Faith and Philosophy, Part 3: God's Existence

Episode Topic: God's Existence

Many philosophers - and even theologians - believe that Immanuel Kant put an end to all attempts to prove God's existence. However, is the case truly closed? Dr. Sebastian Ostritsch, from Heidelberg University, argues that Kant's objections against proving God's existence have no decisive weight against the foundational logic of Thomas Aquinas' Five Ways. Even after Kant, he will contend, it remains possible to demonstrate that God exists.  

Featured Speakers:

• Dr. Sebastian Ostritsch, Heidelberg University

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This podcast is a part of the ThinkND Series titled Faith and Philosophy.

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Transcript

Welcome & Introduction

1 0:07

Good afternoon everybody. We are delighted to welcome Dr. Sebastian Ostrich, a philosopher who bridges classical metaphysics with today's intellectual debates, not only through his academic work, but also through his writings. As a journalist and newspaper editor, Dr. Ostrich holds two doctorates in philosophy, teaches at Heidelberg University and has authored several acclaimed books, including a highly engaging biography of Hagel. His research ranges from German idealism and the great metaphysical questions to the ethics of gaming. Today, he will present a paper that touches on the core of much of our work at the History of Philosophy Forum and the Jacques Han Center, the existence of God did Kant squash, Aquinas's proofs. Please join me in welcoming Dr. Sebastian Ostrich.

Roadmap: Four-Part Defense of Aquinas Against Kant

Aquinas Also Rejects the Ontological Proof

Transcendental Idealism & the 'Boundary Violation' Objection

Imagination vs. Understanding

Kant's 'Physical-Theological' Critique

Why Kant Misses Aquinas's Fifth Way (Final Cause, No Infinite Regress)

