdom and providence. Often in theological specific theological motive is at work here. One takes a stand against what one sees as a modern and secular conception of natural law. Just a few of natural law without a theological foundation that is without participation in a higher law is advocated. For example, in his book, Aquin Theory of Uh, natural Law, where he wants to argue that, and I quote, Aquinas could provide an account of natural law without any reference to eternal law. There is a conceptual secularism in his theory of natural law, end of God. So in contrast to this view of natural law without eternal law. Stands then the theological position That natural law participates in the eternal law of God in their lives. Its normative power as law from this higher law. Now, the hidden presupposition of both alternatives is that natural law is something different from eternal law. And that eternal law, we refer primarily to God's law, but then the formulation us Thomas, becomes incomprehensible. Natural law is nothing else than the participation of of the eternal law in the Russian creature. Eh, natural law is the eternal law as participated in the, there's not the same as saying that the human reason in its normative role is somehow open to and received from the eternal law of abroad. Nor that natural law functions the law, even in the abstraction from the eternal law. let us now look more closely at, at how Thomas argues from the eternal law to the, from the eternal law to the natural law, or how he introduced the idea of a natural law starting from the eternal law. Two preliminary remarks. first, the Eternal law, insofar as it is identical with God himself, is a no to us. It's known only indirectly through the way in which it's expressed in creatures. This fact makes it difficult, not to say impossible to justify the, the basic precepts of law, but trying to reduce them to the normative content of the eternal law. The eternal law is not accessible apart from how the law of practical reason and how the specific, theological structure of the human creature is taken up in that law. So what God requires of human beings is nothing else done to fulfill their human thi and to live in good, live in good and just life. And this is not something about which we need to be informed by the eternal law itself, since we all know this from the law, that God has inscribed in the hearts of all human beings, the law of our natural reason. So there's no access to the eternal law apart from the natural law in us, and there's not an independent theological justification of the natural law. My second remark is this, the moral law of nature is the law of God, right? This, the law, this okay, but the God of the eternal law is not quite the same as the God of biblical faith who reveals this law and instructs community of believers to his law, how to live in good life if you of their final destination in God. If the eternal law is what God commands us to do, then it isn't command that works through our nature and becomes known as a normative principle in the light of our reason. In this sense, it is known by nature to all human beings irrespective of any particular religious tradition. I like to put it in this way. what I as an rational preacher, master of my own acts, free the will and have to, will is in the deepest sense, not different from what God who created me as a specific human being that I am and doubt that reason and free will, wants me to, will, and to do. In this sense, the eminent law of human reason cannot be Trump by the eternal law as a suffer will of a transcendent God, unless one is confronted with the revelation of God's will, compare the story of Abraham's sacrifice. As in at first side, a clash between the sort order of natural morality and God's will who reveals himself. Now, crucial to our understanding of the concept of eternal law is Thomas distinction between eternal law as such in eternal law as expressed in the order of S. The eternal law as such is the plan of God's reason according to wit co, the whole universe and view of the common good. It is the law of God's providence to which all creatures are subject. And providence is not something that works from without. It works through the inner inclinations and operations of things. And the eternal law then has double mode of existence, as rule a measure. Law in the proce of the world, no such. It exists in God and as ruled, measured law in a derived sense. And as such, it exists in the objects which are ruled, measured by this law. And this, each critic can be said to be and kind of embodiment of eternal law. the eternal law may just be said to be in things, to exist in things or things participate in this law, but not as law. But insofar as the eternal law is expressed in the inclinations of things to the proper acts and end things act in a characteristic way, they see to fulfill the proper end and to realize the good that corresponds to the nature. Uh, what they participate in then is the eternal law, of course, Providence as expressed in the imminent theological order of nature. Participation here means having an imminent impression received from a ENT principle, and the law of providence is expressed in specific inclinations of things to the proper acts and ends. the next step in Thomas' argument concerns the distinctive way in which the rational creature is accepted to God's providence and have part in the eternal law. be careful, have part in eternal law, is subject to God's providence. In a more excellent way, Thomas says in the sense that he even becomes a participant of Providence. There is another occurrence of participation in a formulation Does not so easy to interpret it like other creatures. Human creatures are ruled in their