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Revolutions of Hope, Part 5: Culture War

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Episode Topic: Culture War

In the fight for Ukraine, the front lines extend far beyond the battlefield. A recent Nanovic Institute panel explored the strategic culture war, where symbols, memory, and art are vital tools of national resilience. Discover how Ukraine leverages soft power to define its identity and secure its independent future.

Featured Speakers:

  • Ian Kuijt, Professor of Anthropology, University of Notre Dame
  • Olga Filippova, Associate Professor of Sociology, V.N. Karazin Kharkiv National University
  • Olena Kovalenko, Head of the Academic and Research Department, The Ukrainian Institute
  • Khrystyna Kozak '25 MGA, Researcher, Center for Civilians in Conflict, Ukraine 

Read this episode's recap over on the University of Notre Dame's open online learning community platform, ThinkND: https://go.nd.edu/31a338.

This podcast is a part of the ThinkND Series titled Revolutions of Hope.

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Introduction and Overview

Speaker 10

My name is Ian Kite. I'm going to be shepherding this group of people through their presentations and to sort of, hopefully draw on conversations related to what's been termed sort of cultural wars think in terms of soft power, memory, um, and thinking about identity in some form. very quickly before doing that, I wanted to briefly highlight something, thinking in terms of the conversations that have been going on in terms of hope, in terms of memory, what sort of holds together this group of papers from the different, scholars that we have here, and thinking about it, looking at some of the key words and some of the, the different, the different aspects to this. And in some ways, coming back to some of these brilliant conversations about hope and memory that we've been seeing in so many different ways. and as part of that, I was really struck. By how, by one particular example. And I wanna go to Interspecies moments here for just a second. And thinking in terms of how conversations about reframing hope, reframing memory, have sort of connected together. And the example I want to give is this one. This is Patron, the dog sniffing dog. This is a photograph I took a number of years ago in a very empty street in Cher in an early morning and walking out and seeing this picture of the dog. And of course, for background here, this is, a famous dog now, one of the most famous dogs in, in Ukraine. Obviously that is an emblem of hope, of solidarity, of independence, and of resilience in so many different ways. So much so that when you think about it, this illustration here shows you this. This is a dog that has his own, his own webpage, has his own wiki page, has cartoons that are being designed and sort of the sense of resistance in the sense, especially from this dog being from Cher, this sense of hope and aspiration in a really interesting way. One that brings from my standpoint anyways, as a, as a Canadian, American brings this element of humor that is crystallized in so many different ways. Uh, the comment was made last night. The, the idea of humor and the importance of humor in different ways, and I think that's one of the real strengths of this as an emblem with Patron the Dog in some form. here's an example of patron sniffing out one of his, one of the bombs that he's identified at some point. The other parts to it that I take great pleasure in. Is that there's also an internationalism that is connected to Patron and this broader sense of awareness in so many different ways. So what you can't read here, but you can see with the Wiki page, how many of our pets and dogs have Wiki pages on their own. Not many. If you look at the Wiki page and the photograph, the inset of this cute one, this is Patron getting an award in 2000 June of 2022 from the Irish Kennel Club. So that patron is being recognized for his services. And in terms of Ireland, the other international element to it that I take great pleasure in as a Canadian is that the individual on the right, looking down at Patron, is, is Justin Trudeau, the outgoing Canadian Prime Minister who's been a good friend of Ukraine. So thinking about that as just one of these interesting examples under which you have, even in simple little moments. This construction of memory, the reconstruction of history and memory, because this is what, this is what younger children are growing up with now, is this sense of, this is an active agent, a dog as an active agent, and an emblem of resistance. I find it delightful in so many different ways. Okay. Having said that, if we could go to the first presentation, please. What I'd like to do is introduce our first speaker, and you'll have to excuse me if I bring this over here. and I'm not going to spend a lot of time in introductions because my hope is to hear your words and our conversations that emerge after, rather than the accomplishments that have taken place from our speakers in some form. So please, give a warm welcome for Olga Filippova, who is going to be presenting her paper here.