Conclusion: Aquinas's Five Ways as Immune to Kant's Objections

Speaker 2 1:01

Hi everyone. Thanks for inviting me. Thanks for the kind introduction. Thank you all for coming out. Can, can you all hear me all right? Is that fine? All great. I hope you're enjoying your Chick-fil-A, while I have to work. So, um, yeah, I'm gonna talk about Kant and Thomas Aquinas today and we'll see. Hopefully I can upset both camps. No, of course. That's not my goal. and I don't think I will. So I first encountered the topic, of the proofs of the existence of God while I was in undergrad in Germany, studying philosophy. However, this encounter did not take place in the form of an intensive reading of Anselm so-called ontological proof of God's existence or of Thomas Aquinas's Famous Five Ways Instead. I came across the arguments for the existence of God in the course of studying Emmanuel Kant's critique of pure reason. What struck me was my professor stating very matter of factly that Kant had proven once and for all, that the attempt to demonstrate God's existence through philosophical arguments was futile. Anyone who still attempted such a thing today would inevitably fall back behind the insights of Khan's critical philosophy. Trusting this assessment, I long considered the proofs of God's existence to be a curiosity of the history of philosophy, instead, a way philosophical endeavor worthy of being taken seriously. I have since changed my view. Mainly because I have studied the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, but also because I have come across good reasons to doubt that the KT paradigm of transcendental philosophy, which means that cons, transcendental pH idealism should not be considered the default position when doing philosophy. In my lecture today, I would like to present some of the considerations and arguments that have convinced me that KS object objections against proving God's existence do not apply to aquinas's arguments. In other words, the five ways with St. Thomas Aquinas are immune to KS objections. At least that is my claim today. So my talk is four parts. Firstly, I will discuss the criticism. And Aquinas have leveled at the so-called, so-called ontological argument. Secondly, I will discuss Khan's criticism of the so-called cosmological argument and explain why it does not apply to Aquinas's five ways. Thirdly, in order for this defense to succeed, I will make some critical remarks on Kant's reaction to Hume's skepticism about the principle of causality. Fourthly, and finally, I will defend Thomas Aquinas against Kant's criticism of the so-called theological or physical theological argument for God. So I start with my first point, Kant and Thomas Aquinas against the ontological argument for God's existence. The main object of Kant's criticism is the ontological proof of God. This argument seeks to prove God's existence, a priori that is without making empirical assumptions about the world. According to Kant, the ontological argument is of decisive importance for the question. Of whether the proofs of the existence of God are possible at all. This is because K saw the ontological argument as the basis for all other proofs of the existence of God, including those that, like the Five Ways of Thomas Aquinas are not a priori in nature, but originate from human experience. The cant claim that the proofs of the existence of God fail stands or falls with his two-fold thesis. That A, the ontological proof of God fails and that b, all other proofs of the existence of God depend on the former, the ontological argument of God's for God's existence goes back to an anthem of Canterbury. ANUMs argument is extremely short and elegant. It begins with a simple description of what is meant by the term God. According to anum. God is the highest being, or more precisely something than which. Nothing greater can be conceived. God's greatness is of course not to be understood in a special sense here in later versions of the argument. For example, in Descartes. The term perfection is therefore used instead of greatness. What we refer to when we use the term God is the most perfect, being a being in comparison to which we cannot conceive anything as being more perfect. Anam argues that one falls into a contradiction. If one understands God as the highest, most perfect being. At the same time denies his existence. Even the atheists, whom Anam refers to as a fool in allusion to the Bible can understand what is meant by the concept, by this concept of God, quote, ANAM. But at any rate, this very fool when he hears of this being, of which I speak a being than which nothing greater can be conceived, understands what he hears. And what he understands is in his understanding, quote, end the concept of a being than which, nothing greater or more perfect can be conceived is comprehensible. Even to those who think that no such being exists according to unsung, this being therefore exists, at least in the mind of the atheist. Now it is obviously, it obviously makes a difference whether something is only present in the mind or whether it really exists for a painter who conceives his work of art in his mind, it may already exist in his imagination, but this does not mean that the painting also exists as an independent reality. Surprisingly, it's precisely dis difference that according to an. Means that the Supreme being cannot be denied real existence for if we assumed that the supreme being existed only in the mind, this would lead to the contradiction that in this case, one could still conceive of something greater, more perfect, namely that God also exists independently of the imagination and thus in reality. Ansen explains the problem that the, that the denni of God encounters as follows. Again, quote, Ansen and assuredly that then, which nothing greater can be conceived, cannot exist in the understanding alone. For suppose it exists in the understanding alone, then it can be conceived to exist in reality, which is greater end. So anyone who understands what is meant by the concept of the highest or most perfect being cannot deny the existence of this being because otherwise they would've not have conceived of the highest or most perfect being at all. What the ontological argument seeks to demonstrate is that God's existence is a conceptual necessity, just as it is inherent in the concept of a circle that it's round. Or in the concept of a bachelor, that he is unmarried. So it is supposed to be inherent in the concept of the supreme being that it exists. However, Kant discovers a crucial difference between these cases. According to Kant, every proposition of geometry, such as, for instance, that a triangle has three angles, is absolutely necessary. He calls this the unconditioned necessity of judgments, the absolute necessity of things on the other hand, so necessity of judgments and necessity of things. The absolute necessity of things. On the other hand, is something entirely different in the first case, that of the triangle, the question is how to speak truthfully about a thing regardless. Whether that thing actually exists or not. In the second case, the question is the necessity of the thing itself. The fact that a triangle