operations, but they also rule themselves in the acts and few of the goods. And this they can be set to exercise in the light of form of providence for themselves and for others. The soul, as God exercise his providence in relation to the universe and his whole, whole. So the human being, the rational creatures, exercise and kind of providence in relation to the domain of human affairs. Human acted on the basis of what I call rational self-government. They act by reason and free will a few of what they judged to be good. And just in this context, participation is used in a more pregnant sense, not only in a basic ontological sense, but even a anodic sense with is hinted at human ous. Eternal law is participated in a more excellent way, namely even as law that is in its proper ruling function. Its impression on the rational ES takes the self-conscious form of knowledge of the participation of the eternal law is received here in a self-reflective form. Of the light of practical reason in which the first normative principles of human actions are naturally known, law is something of reason. Without reason. There's no law. Law is something constituent by reason. Uh, Thomas says, this means I think that the normativity of practical norms has its immediate source and reason, practical reason contains in itself a norm. A first principle of regulation by means of which it can fulfill a task that is to regulate actions that are willed a few of an end and in good. So at first Principle, simple says, simply says, do what is good and avoid what is bad. The good must be done. Rational creatures then have it in themselves moral law, which guides them in the choices they have to make in their lives. They have a normative principle of their own, which is nothing else than eternal law in its self-reflective expression, then the lu. But there's a complication that makes the interpretation of natural law so difficult at this point. Rational creatures are not only irrational and self-reflective, they have a typical double status. As creatures, we are measured in our actions by the eminent law of court's, providence, because providential law embodied in the reality that we are in the form of the natural inclinations to the proper acts and ends. So the human being is not an exception as natural inclination. To its, proper acts and ends, to be the creatures we are with a particular nature and correspondent, corresponding inclinations is not our own choice. At the same time, this law of providence is reflected in the natural law of our reason, uh, by which we ourself govern and measure our acts. We are masters of our actions responsible what we are doing, this is the work of freedom, but what we regulate according to the normative principles of reason is the reality of human life with the specific characteristics is needs, is fulfilling goods. What it means to be a human from what it means to be human. And to live in good human life is not something arbitrary. The first precept of natural law. To do good, to avoid evil cannot remain an abstract formal principle. The good to be done must be specified in the light of the inclinations in their goods that define what a good and fulfilled human life is. Now, the so-called natural inclinations to play an essential role in Thomas doctrine of natural law, the first and basic precepts of natural law are said to be derived or taken from these, these inclinations. How exactly did this done? It's not easy to explain, in my opinion, the relationship between reason and its normative role and natural inclinations is often described in a too external way. Inclinations are not part of nature. Taken in contrast to the dimension of ity and freedom wants you to be careful here to avoid any form of dualism. The inclinations are not simply pre-given to my rational will in a sense. They express exactly what I, at a deeper level of my identity as a human being will and recognize as a human. Good. Now let's try to clarify, first, now let's try to clarify the, the precise relationship between the natural inclinations and the first principle of practical visa. I am, I will take one inclination in particular as example, the inclination to the preservation of life. From the perspective of the LNA wireless, we can say that the natural inclination to preserve life, the inclination we share with all living beings, opens up the field of values associated with life from the perspective of, sorry. Life is a fundamental. Life is a fundamental good that is affirmed in every activity of a living being in natural law. This fundamental respect for life is expressed in commandment, though shall not kill. Now, why? One may wonder is that the percept of natural law is live and good. That must be unconditionally respected, preserved, and promoted, even when it is one's own life. Or is life and good? Precisely. Precisely because it is my life, the life that I possess and therefore have at my disposal. In the latter case, I have a moral duty to respect the life of everyone else and not to harm it, not so much because life in itself is an unconditional good, but because each other per person has an right to his of her own life, and I should not violate that, right? The prohibition against killing people on might argue, would then not apply to one's own life because the contention fact that I exist and live cannot impose a moral obligation on me. Now, this is a typically modern liberal line of reasoning. that in pens, the widespread belief in our culture that in c in certain circum, certain circumstances, people have the right to end their own life possibly with the help of others and what is called assisted suicide. Once only life would not be worth living in all circumstances. But natural law make reason to acknowledge