Olga Filippova: Migration and Memory

Speaker 2

Thank you very much. Thank you, for this opportunity to be here. And, also thank you for coming particularly to this panel. I was not gonna talk about some issue about Doc, but Jan just pushed me to talk, to, give you some, information. I'm now in Finland since March, 22. And I, I'm still affiliated with Harky University and I teach online, but in Finland. I'm so also affiliated with LAN Institute, university of Eastern Finland. And it was not my choice to come to Finland. It was, uh, my Finnish colleague who organized, literally organized salvation operation for us, for me, for my family, and from, for my dog, Winston Corgi Winston. And now he is a big star in this town, city, and many people knows me. Aspo as researcher, but as a Winston's mother because we had among many other research project, we have community based research, uh, um, community based art research project, and we have film. Where is Your Home, Winston? This is film about Ukrainian refugee escaping from war to other countries, particularly to Finland through the eyes of a dog. So hope, friendship, losing home and, constructing new home. And question where is our home is very important. And this hope in this issue, where is our home? Is, is the main stone. Or foundation for, for us to, to sink and, and to, to live. And now I turn, one day, I, I hope you will see this, film. Uh, a couple of days ago we had screening first in the United States, in, uh, university, uh, Indiana University in Bloomington. Hopefully it'll be more wider and someday you can see this film as well. But now I would love to turn to another, my project, uh, I'm involved in right now. And we just started in, last summer. And this project is about migration. Not only physical migration, but also the main issue is, is it possible and if so, how and for what to immigrate into history. Now we have a lot of. Ukrainian war migrants in different countries, and they're not just a bodies in this country. There's also people with knowledge, people with their, uh, perception of past. And it's really very important to see how interaction in this sphere of past a perception of past is going on. Finland is very interesting case in this situation. Finland. Yeah. So, does memory politics matters in migrants integration? And if so, how? And for what? And also, another question is when Ukrainians will come back to Ukraine, what perception, what knowledge they will bring. And what reconsiderations they bring about ourself, about our past, about politics, of memory. So this project, it's a big project, and I'll tell today just a small part of, from this project regard Ukrainians. So regarding Finland context, uh, Finland, uh, became countries, uh, in, in, in nineteens, uh, Finland has shown from the country of immigration to the immigration country. And you can see here numbers of immigrants, uh, but it's data, up to 2021. Now, situation change accordingly. And, uh, still Russian, Russian speaking population consists the majority of minority, minority, migrant minority in Finland. And the second largest group is Ukrainians. And you can see here that, Ukrainians in 2020, first, consists just only 7,000 of, uh, uh, members of Finnish society. And now it's almost such, uh, 30,000. So also regarding context, Finland has the biggest border with Russia in, European Union countries. And also very, history of Finland is, has very common with Ukrainian history as well. So they exist in between two empires, Swedish Empire and Russian Empire. But Finland was lucky to keep their independence, which Ukraine was not able to do at the beginning of 20th century. So, Our project is about how Ukrainians in this new finish, new for them, Finn memory landscape, reconsider Second World War in connected with this current Ukrainian. okay. also regarding context, fin in Finland, uh, in Finland, popular discourse say, do not use term second world war for war academicians, they use this term, but for popular discourse. This is three wars. During that period, winter war, which in post-Soviet and Soviet and post-Soviet society is known as, Finka. Uh, Soviet, uh, union, Finnish war. Yeah. But in fin in, in Finland, it's winter war also, uh, second war is, war of continuation where Finland has to collaborate with Germany. And it was the main point after war decision by Soviet Union how to treat Finland. And, uh, short war. It was Lapland war where Fins had to, to struggle with, German troops in La Plante. So this Winter war continues to shape Finland's collective memory and, for migrants, it's some kind of entrance tickets. So you should share this idea of importance of this winter war. FIS have, like slogan three s of Finnish nationhood. It's CSU Sauna and Bels. CSU is something that it's very difficult to translate. It's like, main basic of Finnish resilience. Resilience, uh, which made things like they are now. So, oh, I'm sorry. Yeah. Another context, which is really very important and has particular influence in Finnish situation is Russia and its perception about second World War, which is in Russia, is great patriotic war. And again, thinking in into account how many Russians are in Finland now, it's really very important to think about this and context of Ukraine regarding politics of memory and Second World War. And this is also very important because Ukrainian migrants were migrants. They brought this perception about Second World War with them, to, to their, host countries. So, in Ukraine, as you know, um, it was shifting in consideration regarding, uh, this, period and from, uh, narratives of great patriotic war. Uh, Ukraine came to narratives of Second World War and, uh, it was not so smoothly for Ukraine, but now we see this, this distancing from this. post-Soviet or Russian narratives of Second War, uh, of, uh, great patriotic war. But in Ukraine, still we have not, uh, solved all the issue regarding second World War. And here you see picture of, uh, memory, main memory, park and iv, and if we have the end of war 1945, but what is about the beginning of war? It's still unclear. So these two numbers, 40, 19, 40, 41, were deleted from this, uh, monument, but new one was not established. And now I turn to, to, to particular result of this research. So, um, we, the main idea of this research is to use sensory ethnography. We bring participants to some memory sites, which is important in finished memory landscape. We have like excursion with a lot of information and after that we conduct, dialogue, dialogue about discussion about what they have seen. And we started with, uh, cemetery in symmetry, uh, in, uh, CT U and eo. And it was really very, uh, important knowledge for Ukrainians. How here are is does not exist among soldiers and officer, uh, which kind of surprise for, Ukrainians. And this is also very important how we'll treat and remember this current war in Ukraine and how. We use this slogan, hero, Slava, but will we have this equality for all heroes? And so Finland give up. Oh my God. Finland give us, uh, this, this very important notion, uh, at all. another very important issue is about winter war and, uh, this, so tear it's winter warm museum. And uh, here you can see two monuments. when we wear there, it was just to read this quotation from our discussion. The main idea is that Ukrainians do not know about this winter war. And Fis use Ukrainians came to Finland. Why Ukrainians? Because it was Ukrainian, uh, division inside of this Red Army troops and, uh, fis use this for Ukrainians. It was kind of shock that we are struggling now. Right now we are struggling, but we participated in some very dark, uh, events and it was really big discussion between Ukrainian group, how we have to, treat this situation. And it brought a lot of consideration, reconsideration, and a lot of, uh, hope as well. well, if I don't have time anymore, I just would like to bring, final point why we have to talk and think about Finnish case and second World War. Many Ukrainians said that Finnish case, Finnish past Finnish history and presence, past and presence give us a lot of hope because Finland lost the territory. Finland was treated very badly after second World War by Soviet Union. But hope was the foundation to make Finland great. And this is kind of hope and example, how we can hope can we live in situation, in dramatic situation. And so hope for prosperity and great country. Sorry, I was not able to say everything I, I was planned probably Winston

Second Presentation: Alina Kolowski

Speaker 3

talk time more. Okay. Thank you very much.

Speaker 10

Um, now our next presenter is Alina Kolowski. please come on up

Speaker 3

and it's just the green button in the red for going back on. Thank you.

Speaker 4

hello to everyone. I'm very privileged to be here today and stand here in front of such distinguished and supportive audience who came here to Notre Dame for such a, uh, extremely important occasion as opening the Ukrainian studies hub. I'll be speaking today as a representative of the Ukrainian Institute, as a practitioner who is working in the very fragile, yet resilient field of, uh, culture diplomacy. So my perspective comes from the field rather than academic desk. and in my talk, I would like to, uh, offer you a few insights. Uh, into the threats, the opportunities that we see in the culture diplomacy as we enter 2025. but before talking about the risks and the opportunities, I would like to say a few words about Ukrainian Institute.'cause we have a few Ukrainian Institute in America, in London, in Sweden. So my Ukrainian Institute is a part of, is affiliated with Ukrainian, uh, ministry of Foreign Affairs. and this is, uh, the institution with the mission, uh, of strengthening Ukraine's International presence through culture diplomacy. It was established in 2018. Here should be the slide already. Yes. It was established in 2018 and, in 17 and operational since 2018. in this three year, in this six years of operation, the team has grown from 10 people to almost 60. We have opened two offices, one in Berlin and one in Paris. Uh, we have, increased our outreach from 100,000 viewers in 2018 to 198 million viewers in 2024. Uh, throughout these six years, we have been working in the art sector such as literature, film, music, performing and visual arts, but also in academic programs in research and analytics. And we have conducted, over 750 projects in 8 87 countries. Uh, so this is a very active and vibrant community who is working, uh, for the culture diplomacy. Simultaneously from 2018, uh, the very concept of culture diplomacy, uh, gradually gained recognition in Ukraine, both in Ukraine's public discourse, but also in policymaking. Uh, and today it forms a cornerstone of MFA's public diplomacy strategy for 2125. I'll briefly discuss the threats, uh, and I will start from, something that I call a challenged agency. so first and most pressing challenge is chronic underfunding of culture. And culture in Ukraine has historically been a low budgetary priority. So when the cuts were happening in times of crisises, it was the culture to be cut first. since 2022, the sector survived largely thanks to the support of foreign partners and donors, who support now often surpasses state funding three to four times over. And on this map, you will see the budget of Ukrainian Institute, uh, and you'll see that, funds raised from partners were increasing radially from 2021, uh, to 24, and it was like three times more than the state funding that we had in the last year. Sorry, my voice is scrambling. I it shouldn't happen like this. yeah. So this amount of donor funding. We face a problem because, uh, the donor plans are mostly short term by nature, making long time strategic planning nearly impossible for us, uh, in such conditions. It's much more difficult to build sustainable partnerships or commit to long-term, projects or programs with our partners. In addition, there is a channel, there is a channel, a challenge that the formats and topics of projects can be determined by the conditions of the grant, which poses a challenge for the institution's,