necessarily has three angles or that a bachelor is necessarily unmarried does not mean that triangles and Bachelors necessarily exists. Rather, such judgements are hypothetical. If there is a triangle. Then it necessarily has three corners. If there is a bachelor, then he's necessarily unmarried according to the ontological argument. However, the situation with God is different. The supreme being itself is set to be of unconditional conceptual necessity. If this were the case, then denying God's existence would be a logical contradiction. However, count insists that the concept of existence. Behaves logically differently from concepts that can be used to describe how something is. We can imagine any object and then think that it also exists. However, this does not give the imagined object any new properties. Rather, it gives rise to the assertion that it exists not only in our thinking, but also in independently of it. For example, we could imagine a certain sum of money. To use Ks example, 100 failures. So a failure is like a silver coin at that time, and then say that this purely imagined some exists. However, this does not add any property to the concept of 100 failures, as would be the case if we were talking about 100 silver failures. In this case, silver would be added as a new conceptual determination, as a real predicate, as con says, being or existence on the other, on the other hand is as evidently not a real predicate or a concept of something that can be added to the concept of a thing. The difference between a hundred possible merely imagined failures and a hundred real existing failures is therefore not a conceptual matter in nature. Rather, the existence of an object means that the object itself and not just a concept of it, is given. KT argues that our thinking would even fail to grasp reality if existence were a real predicate. For then there would be a conceptual difference between what we think and what actually exists. And as concepts quote, I could not say that the exact object of my concept exists, quote, and the hundredth thas that I actually hold in my hand on payday would then have to be a conceptually different object than I had previously imagined with the help of the concept of a hundred thas. So if all this is true, then the alleged result of the ontological argument that God exists with conceptual necessity cannot be correct because the existence of a thing is not a conceptual question at all. According to Kant, the question of whether something exists must rather be judged according to empirical criteria. We know that an object really exists. If it can be perceived directly or at least indirectly by the census, Thisk puts it, there must be a quote connection with any of my perceptions according to empirical laws. The belief of a tree, for example, can be recognized with a naked eye, or in my case, with glasses and thus confirmed in its existence. The existence of gravitational force, or electrons on the other hand, cannot be recognized in the same immediate way. However, the existence of such theoretical entities can be inferred indirectly, namely through their effects. In both cases, however, there is a connection with our experience. Things are different with regard to the objects of pure thought according to content. In so far as there is absolutely no means of recognizing their existence. And this is a quote insofar as the ontological argument operates with a concept of God that cannot be confirmed by our sensory experience. This concept, according to Kant, has no sense and is entirely empty. What K did not know? Thomas Aquinas had already rejected the ontological proof with a very similar argument in his Summa contract. In he begins his critique of an's argument with the following distinction. Regardless of which concept, Norman, we are dealing with, a distinction must be made between the thing race to which the concept refers on the one hand. The logical or semantic content of the concept rats, your nomin on the other. In modern terms, this would be the difference between the extens and the intention of a term. So anyone who understands what is meant by the, by the supreme being, the concept of a supreme being grasps a conceptual content. However, it does not follow from this that the thing itself also exists outside of one's own understanding. In the words of St. Thomas Aquinas quote. Now from the fact that that which is indicated by the name God is conceived by the mind, it does not follow that God exists safe only in the intellect. Hence that than which a greater cannot be thought. Will likewise not have to exist safe only in the intellect. From this, it does not follow that there exists in reality, something than which a greater cannot be thought. Quote end one can therefore understand what the term God means. Namely then that which nothing greater can be conceived without having to assume that the thing thus conceived also exists in reality. Conceived existence and real existence are not the same thing. EM'S assertion is that he who denies God's existence contradicts himself when he says that God does not exist. QAs counters, even if the concept of existence is logically connected to the concept of a being than which nothing greater can be conceived. This does not imply God's actual existence. The logical connection between the two concepts of existence and something, beyond which nothing greater can be conceived, does not allow us to conclude that there is a real thing that corresponds to the letter concept. According to Aquinas, em's argument does not prove the existence of God, but only demonstrates a hypothetical relationship if there is something that which nothing greater can be conceived. Then this something also falls under the concept of existence. Whether such a thing exists, however, is an open question that one can answer in the negative without falling into contradiction. Otherwise, one, one would have to presuppose what one wants to prove, namely that God actually exists so long before the alleged all crusher. That's, uh, name given to Kant by Mendelson. From Konberg was born a God-fearing mendicant had already carried out the demolition work on the conceptual edifice of the ontological proof of God. This is a strong indicator that even if we accept Ks arguments against the ontological proof. This does not automatically undermine Aquinas's argument for the existence of God, the other arguments that Aquinas gives. After all, Aquinas explicitly rejects an some on some's argument, but considers other rational ways of proving God's existence to be viable. I will come back to K's claim that all other proofs of God's existent depend on the validity of the ontological argument At a later point in my talk, now I wanna turn to the second part, which deals with K's, critique of the cosmological proof of God's existence. Unlike the ontological argument, the five Ways of St. Thomas Aquinas are not a priori, but a post II in nature. This means that they start from obvious empirical phenomena and infer God as the cause that makes their existence possible. The first three of Aquinas's five ways are quite similar to each other. For good reason. All three are therefore considered