that it is not permissible to take one's own life. The prohibition against killing human beings includes human being, but one is itself, but one is oneself. Now, let's carry on that, the debate between the two positions a little further. Not everyone will be prepared to accept this consequence. Why should people not have the right to end their own life if it is full of mystery and suffering in our secular culture? This is taken for granted by many. Why should it not be moral or less permissible in certain cases when the burden of life has become too heavy to end one's life? Even if one accepts a natural inclination towards the good of life, and we normally see to preserve life and oppose everything that threatens it, does that inclination entail an obligation for me to live and to go on living? Is this what nature wants in earth to live at all cost? Now, it's important to see that for Thomas Nature and its inclinations. Do not immediately and as asserts have the factor of a normative precept. Natural law does not mean that nature itself has the factor of a law or, perhaps one can say that nature wants to live, I mean the nature and earth, but only it only becomes a normative principle concerning the preservation of life when it is taken up by reason and it becomes part of the law of reason. Only Dinka nature be a source of moral obligation. If the object of his inclination is apprehended by reason as good. This is something to be pursued. Nature is not something external to reason, to what I will and have to will. I relate to my nature of my nature, and I accept nature's will to preserve life as my will. if this is the case, then there is, according to NATO law, a sort of practical contradiction in the act of suicide. After all, life is not a limited value to be waived against all the values, one cannot say for the sake of a higher value to which I attach greater importance. I choose to cancel my life. As so far as the actual condition of this life full of unbearable misery makes the pursuit of the higher values, wellbeing, autonomy, meaningful human relationships, et cetera, yeah, are impossible or at least very difficult f for canceling my own life. I simultaneously cancel all other values of life, which I cannot help but firm and acknowledge at the same time. The reason for this is that all other values are only values to the extent that they give meaning and fulfillment to the basic value of life. So in the case of suicide, one no longer wants to live in this way considering admissible condition of this life, and then seeking to cancel this undesirable condition and one cancels one's life. As such, this is what I mean by practical contradiction, by choosing one's own debt, because one's life seems to lack the values according to which it is desirable. One cancels what is necessarily will as ground and meaning of every choice. This life is a fundamental failure that is affirmed in every human act and is understood a briary that means for Thomas naturally, spontaneously as in good to be respected and affirmed by practical reason. Now, when in this context one speaks of a natural inclination to the good of life, nature does not stand for factual, inclination, perceived of otherwise, which lies outside my freely world acts, and which would binds my freedom and external and therefore accidental way. The moral argument cannot be as follows. You want to die. I fully understand your wish, but your nature, which is the work of God, forbids you to carry out this wish. But Because your nature wants to live now, the urge to live, if you formulate it in this way, cannot be external to reveal as if there merely a biological earth to survive, which the will can also possibly eliminate or oppose. it is a natural inclination, an incl in me as a living and physical being, which is included in every freely willed act of my inclination and will to live. Will to live that I have not a free, that I have not freely chosen, but which is never nevertheless my will not. The law is the law of reason. formulating laws and rules to regulate human acts is the work of reason. Work of practical reason in a broader sense, consists in the virtue ordering of human life in the creation of a moral and political order in which the human or in which the human good is to be realized. This is the work of freedom, but it is derived from principles known by nature. In this sense, natural law is a normative foundation of the lecture, Humana. It is the law of reason, UIN reason as the starting point for its discursive and free work of inventing norms of formulating laws. Now I have come to the end of my talk, first on water. The contemporary debate on natural law two positions can be distinguished concerning the relationship between natural law and internal law. According to one, natural law can function perfectly as law, even without God of his eternal law. It allows for a secular interpretation that makes it acceptable and modern secular society. Perhaps in other position. The other position stresses the intrinsic dependence on the internal law of God. No law without God as the ultimate law ever. Now, I hope to have shown that both positions are based on a false assumption. There's no natural law without the eternal law. For natural law is nothing but eternal law as participated in the rational creature. Natural law is the law of rational self-government. Now, what might us serve? What might serve us in conclusion, it is in light of practical reason that the basic orientation to human goods, the reflection of the eternal law in us, gets normative value for our rational self government. Thank you. We have just over 10 minutes for questions. Uh, if you have a question, please approach one of the two microphones on either side of the room