Speaker 3

uh, agency for us. Um, another, uh, unavoidable threat

Speaker 4

is the physical destruction of Ukrainian culture. we all know that effective representation of the country brought must rely on strong and capable institutions within the country, and the war has inflicted tremendous damage all on all Ukraine's culture sector, film production, museums, publishing. Theater and many more spheres. Uh, many specialists have left the country or changed their professions. Russia has damaged or destroyed, over 200, 2000 Ukrainian objects of culture infrastructure. Uh, you will see more numbers here. Uh, so it's over, uh, 780 libraries, 120 museums and galleries, 39 theaters, and over 1300 objects of cultural heritage. Uh, we do not have data on how many artists post their careers put on military uniforms and when to fight, nor do we have accurate data on how many have been killed in action or killed at war. Uh, the Ministry of Culture reports 183 artists killed while the civil initiated Nani or disrupted writings, uh, reports to 35 people flow from the literary sector alone, killed by Russia. Uh, so paradoxically, but cultural diplomacy may once find itself without culture in Ukraine. and the third threat that I would like to refer here, uh, is, that amids this huge threat. Uh, it's the disproportionate, large disinformation machine of Russian cultural propaganda in 2023. In 2024, we witnessed the, uh, comeback of Russian, uh, representatives and artists to an international culture. Events, highlighting the inefficiency of culture cancel Russia policy that some of Ukrainian institutions implemented. Uh, in fact, Ukrainian culture. Diplomacy has a dual task, uh, on the one hand introducing Ukraine to those who is not familiar with the country and with the culture. And on the other hand, um, dispelling stereotypes and prejudice about Ukraine that was formed by Russia throughout the years. And, uh, the studies that were performed by Ukrainian Institute in 2020, the studies of Ukraine perception abroad, uh, revealed a number of Ukrainian cultural phenomenon and figures. Uh, the foreigners very often associate with Russia such as, uh, go Malin, uh, and many others who form so-called Russian agars. So there is a huge number of people who are thought to be Russian art, but in fact, they're representatives of Ukrainian, uh, artistic scene. And from the very first days of full scale invasion, uh, many Ukrainian cultural actors and public intellectuals adopted the terminology of and frameworks of the colonial studies explaining the causes of Russian aggression to Ukraine, to foreigners criticizing biased and contenting views on Ukrainian culture and history. however, this discussion very often, frame Ukraine in relation to Russia. placing us in a very reactive position rather than defining our own agenda. So the problem here is that in condition of limited resources, the choice between reaction and pro action can really be very difficult for us. So we have to choose whether to talk about Ukraine or to talk, uh, about the Ukraine is not Russia, which is still partly talking about Russia. so with this, I would like to, turn to the brighter side of what I was going to tell and talk about the, spaces of hope that we see today in 2025. Um, and, uh, while some speak about the closing window of attention for Ukraine, we really see the, the unprecedented, the unprecedented global demand and interest, towards Ukrainian culture and need for cooperation with Ukraine according to the global Soft power index, an international survey of the perception of. Of national brands, uh, Ukraine recognition skyrocketed in 2022, since the start of full scale invasion, all of Ukraine's indicators in this index have been significantly high compared to 2021 with Ukraine jumping from the 30, from the 61st place, to the 37th. And no other country made such a big jump, uh, in history. Uh, although in 2022 we dropped back to the 46 place, the recognition score is still quite high. So actually if you see the familiarity score, it's 7.3 out 10, which is quite high. And it chose that. Foreigners do know that Ukraine is, that Ukraine exists, but at the same time, the influence, the reputation are quite lower. So we chose that there is a sphere, there is an opportunity for us to explain Ukraine to those who already know about Ukraine. So we really see it as one of the biggest. Uh, opportunities right now. we're also, uh, witnessing a significant political turbulence around the world with attention to shifting, to other crisis and other conflicts, and growing fatigue from Ukraine and growing, fatigue from sympathy to Ukraine. Uh, and this fatigue is disappearing when we start, presenting ourselves solely as victims. When we stop, presenting ourselves solely as victims, constantly showing images of word distraction becomes overwhelming. but this is not the only part of Ukraine's present history. We also have a legacy of struggle, uh, heroism and fantastic civil solidarity, those elements of our dynamic culture, and creative culture that Ukraine possesses right now. Uh, the previously, mentioned research of, uh, UK Ukraine's, global perception rebuild, number of Ukrainian cultural phenomena and figures. Potential interest to sustain a global interest in Ukraine. Uh, this include Maria Pri theater, Ivan and the Artist of the Executed Renaissance, culture. Diplomacy is perhaps the only effective way to promote Ukrainian narratives in politically complex, complex regions. In 2020, uh, in 2023, the geographic scope of the Ukrainian Institute's work expanded to eight countries of, uh, Asia, Africa and Latin America, where we carried out 16 projects in 2024. And we're currently completing the research on the Ukraine's perception in this countries, uh, and the research, in India, Indonesia, South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, Mexico, and Brazil. We see, that the dress on promising fields. to cooperate with those countries. For example, in Nigeria, those are visual arts, film and fashion. For India, it's musical and performing art. And, uh, for almost every country within this list, uh, the development of Ukrainian and Cian guitar studies is a very promising area. So we can start building connections with those countries. Were politically more challenging for us, but culturally it can be a way to start cooperation here. Uh, and the last point I would like to make is the added value of culture. Because promoting culture requires, requires framing it, uh, within the context of the present day. Uh, it's not enough to simply, um, face, the, the value that culture has value, but we must highlight, uh, its added value, what this culture can offer to the world today. Uh, how, how can it help us confront global challenges, uh, understand the war prevented, or finish it quicker? How can it foster, coexistent and mutual understanding, uh, in this context? The added value of Ukrainian culture is immense. Uh, it embodies dignity, subjectivity, independence, uh, reclaiming the right to have a voice, hope, resilience and justice. Uh, universal values that are important to people on different continents, uh, during the times of

Speaker 3

political turbulence in which we leave. And I will finish with a picture of

Speaker 4

the shows, the moment from the notes from Ukraine, the project which we created withm for Ukraine, uh, Ukrainian and US embassies. this was a concert in the Carnegie Hall, continued Ukraine that continued Ukraine's cultural diploma submission EQU events from a century ago when the Ukrainian Republic Capella performed, Chadrick known as Carol of the Belts for the first time in the us. Uh, in the 18, in the 1920s, during extremely challenging historical conditions, the Ukrainian State recognized culture as a powerful tool to protect and build the country's international recognition. And today, 100 years later, we find ourselves in more favorable, more favorable, favorable conditions. I hope, uh, and as it has been already cited from Vala, we believe that everything we do in diplomacy is worth doing no matter how it turns out.