as variants of one and the same type of proof, namely the cosmological proof. The first three ways can be called cosmological insofar as they start from empirical phenomenon, such as change, the natural order of cause and effect, and the transient transient of things, and then deduce the existence of a first cause of the universe. Cosmos. Which explains why these phenomena exists in Khan's critique of pure reason. There are two arguments against the cosmological proof. The first one claims that whether intentionally or not, the cosmological proof of God's existence ultimately presupposes the ontological proof, which esk and Aquinas agree is a failed argument. K focuses primarily on the proof from the contingency of the world, ex. The proof that most closely correspond corresponds to Aquinas. Third way, K summarizes the cosmological proof, which he models after live and not after Aquinas as follows. So this is K. If there exists anything, there must exist an absolutely necessary being. Also. Now I at least exist. Therefore, there exists an absolutely necessary being. The principle of causality is implicit in the first premise. This principle demands a cause for the existence of every merely contingent thing. Cunt does not attack this principle directly, but rather the concept of a necessary being. A being that exists out of necessity. Can't even speak of absolute necessity. Must be something that cannot be conceived of as anything other than existence, as existing. A necessary being would therefore have to be one that we could only conceive of as not existing at the cost of a logical contradiction in Khan's own words. It would have to be an existence of mere concept. This is precisely the basic idea of the ontological proof from the mere concept of a supreme an absolutely perfect being. It's to be concluded that such a being exists according to Kant. This shows that the cosmological proof secretly presupposes the ontological proof, which he claims to have dismantled. Therefore, can believes the cosmological proof is doomed as well. How can Aquinas counter this objection? After all, it is true that the first three ways and most explicitly the third end with a being whose existence is necessary. However, there is no compelling reason to understand this necessity as a conceptual or logical necessity as it occurs in the ontological proof of God. For the necessity of God's existence, which Aquinas arrives at in the first three ways, is not the result of a definition or a conceptual analysis. Thomas does not derive from the concept of God, that God exists as one can infer from the concept of a bachelor, that he must be an unmarried man, rather Aquinas deduces the necessity of God from empirical, sensible phenomena. If one wanted to give a name to the kind of necessity to which the first three ways lead, it would perhaps be most appropriate to speak of a metaphysical necessity, which however, must not be equated with a purely logical or semantic kind of conceptual necessity. Uh, this is a point that was, I think famously also made by Ed Faser in his five proofs of the existence of God. The claim that the cosmological proof and consequently also aquinas's first three ways necessarily presuppose the ontological argument is therefore false according to Kant. However, the cosmological proof conceals quote a whole nest of dialectical assumptions. That is a fallacies, which is why he has further arguments against the cosmological proof. So now I turn to these, to this nest of dialectical assumptions. According to Kant, the main source of error from which these dialectical assumptions resolve is a lack of distinction between the sensible world with its sensory appearances on the one hand and the intelligible world. With its Mina, its things of thought on the other. One of the cornerstones of content philosophy is that knowledge is ultimately only possible of the phenomena of the sensory world. On the other hand, nothing can be said about how things are in themselves that is independently of the way they appear to us in space and time according to Kant, even our most fundamental concepts such as substance or cause. Only makes if they refer to the world of phenomena to the reality that is accessible to the senses for cu the principle of causality. That is that everything that is accidental or conditional has a cause for its existence, is valid in the world of senses only, and has not even a meaning outside of it. That's the last part of that was a quote. However, the cosmological proof infers the existence of a cause beyond the world of ex appearances precisely from such sensory phenomenon. From Khan's point of view, this proof is therefore guilty of an impermissible transgression of boundaries in knowledge. If one has started with empirically accessible phenomena, one cannot quote. Afterwards, suddenly leave this line of argument and pass over to something which does not belong as a member to this series quote. End. Well, this line of reasoning is wholly dependent on the thesis that we cannot use the concept of a cause to draw conclusions beyond the realm of sensory experience. The motivation behind this claim lies in cunt reaction. Argument by David Hume, to which I'll now turn. So this is the third part of my talk. Criticism of the principle of causality or Hume's false wake up call. According to Kant himself, the Scottish Enlightenment philosopher David Hume was responsible for awakening him from the dogmatic slumber of his early philosophy. With his critique of the principle of causality, Hume provided the motivation for development of Kant's view, his new revolutionary philosophy without Hume's skeptical, wake up call Kant's, attempt to shatter the possibility of proving God's existence would not have occurred. So what is Hume's argument? Hume understands the principle of effective causality in a manner. That is in line with the scholastic understanding of this principle. That is everything that begins to exist must have a cause of its existence. A block of Carrara Marble does not simply transform itself into a statue of Moses, nor does the latter come into existence out of nothing. Rather, it requires Michelangelo as the effect of cause for the stone prophet to come into being Hume, however. Claims that this connection between cause and effect may seem self-evident and necessary, but in reality it's not according to Hume. In order to truly prove the principle of causality, one must demonstrate that it is impossible that anything can ever begin to exist without some productive principle. However, since the idea of a cause is different from the idea of an effect, both cause and effect can be separated in mind. We could therefore easily conceive of an object to be non-existent this moment and existent next, without conjoining this to it, the distinct idea of a cause or productive principle, however. Whatever we can imagine is not absurd and therefore not impossible, but this is Hume's argument. Kant did not understand Hume's criticism of the principle of causality is a blanket denial of cause and effect according to Kant. Hume never doubted that the concept of of a cause was quote, right. Useful and even indispensable for our