and, uh, I'll let Professor Voda, call questions. who else first, if you. Thanks for the very interesting talk. I was wondering if you could comment, you've spoken a lot, it seemed to me of the originative source of the law. Like whether, you know, it's nature, it's the divine. and I'm wondering if you could comment maybe on looking at the end of the law. So if we look at human government, we say that like the authority governs justly for the sake of the body, of the people, for the common good. And I'm wondering if we can maybe contrast that with, uh, the way that divine governance works, which is definitely like for the sake of the natural objects. and that's the natural inclinations you were talking about. But also, and through that, for an extrinsic end, which is God's glory. so I was wondering yeah, if you had any thoughts or comments about how that would impact how we see natural law? Yeah. Okay. Thank you. It's important. Uh, Christians, um, first of all, I didn't discuss, the definition of law that this common good and it's a community, because I think that the definition, the common definition is not, uh, applied in the same sense on the different kinds of law. So it's complicated. the, the, the, the discussions a lot. that's first and second. I restricted myself to what is called an domestic, uh, world, the natural order. so I put, uh, the, the divine law of his revelation, of course, revelation between brackets. maybe that's an, uh, a deadly sin and optimistic I'm not, but sure. But, uh, it's a way of clarifying things better. So what is the end? If you are asking the question, what is the end of the law? Law in the sense of natural law and the human laws based on it, then yeah, one must say it's the, the realizing of the telo of the human being, and that's the human good and whatever, way you may interpret it, it, but the human goat is, is the horizon of, uh, of human action guided by law. That's first. Second, if you want to, give revelation. old Testament, new Testament, the law of Moses, the, and the grace of Jesus Christ. If you want that, make a part of the discussion, then some things will, change. there is not, the human telo has a different sense according to the level of nature and the level of super, the supernatural fulfillment of now there's all, yeah, there's all complications. So I like to keep it simple, but there's a lot more to tell about this. Yeah. Yeah. Thank you professor. very important topic and quite enlightening. I wonder if you could comment on, another aspect that arises in question 94 of the prima sae when it comes to the comparison between. Precept, the principles that are known for speculative reason and the precepts known for practical reason, because, Thomas does something here, which, still perplexes me a bit. and Professor Tette, who happens to be sitting right here, has helped me to think about this, uh, topic quite a bit. it's the distinction between the way that precepts are known, and so we have that, uh, the, those that are per se, not, but then more interestingly, it's with a Enos, right? Because the distinction is between, those that are known Ka omnibus. But then I think most interesting is those are known soli bu Now it seems to me that this is another piece of evidence for the ordering that you are stressing, in this talk. Between the eternal law and the natural law. And so far as, uh, Thomas doesn't go into, I think, I mean, doesn't go into I think satisfactory, satisfactory, explanation, I think of why he's introducing the person notice tuus, in question 94. But it seems to me it has something to do with the fact that it is possible through wisdom to see more clearly those precepts of practical reason precisely as, uh, as a PHUs, so to speak, which is in the natural law that is in every single precept that has to do with practical reason. the wise happens to see it precisely as a participation in the eternal law. And, and maybe that those who are not wise, they can, they still have knowledge of those precept in a way, but in some way, which he doesn't fully disclose or describe at that point. Yeah. Thank you. Uh, very difficult question. article two, there's a second article of question 40 94. One of the most difficult, or in even most intriguing, interesting text, uh, of the whole tweet ties on law. And I read it, uh, often, uh, many times, and I must confess, there are still, uh, elements in it I don't understand. but, uh, the simple idea is, Thomas one, the, the question is concerns about, does the natural law contains one precept of many. Answer is asserts one asserts many in many years. Some kind of articulation of the one and basic precept. and that, and those many, you can't go on end endlessly, endlessly without many, but the many is filled in and the text with help of the incl not virus, but in certain sense is every actor feels you belongs to the natural law. You can say that, but, uh, now, natural law, law of practical visa that the distinction between principles known only by the wise and only, and known by everyone. I can't explain that to you at this moment. I have no answer to Dr. Rest. Maybe some, someone else. but what Thomas is doing is. Now let us, draw a kind of analogy between theoretical reason, theoretical intellect. The first concept of the theoretical intellect is being, and in the light of being immediately, some principles are known where se and the natural valley, the principle of non-contradiction. now in a similar way, you can take practical reason. Practical reason. What is the first concept? The first idea of falling in practical reason. Practical reason. The task of practical reason is regulating human actions, actions, for the sake of an end. And the end has a character of a good, this most important