Speaker 10

Alright, if we could, uh, have our next speaker please. Christina, KZA if you'd like to come up, please. Thank you very much.

A Personal Story of War's Impact

Speaker 5

Hi everyone. I'm a graduate student in Notre Dame, so I'm trying to survive for my spring break. I don't have a presentation, so sorry for that, but I guess I will try to guide you for my notes, uh, without presentation. so, um, I would like to present to you today, uh, actually my capstone project, which I, my, one of the chapter of my capstone project, which I will be defending this, uh, this month at Notre Dame. I was working, uh, at the register of damages for Ukraine in the heck for the last six months. So my program has, um, the last semester spent in a field, and that was my field research in the hack, working with them as a legal advisor. So I get there some knowledge and I will start thinking how it's possible to incorporate the register and how potential the register can evolve into a memory project if it potentially can evolve at all. I will shortly tell you something about the register, so you have some background of that. The International Register of Damages for Ukraine, which, uh, sit in the hack is international institution, which was created only in 2020 23 actually like quite, quite recently. And it only start on rollin basis except the claim from people who suffered from the Russian aggression against Ukraine. Uh, register is not a standalone institution. Register has a mandate to document, uh, Russian wrongdoing, international wrongdoing, but, but does not have mandate to compensate. At the same time, the claim commission for Ukraine should be established soon. The SI signature for establishment, the claim commission will be open in March, this, this month, this year. register is now currently is under Council of Europe. Normally such institution is being created under United National, but obviously Russia, ashamedly hold. Um. The seat as permanent member, uh, in the security council. So it was obvious that it was not like possible to establish, uh, the claim commission or the register within United National, uh, system. So it was created in the Council of Europe. Uh, there is two reason why I saw that register has a potential to evolve into memory and to objective. Firstly, as Ukrainian, I thought that I don't want us as Ukrainians to forget what Russians did to us. And I'm said, no, no Putin, because it was all Russians who did it to us. And secondly, considering that now the facts about the invasion and even there is a question whether Russia invaded Ukraine is in a public agenda, there is a need actually to uplift, uh, the messages. And also they uplift the voices of victim who have, who are affected by the Russian aggression. And there is two reason why the register can be transformed into Maori project. Often when people hear register of damages, they think that register is only proprie. Like only click only. Try to document the damages of property at the same time. It's not true. It just like very surfacial analysis of the register. The register has 46 categories of damages, uh, losses and destruction. Actually, my colleague Ena, um, who was just talking about the cultural, um, damage and the damage of cultural infrastructure, it's one of the category which the state of Ukraine can submit to the register of damage to the hack, to collect, uh, all of the, to have a clear list of the reparation and to have a cost. however, we know that like cultural heritage, which was distracted, cannot be evaluated by money. It's obvious. So how the categories of the register works. It's divided by three groups based on the type of the legal person as a personality. The first one, a, is for natural person. The second is for state of Ukraine, B category, and the third is for legal entities. I will focus for the purpose of this, uh, uh, speech, uh, only for the categories for the natural person, because like I think that the legal entities, uh, will not contribute that much to the memory and the narrative, what happened to people. And, uh, on the ground, uh, basically there is 21 categories, uh, for submission of which will be open for a natural person and only seven of them are about, uh, destruction of property. two third of them are about non-material damages, uh, which normally is the mandate of truth commission in other contexts, such as torture, deportation of children, deportation of adults, forest displacement, internal external displacement, sexual violence, um, access, loss of access to the healthcare, loss of access to education. So basically it, the overwhelming majority of the categories are not about, uh, property are more about suffering of a human being, which the register is try to record. And the second objective, the second reason why I thought it's possible, uh, I was working in the hack with a lady, who worked in, uh, 2000 in Germany, uh, in a compensation program for the victims of the Holocaust. So Germany in 2000 opens the Holocaust Victim Asset Program, in, with Swiss banks, with Switzerland banks, and also in Germany, the German forced labor compensation commiss. And people all over the globe, the survival of the, of the Holocaust started submitting claims and naming the concentration camps, which, which was not known before. And it was apparent that we know about Holocaust, not as much as we thought, because we know only about a big concentration camp, but we not focus on smaller amount of concentration camps, which also existed, uh, in Germany and also in Eastern Europe. so I was thinking that considering that the register is open not only for submission from the governmental controlled area, but also from the Occupy territory, uh, in Ukraine, we potentially can understand the scale of atrocity atrocities, which happen also from the victims, because for us, for Ukraine, it only become available and the scale of atrocities and only visible after theup of the, of the territory. And considering that. A lot of, like now 25% of Ukrainian territory is still under occupation and, and millions of people of Ukrainians leaving there and has a right to submit a claim. It's a potential for the register to collect all of this rich data about the victim suffering. Also, I was thinking how potentially it can actually be transformed into memory project. And when I was in the hack, I was talking because it's, uh, my topic of my, uh, research. I was asking people and I was talking with them like, let's talk whether it's even potential to transform it. And uh, obviously I understood that currently with the ongoing mandate, it's not really possible because it's overboarding. Overburdened the institution with additional mandate and the institution cannot fulfill its current mandate. At the same time, it's also normal and feasible from what I have seen in the history of the similar reparation institution that normally the legacy and the memory projects, they expand only after the closure of the mandate. For instance, Notre Dame, uh, host the legacy project of the Columbia Tru Commission. This is one of the best legacy project I have ever seen, and when I was talking with, um, the director of the Legacy project, I understood that when the mandate of the Tru Commission was ongoing, it was not clear for them whether the legacy project will be in place. But once they collected all of the data and understood their richness, they decided that those cannot be kept to like just by one report, which is published normally by the Tru Commission, and it should be expanded and also visible for everyone who want to understand what happened in Columbia. The same happened also with ICTY. ICTY has a seat in the hack. It, uh, it now was transformed to the residual mechanism. A CTY is a international tribunal criminal tribunal for former Yugoslavia. And once, uh, after upon the closure of the mandate, uh, it opens the archives because normally is a narrative about what happened in the genocide in Bosnia. And Vena is only around re however, is the same, almost the same amount of genocide or acts committed against. Those people were also in the rural area, but nobody focused on them because the public trial was only focused Abouta, other cases. So now upon the openness of the Legacy project and uh, the archives in ICTY. People from Bosnia, Herto go historians. And also our artists try to re relearn what happens here and try to revive and try to reconcile even within society the, the narrative of what happened, uh, during the war in the former Yus Lavia. Normally in literature, as I already touch, like shortly touch the topic of the Trus Commission. Normally in literature, a narrative and the collective memory is being persuaded through the Tru Commission. And I was not, I was, I didn't think to cover the Trus Commission because the operation of the register in the Hack and Trus commission are very different. Registry is trying to process all individual claim which people submit to it. Uh, while Trus commission does not focus on any individual, it tried to identify the pattern of violence and then, uh, submit a report about the perpetrator and the type of crimes, amount of victims, but do not delve into any individual cases. At the same time, while this institution are quite distant, I still try to understand how they overlap because as I already mentioned, register like fully focused on the thematic area, which is normal for a R commission. However, there was never a r commission in the international armed conflict, which we have now, within the Russia, Russian War against Ukraine. So when I started looking and apparently since 2022, there is a lot recommendation and literature readings, uh, writtens that Ukraine must establish through commission. And normally all of this recommendation comes from foreigners for, from experts abroad, mainly from Spain, US and Geneva. obviously not consulting with Ukrainian society. Firstly, whether Ukraine society wants to have a claim commission, what is the mandate, who should reconcile between whom, and also all of this research, which has been done abroad with without a consultation with Ukraine, it's normally. just, um, being in vacuum analyzes and do not take into account all of the existing mechanisms such as register of damages, sits in the hack, and also all of the other register which exists in Ukraine. And for me, if you provide this recommendation, and then there will be a need to establish, uh, that claim commission, that risk commission, obviously thanks. obviously there will be a potential overlap and what I see is that it might retro traumatize victim because you already, you provide the same and the same information several times to different instances. And I want to tell one example, which I have it's terrible example, sorry, but, it's, uh, it's a war. So I have a very close friend, she's from Meru. Her father died in Meru in March, 2022. He was not able to evacuate. The fact that he died was not, uh, was not known, uh, for one year. So it was considered that he's missing. She considering that Mari Rupo is, uh, under the State Security Service, she went several time to interrogation with the prosecutor to fill all of the documents and it take, and it took her almost two years to get all of the documents in Ukraine. Now there is open category in the register and she will submit the same documents and will tell all of the same details, like still online, but she will still be potentially re-traumatized by returning to the same facts. And then when there is a need, and people say, foreigners say that, let's establish True Truth commission for Ukraine. All of these people will come again to the same victims and will ask the same question, which doesn't make any sense, because nobody is thinking about people who, who are affected by the war. It's just a all fit model of transitional justice. The Truth Commission is a right to truth, and there is no other option available. So what I suggest is that if there is a demand from Ukrainian society. Tru Commission can be established, but only if there is driven domestically and not imposed, uh, from abroad. And then potential is a register can cooperate with the Tru Commission to transfer all of the data that personalized if there is a need