knowledge of nature. Rather what Hume wanted to prove was that the concepts of cause and effect do not apply before any experience that is a priori and are therefore limited to appearances only. Kant took Hume's critique of causality as a challenge to develop his own solution to the problem. According to K, the category of causality is anchored in the human mind and is imprinted on the material that presents itself to our senses. The causal order of the perceptible world, thus has its origin in deg subject. What initially may sound like a form of subjectivism is in fact intended toward off Hume skeptical attack on the principle of causality. According to Kant, the categories of cause and effect are rooted in the human mind, but this is precisely what ensures that the law of causality applies before any experience and to all possible experience. However, this attempt at rescuing the objectivity and universality of the principle of causality comes at a high price. From K's point of view, talk of an order of effective causes, a language that Aquinas uses in, um, in the third way or the second way of the summa theology. This kind of language is only permissible if you limited to the phenomenon. It can be perceived by the census to the world of appearances. On the contrary, we cannot say anything about the things in themselves. As they are completely independent of our understanding and our senses for Kant, however, this also means that we cannot use the principle of causality to draw conclusions beyond the world of sensory experience. From K's point of view, the path to a transcendent cause, which we call God is therefore blocked. But what if. What if hues criticism of the principle of causality is not correct? In that case, Kant would not have awakened, awakened from a dogmatic slumber, but instead he would've reacted to a false alarm. Elizabeth ans has, I think, exposed hues, criticism of the principle of causality as such a false alarm. The fundamental problem is that you makes no distinction between. Imagining imagin and understanding something, to imagine something is to form an inner picture of it. Indeed, we can imagine, for example, that a rabbit is suddenly just there now. Now I would love to, to be able to do some, some, some magic, but I can't. So just imagine. You can imagine a rabbit just sun being there. However, the existence of such a mental image. Says nothing about the absurdity and this about the possibility or impossibility of the thing imagined. Just think of the multitude of, IM so-called impossible objects. In the works of the artist, MC Escher, some of his lithographs show vary variations of the so-called Penrose stairs, which were discovered in 1958 by a mathematicians, Lionel and Roger Penrose. Penrose stairs, which lead both up and down. You can, you can easily Google it, you'll find it. And so there's a, these stairs that lead both up and down at the same time are contradictory in themselves and therefore impossible in reality. Their representation is based on an optical illusion. Despite their factual impossibility, they can be transformed not only into a vague mental image, but even into. A concrete drawing, impossible figures such as the Penrose staircase make it abundant, abundantly clear that Imagin is not a good criterion for the possibility or impossibility of something. Instead of asking whether we can imagine, for example, a rabbit beginning to exist without a cause, we must ask ourselves whether such a scenario can be comprehended. And I think the answer is clearly no.'cause if a rabbit appeared out of nowhere in front of us, we would inevitably ask ourselves where it came from and why was the rabbit hidden somewhere nearby? Is it an, are we part of a secret magic show? Or was the animal teleported here from another location using technology that is still unknown to us? All these questions articulate possible causes for the appearance of the rabbit. Aristotle Rie stated that quote, men do not think they know a thing till they have grasped the why of which is to grasp its primary cause. To state assumed us that something began to exist without any cause, therefore, amounts and truth to an admission of not knowing what caused the thing in question. So why we may be able to imagine that something begins to exist without a cause. We cannot think or comprehend it in the true sense of the word. So if Kant's philosophy does not represent the solution to a compelling philosophical problem, then his philosophy cannot be taken as the default starting point for doing philosophy. Ultimately, then Kant and Thomas Aquinas represent two opposing philosophical views while can't. In response to Hume develops a theory of knowledge that considers direct access to reality. Impossible. Aquinas's philosophy is thoroughly realistic. If knowledge is to deserve the name knowledge, it must be based on reality and not the other way around. But of course, even if you reject Khan's theory as I think we should, we can nevertheless acknowledge the the genius, the pure genius of his theory and his answer to Hume skeptical challenge. But with regard to the cosmological proof of the existence of God and Aquinas's first three ways, K argument is quite weak. It presupposes the truth of his own very presupposition, presupposition, laden philosophical system. One would therefore have to be prepared to abandon Aquinas's realism, which I believe is also the realism of common sense in order to be convinced by cons. Transcendental idealism. His argument against the cosmological proof of God's existence. Now I come to the last part of my talk can's, critique of the physical, theological, or theological proof of God's existence. Let us consider the last argument that can't wields against the classical proofs of the existence of God. This argument is directed against the so-called theological argument. Which K gives the somewhat cumbersome name of the physical theological proof. The theological argument as defended by Aquinas in his fifth way, starts from the observation that every natural activity has a purpose in order to be able to observe and determine any regularities in nature at all. We must admit that natural processes have purposes or ends. Otherwise the world would be chaotic and indescribable. But where there are ends, there also must be an intelligent entity that sets those ends. If however, the net natural world as whole is permeated by purposeful processes, then a two must have an intelligent and setting entity outside of itself. And this is what we call God. Summarizes the physical theological proof somewhat differently. He starts from the astonishing quote, variety, order, proposed purpose and beauty that can be observed both in the infinity of space and in its unlimited division. This proof therefore centers around the experience of a wondrous order at all levels of reality. This experience not only motivates us to explore ever new and deeper dimensions of purposeness in the universe, but also allows us to develop the conviction that there must be a supreme or divine being, a divine cause for a world that is so purposefully ordered and so harmonious. K shows more sympathy for this argument, for the existence of God