notion of practical reason is the good, the studies not being the good is the first concept of practical reason. The first principle. Immediately, to what is immediately known on the basis of that concept is the good is what all the desire and the bad is what all try to afford to have. So something like that. There's a principle, first principle, and then comes the first precepts, the precept formulates an oath and you must do the good, you must avoid to and with that precept can the practical reason Yeah. Do his work. But, sorry, I can't give you a satisfy answer to the, the principle only known by the vice. Yeah. Yes. Thank you very much for your presentation. my question. You've written excellently in participation and substantiality on Aquinas's, systematic and metaphysical explanation of participation. Do you see that connecting here with his language of participation in the natural law? And if so, how or why not? Not immediately, no. I think this is in different context with different accents in the use of participation. in my dissertation, I, left NA Law outside on consideration as well. The not, this is another important, uh, use of participation in context of doctrine of grace. Grace is nothing else than, participated likeness of God's nature and also kind of, of, systematically important use of participation there. but the basic participation in the metaphysics of Aquinas is about participation in being. So each creature participate, being received from God, and it participates being according to some essence of nature that is helpful. To be created means to be right. Total dependency on the principle of creation. At the same time, the creator has received its own being according to a nature it creates. Its, its constitu an Im imminent order. Now, some elements of that will return in the discussion of natural law, but so, so there was likeness similar to though, does not play a role in, in discussion natural law. Yeah. Okay. We're running short on time and I can't say no to Professor Porter. So we'll just have two last questions. Answer your question. I think mine is pretty simple. I'm just wondering. Sorry. thank you for your talk. I think my question's fairly simple. I'm just wondering how, you know, which natural inclinations are indicators of the eternal law and to be followed? I, yeah, yeah. Very simple. in my, one of my first versions of this text, um, I know, um, uh, I try to explain what the difference was between natural inclination according to Aquinas and how, what makes it notion natural inclination so problematic for us modern people. we don't know that nature and, and natural inclination. For us, it's an inclination, a kind of factual earth of a factual inclination to do something. But it is not following from, um, theologically organized nature. So if Thomas speaks on natural inclination, we would, ask the question. Yeah, but why would a natural inclination, an inclination for the good, eh, since cunt, we all know that all people are inclined to do the bad, to do, to do evil. so there is a lot, lot of, of to say about it. But Thomas speaks in this context about natural inclination. in preposition that, in inclinations are the work of eternal reason in this creative providing, activity.'cause we may traverse, we may put in first in those natural inclinations. In our in are the basic goods, uh, to preserve life. I think it don't need a lot of discussion. yeah. Okay. can you hear me? Yeah. Oh, there we go. Okay. Thank you so much. That was a really interesting talk and this is a subject that a lot of us have been interested in for a long time, and, and it is very difficult. So let, let me make a couple of observations and raise a question. My first observation is that Aquinas doesn't ever say that the inclinations yield precepts. What he says is that the precepts of the natural law are ordered by reference to the inclinations, which makes sense because the inclinations are actually not judgments of reason. They're acts of an appetite. the appetite of the will and the inclinations track the natural objects of the will. So this is how you get order out of the multitude of precepts of the natural law. Second thing, Aquinas says that to every inclination there corresponds a virtue, which says to me, at least, and says to some of us, not all of us, that the inclinations as such and taken in themselves, do not yield norms for action. That there can be good and bad ways of pursuing the inclinations, and you have to understand the virtue proper to each inclination in order to know what those norms are. So those two observations are, to set up the question, can you say a little more about what you think is morally normative about the inclinations and if the inclinations alone are, are not morally normative, what other considerations have to be brought to bear in order to take them as action guiding principles? I call it you famous. Uh, partly is some kind of, of, addition to what I said, and I, totally agree with that, especially about the virtue. But the natural inclination, my point was the natural inclinations in themselves has not a normative failure. They don't represent obligations directly. There is a formulation. Yeah, sorry. So speak about Aquinas in rhythm. 94. this is, I think in very important and difficult formulation. where I read it in Latin, if you don't mind. we are. This text that means in my, it is difficult to interpret it. This, it means that only when the cio, when it is mediated with the law of reason, that the natural inclinations receive an kind of normativity, they must be apprehended by reason, as in good, that volatile, and that makes them threes of natural law. But there's much more to say about this. Of course. Okay, so please join me in thanking, professor.