Speaker 6

to try to avoid ization of the victims. Thank you.

Speaker 3

Thank you very much. And now

Speaker 10

for our last speaker, if you'd be so kind. We have, uh, Michael, Rob. Chuck.

Speaker 3

Thank you.

The Call for Limited Promotion of Russian Culture

Speaker 7

dear colleagues, uh, first of all, I'd like to add my, uh, humble voice to the thanks, which, uh, were expressed here already to the organizers. And secondly, to apologize for not presenting my, uh, my slides. I prepared them, but it's, uh, for, 40, 45 minutes lecture. I cannot afford it. so I'll try to contain my species in 12, 12 minutes, right? 12 minutes. Um, I was asked, I promised, uh, to organizers to talk about, cancel, cancel culture, uh, controversy in Ukraine, uh, during the war. that means, uh, controversy, which, uh, comes from, attempts to, to, to ban, to cancel, uh, some, uh, phenomena from, from some works of Russian culture, monuments or whatever in Ukraine, but also to, to encourage people to do the same internationally. So, uh, before I present my arguments, because of course there are very, it's huge controversy and very different arguments are for and, uh, and against, uh, I make two, uh, ca carrots. first of all, I'd like to, uh, emphasize that, uh, this, uh. Term is not, maybe not very suitable because of course it relates to, to different phenomenon. You know, cancel culture emerged long ago in, in Western context, and it's barely applicable to Ukraine. But of course it, it can be applied because it has something in common in, uh, as I feel it's also in, in the case of Ukraine, is also can be considered as attempt of marginalized, uh, group, uh, of underdogs, uh, to, to challenge the, uh, epistemological dominance of, of, uh, other group, uh, to question, uh, imperial knowledge, in this case, imperial culture as a vehicle of, uh, imperial knowledge, to, uh, to, to, to challenge, establish structures of, of cultural production and, and distribution. And secondly, uh, I'd like also to, uh, to, to emphasize profound difference between, uh, this ongoing attempts to cancel, uh, Russian culture and censorship because we, we very often, often we can't. here, this, uh, arguments, this comparison. Mm. Uh, it has nothing or very little to do with censorship because censorship, provides, uh, is based on some legal, uh, on some laws and some enforcement of these laws. in this case, in case of cancellation of, uh, of Russian cultures. There is no, there are no laws which, which ban it. Uh, this, this, uh, cancellation is based primarily on, verbal appeals to, to moral, uh, conscience of, uh, cultural entrepreneurs and, and, and of brought public. so, you know, um, there are no mechanisms. There are no laws which, which, uh, can be applied in this case, rather. It is, it's a matter of, of, uh, moral, uh, conscience of responsibility, of, empathy of solidarity with, beleaguered, groups with, uh, in this case with Ukrainians who are, uh, underdogs in this, in this current situ. And, and now, uh, uh, it'll bit, uh, briefly about, this entire problem of cancellation, uh, how it looks, uh, like in Ukraine, uh, today. no, first of all, of course, it's, uh, it's not matter of sanctions. sanctions were introduced, uh, immediately after full, uh, all out invasion, uh, primarily by, uh, first all countries. no, no, virtually no countries from the global south join the sanctions. They still, apply arguments, very, very cynical arguments, uh, or as they say, pragmatic arguments. So they pretend it's, you know, economic relations by buying Russian gathered. Oil has nothing to do with financing Russian Army and killing Ukraine. Civilians, of course, it's very hypocrite position, but it's, it's typically both in India and China and, uh, elsewhere. Unfortunately, culture is not matter of such a, uh, such, uh, of sanctions. Uh, but, uh, immediately after Russian, uh, all out invasions, there were a number of appeals from Ukraine, Pensat, and from other, from public intellectuals to international community, uh, appeals to, uh, to, uh, to postpone publications of Russian books, to, to postpone invitation of Russian author, to, to, to withdraw, uh, Russian plays from repertoires and on and on. so, uh, of course these appeals were, were, uh, in some cases they were, uh, perceived and, uh, and adopted and applied, uh, in some cases ignored. but, uh, controversy matched. on the one hand, uh, nobody ies that, that authors who, openly support, uh, Russian aggression. Should be, of course, canceled. It's, it's, it's clear there is little controversy about this. If somebody, you know, parades with, St. George reborn or, uh, makes photograph like, like Mr. Ian, the frontline with, with, uh, weapon shooting Ukrainians and so on. So of course these, these people are not acceptable, even though they were invited until, until 2022. They were published, broadly published, and invited, like Alexander Guin dug into various Western universities, even though he, he's a clearly fascist ideologist. Nonetheless, uh, it changed in 20, uh, 2022. Uh, but, but, so, so, but still, you know, there is, uh, there is, uh, there is a question, uh, who should be canceled and who can be tolerated. This is one, one problem whether, so how to distinguish, you know, good Russians and bad Russians. It's, uh, I will, I, I would eventually argue that this is, this is a wrong question because in, in both cases, pro it works for promotion of Russian image. As good or bad as its imperial culture or anti imperial culture, it still is works. It enhances the image of, of the rock state wellno. And this is, this is the main problem from my point of view, the main, main problem, which very few people, tend to, uh, understand internationally, uh, to, for, for various reasons. Of course, of course. Um, some al interest play a role because of course, for many publishers and for theater owners and auto and et cetera, et it might be profitable to, to, to publish some Russian author, to stage, some, uh, plays and, and on and on. So of course, we cannot exclude this very, very pragmatic, very, very f financial, uh, interest. Uh, but there are also, uh, other, uh, uh, other, uh, interest in play, and other factors in play. Uh, first of all, I believe there is very, very profound misunderstanding, uh, in liberal and democratic societies. Of the role, which culture may play in authoritarian, uh, nationalistic states. Its culture in such states is fully ized and instrumentalized for, for the purposes of, for the state purposes. And it's very difficult to explain because this tradition never existed in, in, in normal, normal countries, normal societies. But it was very, it has very deep roots in, in Russia, in the Soviet Union. And again, in Russia, in Russia culture, as everything is totally instrumentalized like church, like sport, like, uh, anything