than for any other. This proof he emphasizes, quote. Will always deserve to be treated with respect insofar as it is the oldest, the clearest, and most in conformity with human reason. Quote end. This high praise is based on the fact that cunt attributes a knowledge promoting power to this teleological proof of God instead of deterring us from scientific, scientific exploration of the world. It gives life to the study of nature, deriving its own existence from it, and thus constantly acquiring new vigor. K thus sees a kind of mutual reinforcement at work Here, the more we recognize the purposeful order of the world, the greater our belief in a Supreme author of this order becomes, and the greater our belief in a God who has established a world in a well-ordered manner. The more we are a client to search for regularities and laws, even in the seemingly chaotic and disordered in the end, according to K, this not only increases our knowledge of the world, but also increases our faith in God, which ultimately becomes, and this is a quote by K, an irresistible conviction. Despite this praise, can't convinced that the teleological proof fails. If one knows how to interpret it correctly, it can represent an approach to God that is both uplifting and useful for the exploration of the world, but nothing more, so not a real proof. In other words, the experience that the world is ordered purposefully allows us to assume that a divine creator of this purpose, purpose of order exists. But this assumption should not be misunderstood as a proof according. We must aim to quote tone down the dogmatic language of the over weening soft, so that will be me in this case, to the moderate and modest statements of a faith, which faith, which does not require uncondition submission yet is sufficient to give rest and comfort the version of the teleological proof of God existence that Ks grapples with. Different, different from Aquinas's. Fifth way, just based, not so much on the fact that natural objects have behaved purposefully, but above all on the fact that despite their diversity, they agree with each other in a harmonious way. This purposeful arrangement can arise from nature itself. Can't argues since it requires a rational disposing principle according to certain fundamental ideas. Therefore, there must exist a being that is more than a B blind and all powerful nature. It is a being that possesses intelligence intention and will, and that has brought about the purposeful harmony of the world in a planning and intentional manner. According to Khan, such a creator is the most, is the most plausible explanation for the harmony within nature. Analogous to how we infer the existence of a human craftsman from human artifacts. At the same time, this analogy with human craftsmanship is the greatest problem according to Kant because the human craftsman is not a creator who creates this material out of nothing. Instead, as Kant puts it, he forces nature not to follow its own aims, but to adapt itself, itself to ours. Insofar as the theological argument is based on the analogy to a human craftsman, only a conclusion about a powerful architect of the world who has shaped the material of the world for a purpose is permissible According to K, a perfect omnipotent God who created the world out of nothing, cannot be deduced from this. Therefore, kt argues. The theological proof cannot stand on its own two feet. Rather, it must seek help from the cosmological proof, which concludes from the fact the world does not necessarily exist, that God is a necessary being and the first cause. But as we already know, can't believe that the cosmological proof, whether intentionally or not, presupposes the ontological proof of God. Thus, K says quote. We have seen that the physical theological proof rests on the cosmological and the cosmological on the ontological proof of the existence of one original being as the supreme being, and failure of the ontological proof, thus leads to the failure of the entire project of proving the existence of God. However, there are enormous differences between Aquinas's, fifth Way and the physical theological argument that Kant deals with. For one thing, Aquinas makes neither explicit nor implicit reference to the ontological argument. Furthermore, the fifth way does not deal with the idea of harmony, which is central to the physical theological argument. Although the sum focuses on the surprising harmony between different natural purposes or ends, this is not the case. In the fifth way of the Summa theology here, Aquinas is concerned with the fact that there is such a thing as purposefulness in nature at all. This, the theological order was not created once, according to Thomas at the beginning of time. But it must be maintained continually. Therefore, the creator of the purpose of Order of the World for whose existence Aquinas argues in the fifth way, is not a world architect who withdraws from his work after it's done. Instead, the creator is the ultimate and transcendent final cause that gives the material universe, its its purpose of structure continually. There's also another reason why the intelligent final cause to which the fifth way leads must be more than just a powerful word, world architect. If this creator were not the perfect self, self subsisting, God would have to ask in turn why he exists. A powerful but ultimately limited world architect would either have to be the result of a. Purposeful natural process or processes or the product of an intentional action, as is the case with works of art of all kinds. In both cases, one would again, have to presuppose the existence of a purposeful order. The world architect would thus be embedded in a higher level of purpose of order, the existence of which would require just as much explanation. However, an infinite regress is unthinkable when it comes to a hierarch hierarchical series of causes and effects. In short, if a world architect existed, he himself would need a final cause that explains his existence. Thus, the conclusion is warranted, that there is an ultimate intelligent final cause that self subsist is pure actuality, or ACTO pools in any case. K's critique of the physical theological proof misses the thomistic theological argument for God's existence. Just as K's critique of the cosmological proof misses the first three of Aquinas five ways. Now I come to my concluding remarks. The aim of my lecture was in a sense only negative today. It consisted in fending off K's, attacks on Aquinas's five ways, and thus combating the commonplace notion that after cunt, there can be no more proofs of the existence of God. What I was unable to do today due to time constraints, obviously, was to present a detailed argument for the plausibility, validity, and conclusive of the proofs of St. Thomas Aquinas. Also, I was not able to address the numerous objections raised by other non-Cat thinkers against the five ways. I hope, uh, to have done much more to answer these open questions in my new big book, which has just come out, which is, I'm afraid only available in German so far. But, um, thank you very much for your attention and, uh, now look forward to your questions. Thanks.