else. So it's not, it's not just soft power. It's harsh power. It's soft power which turns, uh, hard during the war. And this is what we have to understand. so, um, the same, uh, the same, can be applied also to, contacts and to cooperation with, uh, Russian authors and scholars and on and on. Ukrainians again, uh, currently refuse to to share podiums, to share conference, uh, venues, uh, with, with, with Russian colleagues. even if this, in many cases, these colleagues are quite, quite normal scholars and many of them are oppositional vis-a-vis, uh, Russian regime, regime, uh, by, and, and nobody denies possibility of personal, of private contacts with these people. But, uh, what, what is, uh, disturbing, for many Ukrainians and, and acceptable that such appearances in public may indicate symbolically some idea of dialogue, his favorite word buzzword in the west, and some, you know, possibility of reconciliation and on and on. So during the war, during this genocidal war, it's, it's impossible. It's, it should, it's not on the agenda, and this should be excluded. This is position of. Of Ukrainian Pen Center of Ukrainian, uh, intellectuals. We should not send this wrong false signal about possibility of some reconciling. You know, as long as there is a war, as long as there is genocide, we, we, we, we, we have to talk about these things and not about, uh, dialogue, et cetera. so, um, metaphorically we can compare, culture, like sport, like anything else symbolically to, uh, national flag. It's national flag. I say it's, you know, uh, as it's raised by Putin group or, and Tai Putin is group, but it's national flag, it's Russian flag. And during the war, waving, rising and waving, Russian flag, uh, from my point of view is unacceptable. This is what Ukrainians, say and try to, to convey to, to their Western colleagues, uh, to their international, partners. so, um, uh, maybe, perhaps, uh, yeah, the last point. Is, that, um, Russian culture, is, not necessarily, which is very often canceled, uh, is not necessarily imperial. It's imperial, but it's not in a sense that, uh, imperial in, in terms of glorification of, uh, of the empire, of imperial conquest, of imperial domination of all this genocidal war. No, the best authors, do not do this with some exceptions. You know, of course there are some, some very, uh, very, very bad, uh, uh, poems produced by Ky Dobrosky. Uh, but it has exceptional, most of them basically, uh, are good authors and produce good text, which are valuable. The main problem of this culture, of this literature is that it's, it silences all these things. It has says nothing, never said, and still say nothing about all these things. There are no, no remarkable works or with very few exceptions. about, about colonial conquest, about colonial domination. It's absolutely, uh, non non-issue in, in Russian culture. And this funda, this, this makes this fundamentally different from other imperial cultures like, like British or French or, and other which, uh, which underwent all this process of re evaluation, which, produce very, very, very powerful, very strong, anti-colonial discourse and anti-colonial analysis. It nothing like this has happened so far in, in Russia and, and silencing is probably, is main, main, main guilt. So, uh, what, what I'd like to emphasize once again, that, uh, the main, main problem, uh, of, our, promotion because, because basically this cancellation is not about total ban on Russian, on Russian books or whatever. You, you can, you can still read them, you can still watch films and, and so yeah, it's rather, it's rather, uh, appeal. It's as a call to, uh, not to promote them now during, right now, during the war to, to stop promotion. Or as a former minister of culture of Lithuania, put it to put, uh, to put them, into the fridge, to put them, uh, on, on the current eye, and then to reconcile after the water, reconci it, to reevaluate, to apply new methodology, new analysis, new canon. Uh, it's, it's possible it's necessary, actually. But so far, let's, let's abstain from this, right? Let's not not do this because it's, it's waving the flag, it's waving, the flag of, of, of rock state and uhno when we, promote this very good culture. Very good works. We detract, attention from something more important related to today's Russia. We sno we think about great culture, great literature, and for, for a few minutes, for a few seconds, we forget about, killing of Ukraine, civilians, of destruction of Ukraine, cities. You know, we, but these things go together. Moreover, today, these killings and these destructions are much more important than all this so-called great culture and great literature. That's a matter, that's another matter how they can, uh, coexist. And they coexist. Unfortunately, that's another problem's, uh, very, very interesting research problem, how they go together. But, uh, but the danger, the main danger, the main challenge for us is to, to forget about, uh, rock this little, uh, rock face o of, of Russia, uh, when we, uh, read, consume this, uh, nice, very, very talented, uh, works. So, uh, be, uh, be, uh, be careful. And, um, the last point, I'd like to give you example. Uh, I didn't prepare. I, I wouldn't show you slides, uh, but I, I will give you one interesting quotation, which perfectly illustrates something that many foreigners fail to understand. as I mentioned already, uh, people mostly, especially in the West, they, they don't understand that any culture, uh, works, uh, for, for, for the state, in this case for the wrong state. Russian, a ideologist understands this perfectly. And here is quotation from, uh, director of, uh, Ermitage Museum in St. Petersburg. Mr. Uh, Michel Petroski, who is very, very Udinese for many years. He supported him for, since early two thousands. And, um, he, in one of the interview two years ago, he declared openly. So literally our recent exhibitions abroad are just a powerful cultural offensive, if you want. It's a kind of special operation, which a lot of people don't like, but we are coming. No one can be allowed to interfere with our offensive. This is words of, cultural entrepreneur. And please notice that, Ermitage is the museum of, uh, with foreign, art. So it's not Russian art, which is exhibited abroad. They brought abroad works for, from Hermitage, from Renaissance to, to impressionist. So they don't promote Russian, uh, Russian, uh, art per se, but they promote Russian museum. They promote, you know, this gen gentrified nod image of Russia, which today is a rock state and people tend to forget this is, rock state. When they attend, they, when they visit this nice exhibitions from Armitage, this is the, the, the main problem. So, uh, once again, please, please remember this, uh, peculiarity. And, uh, I will stop here. I, uh, exhausted my 12 minutes. Thank you.

Speaker 8

Excellent,

Speaker 10

excellent. Okay. Uh, we have some time for questions. here's one right now. I think we, yes, we have several hands over here. Uh, there's first one here and

Speaker 3

then in the back. Sure. Good afternoon.

Speaker 9

thank you for this wonderful presentation. I have a question to, uh, my Professor Muk, because, uh, uh, I kind of do research also in Vienna University with the Institute of Slavic Studies and, uh, well, uh, concerning what you've said about Stan Russian culture and, uh, this ambiguous, uh, uh, point of view on it. So I, I, I wasn't need an advice because when I came to Vienna University and when I went to the library of, uh, joint Library of Institute of Study Studies and, uh, east Central European history, I saw, uh, pictures on the walls. Uh, which I, I, I, I guess, uh, the, the person, people who hand them there are proud of like, having the in Vienna. And, but this is not the worst, the worst thing. I saw Hadda, there was a book, of Dugin in the shelves about Ukrainian history and, uh, yeah, that's, that's true. And also, uh, it was a bookshelf, uh, like the Ukrainian Ukrainian history dedicated to Ukrainian history. And, uh, and also a book of one, his Russian historian. I don't remember the, uh, the, the, the, his surname. It's of, uh, 2015, something like that. After this, uh, 2007, uh, 14, when the, the war started, it was entitled like, what We Have to Do With, with Ukraine, something like that. How, how should we react on that? Because I, I went to the librarian, but to, to this desk and said that it's not okay. Should we kind of young scholars who see such things, uh, report to, to, you know, to do the, to, to the, uh, leaders, to the chairs of it or, or, or what?

Speaker 6

Thank you.

Speaker 3

Should I answer, bill? Of course. Please answer. Okay.

Speaker 7

well, um, uh, first of all, uh, uh, of course, uh, we, we, it's up, it's uphill battle. We cannot win it so easily. Uh, we should not, uh, scandalize, uh, because it may, uh, provoke the opposite reaction, but try to explain. Of course, it depends whether this book are in the public library or in the academic scientific library. This also makes difference because we, we, in, in, in, in the university libraries, in academic libraries, we, we may keep everything including mine, kaf and water and dugin and whatever. Yeah, it's normal. In Ukraine, actually, uh, uh, Russian books were removed from public libraries, but still are available in university and elsewhere libraries. So whoever is interested can go there. They're not just, you know, everywhere. Just like pornography. It's, it's not, it's not completely banned, but there are special places to, to buy this magazine and hotel. so this, there's a difference. but on the other hand, of course, we have to explain, uh, that all the things are, inappropriate, especially during the war. They're killing us. That's, that's a fact. That's the main fact. Not, not bol Theater not great. And, and so, unfortunately, you know, this, um, the fact that this terrorist state has, this great culture, obliterates, its, uh, its wrongness, it's ugliness. The main difference between, uh, terrorists from Hamas and ISTs from Moscow is that Hamas doesn't have Dostoevski. Hamas doesn't have SRE theater. And because of this, there is no nothing to gentrify their activity. In the case of Russia, of course, there are many ments to, to gentrify and to forget about to, to, to, to push it aside. It's a secondary, you know, the most important is, you know, great culture and the killing of Ukraines. It's something, you know, temporary and can be, can be neglected. That's, that's the problem. So, uh, my response is to, to, to react, uh, patiently. Try to explain, to try to, to appeal to, to some moral, conscience to say that, you know, they're killing us and, and you promote them. So, so promotion, so we don't call for, for complete ban. We call for a limited, very limited, restrict restricted promotion of, of Russian culture, of Russian books of Russian authors. That's what what this, the story is about.

Speaker 3

Other questions we have, uh, some hands up here.

Speaker 10

Yeah. This is a question, uh, primarily for Christina Ko because you had touched on your work at the Hague and also touched on the massacre Za. generally it's now accepted that ZA was an act of genocide with the, the killing of 8,000 Bosnian men and boys. and that's in some ways the litmus test, internationally in terms of what's accepted as an act of genocide. The question I have to you is, is, uh, to the degree that you've, uh, studied this and have, interacted with a lot of scholars and and attorneys, um, in this area, to what extent is there a, a broadening consensus that, that, Russia is committing genocide by intent? I mean, Tim, Tim Snyder talked about this when you're looking at that April 3rd, you know, two, 2022, statement from a novarty, which says, we're prepared to destroy half of the Ukrainian population. That's, at that time it was 20 million people. The question is, is there, is there a pretty strong consensus now? are people still nitpicking, uh, what constitutes, uh, genocide or not in, in the case of, uh, the, the Russian invasion? And so I'd be curious to hear your response. Thank you.

Speaker 5

Thank you. It's a really great question. Um, yeah, and I, CT wise, uh, finding was that it was in, was not genocide, it was Serbia. Failed to prevent the genocide to happen. So that was the accusation. Unfortunately, register in the hack does not necessarily provide a legal examination of the Russian wrongdoing saying that what the genocide and what is not in only document the all of the damages destruction to have a material record when the negotiation with will happen potentially to say we have an actual account of what Russia did and what Russia must pay at the same time. Your question, I would say that it depends whom you ask, and I would not say that there is a pretty much consensus that it's a genocidal war, at least with whom I'm unfortunately spoken. People sometimes even try to avoid the, still avoid the term of war and try to just like soften it. Ukrainian conflict, Ukrainian war, which is like, who is killing whom, why you are not name naming the perpetrator. So unfortunately I would not say that I saw a lot of people who work on this topic, but I know today there was a panel with another scholar from us, Christina Hook, and she's the one who is working on the genocidal war. And she tried to show that the genocide which happened, which was committed by a Soviet Russia to Ukrainian with a lot more is a, and the current war is a continuation of the genocide. But I would say that it's rather a minority, unfortunately, that see this war through the lens of genocide. However,

Speaker 6

I see this war as through the lens of genocide. Thank you for the question.

Speaker 3

Good afternoon.

Speaker 11

thank you for very interesting panel. I really enjoy all the speeches. I think I have some. It's not a question, it's more like one more, I, my argument to the discussion that brought professor, rep took, because I was in Europe, after like I was having an artistical scholarship in Europe after full scale invasion. So I found myself like in the epicenter of these discussions, and one of the arguments that I used was, for example, at the time when famous Ukrainian, film editor Victor Onco was killed on the front line, other, Russian artist was making a performance on the topic like why Russians, uh, stay silent during the war, justifying like their motivation. It was very painful for me to observe it obviously. And I had very tough discussions with my colleague at the moment and I explained them that Russian artists should do their part of work with their society until they are properly wor, uh, not working with their society as they should and bringing like really all these question that they prefer to stay silent. They have nothing to say to the international society. They should give floor to Ukrainian artist who is killed, uh, at the moment or have no possibility properly to work because it's also about the disbalance of powers. Because anyway, even as opposite Russian artists, they still are more privileged than, Ukrainian artists who are physically killed at the moment.

Speaker 3

Yeah. Thank you. we have time for one more

Speaker 10

question. Yes, please.

Speaker 12

thank you for presentation. I have questions for Alana and ing. there are some like belly troops, have their, uh, tour, uh, through Europe and North America, and they present in themselves as Ukrainian troops. For example, grand key of ballet or Royal Ballet of Ukraine, something like this. And they dance in Tchaikovsky ballets, but with Ukrainian flag. And my question, uh, is it some kind of threats during, uh, Ukrainian politic culture politic and, um, how to answer to Western colleagues when they asking why we should cancel Tchaikovsky ballets, uh, like in December while Ukrainian fake Ukrainian troops, uh, still have the tours, uh, with, uh,

Speaker 3

uh, with na, for example. Thank you. Thank you for the

Speaker 4

question. I would say how I see it, probably this is the, problem for still disintegration of Ukraine's culture, diplomacy and, uh, speaking, uh, the United Voice because there are a lot of actors of cultural diplomacy, the state actors, the, the private stage actors. And, uh, since Ukrainian is a democratic country, we cannot control everyone. What do they perform? Of course, uh, you will never see such performance for, from Ukrainian state troop. but there is no control over private troops, who are, um, concerting in Europe. So, what the answer can be here is, uh, educating our own Ukrainians, with why performing with Tchaikovsky is not okay. And recently, there are a lot of, uh, new Ukrainian ballets, including the Nutcracker with the Ukrainian music, which is developed last year. So there is a possibility to perform something else, and this is a matter of choice.

Speaker 7

please, I can, uh, just a few words, uh, regarding, uh, Tchaikovsky. We have different views. My, uh, wife, because she, she believes that, uh, Tchaikovsky like gel should be rated by Ukrainians because of some Ukrainian roots or regions. Which is basically a very reasonable approach. We can appropriate a lot of things which, uh, uh, I believed to be Russian, uh, because they are ambiguous, uh, to some degrees. They belong also to Ukraine. Uh, but you know, it's remote project and we cannot do this right now. We don't have, we don't have sufficient discursive power and, uh, and so on. but it's interesting, uh, perspective so far. I believe that of course we have to, we have to, um, emphasize inappropriateness of this, misusage, uh, of, of Russian text, of Russian music and whatever symbolical importance of this, which was known as sim symbolically supports, contributes to, to, to empowers, uh, Russian dominance, symbolical dominance. Uh, but at the same time to avoid, uh, two hysterical reactions because it, of course, it's might be, counterproductive. So it's very, very, very complicated cultural diplomacy. But we should perform it, of course. uh, what I'd like to emphasize here, that there are many works, which Tchaikovsky is not irreplaceable. You know, nobody is replaceable. There are a lot of, uh, of works which are simply not performed. Not, not only Ukrainian, but you know, Czech and polish and, and, and creation. Whatever they, they should be, uh, performed. So there are a lot of things which are forgotten on, neglected or marginalized. So there is a little huge space to, to feel this temporary emptiness if you remove chaikovsky or, or whatever. So let's, let's promote it. Let's say that, you know, there are other options. We, we, we can do this. Especially now, especially, especially during the war. Very good actually opportunity to, to promote something else, to, to, to pay more attention to alternative, uh, cultural phenomena.

Speaker 8

Another quick reply.

Closing Remarks and Reflections

Speaker 2

Uh, yeah. Yeah. I just would like to add to all this heritage and cultural issue. We also have to struggle with appropriation of Ukrainian culture by Russians because all this exhibition from, uh, Hermitage for instance, they utilize a lot of Ukrainian cultural product and, presented them as a Russian and again, Finnish cases also very interesting. So, Ukrainian cultural is unknown in Finland, and so it's really very important to show, that for instance, Alexander OV is Ukrainian Panist, but not Russian. Yeah, so I, I just encourage all of us to, to struggle with this in any way we can. Do.

Speaker 10

I think that's a good moment to close things. just as a quick announcement, I do believe there's coffee and snacks outside since Notre Dame. Oh, I'm sorry. It was what? Of course, please echo.

Speaker 8

I I don't have a microphone. I don't know if everybody can hear me. I'd just like to comment on this panel, which I think my comment doesn't necessarily for, is relevant not only to this panel, but two

Speaker 13

non-specialists or two young, a younger generation. What we're seeing right here is quite, quite amazing, for various reasons. before our eyes, we have a broad generational spectrum. Chuuk. Not everybody might know him, but he is really one of the deans of Ukrainian intellectuals. He is somebody, I can't remember the details, correct me if I'm wrong. I think they threw you out of the university in, in the early seventies. He belonged to kind of a literary underground more than 50 years ago. And over those 50 years, he's written numerous books. Uh, been one of the most prolific Ukrainian intellect, public intellectuals, publishing in English, working in different countries. and at the same time he's accompanied by, some people. I think they could be his grandchildren. and they're quite amazing. These, these women, uh, representing Western Ukraine where, you know, McCullough was thrown outta the university, but also Haq, which is right on the front. But Haq actually is in Finland, you know, in a place where there's almost no knowledge as you just told us. So what, um, I don't know if Clements is here. He's taking a break, but, the Vic, uh, center is put together an amazing program, and this, this panel is a reflection of both a summation and a presence of a long tradition of independent, creative, incisive thinking, but also you are seeing the future of, uh, Ukrainian studies and, uh, Ukrainian intellectual life. Thank,

Speaker 10

we'll draw that to a close and recognizing that there's tea and coffee out there and reassemble in, I believe about 20 minutes or so. Thank you.