Q&A: Space/Time, PSR, Infinite Regress, and Necessity from Experience

Speaker 4 48:01

Got a microphone. If you'll just raise your hand. We'll try to keep a cue in my mind and get to each of you. Thank

Speaker 5 48:08

you, professor. out a question about what seems to be kind of a missing piece from. Construction of his argument that leads into his rejection of the proofs, and that's his, specifically his of space and time. it seems that the, the way he gets from his fear about Hume to his idealism is this positive rejection that space and times, space and time are properties of things in themselves. And I think at one point you said that. For con to function, he would've to, or someone to preserve Con, they would need to reject Thomas's realism, his epistemic realism. It seems that if thees are successful, that's happened and thus causality, positing causality of things in themselves becomes immensely more complicated in the way it seems that Hume thinks. Is there a way in which Thomas rejects something like the Antibes of space and time? Do you think thees are as important to kant's arguments as that? just in issue for, uh, for your thoughts?

Speaker 2 49:17

Oh, wow. That's a, that's a tough question. So, I, I'm not sure if thees are so, I don't, I don't think that there are, I think they're more of a product of K's whole setup, as than, than there're really a cost for it. Um, but yeah, I would, I really can't give you a satisfying answer that what I would've to think, think more about it. yeah. I'm sorry, but it's a really good question.

Speaker 6 49:49

How can I get a copy of your book?

Speaker 2 49:52

Well, that's an easy, no, that's not easy because it's actually sold out. Uh, but, um, due to other events, which I didn't, couldn't control. Um, but um, well, if you read German, you can just order it on Amazon, I guess,

Speaker 6 50:05

and it will be in stock.

Speaker 2 50:08

Well, that's a good question. The second edition is being printed right now, so yeah.

Speaker 6 50:13

Okay, great.

Speaker 2 50:17

Yeah. Germans go crazy when they hear Kant against Thomas, so it's,

Speaker 7 50:22

yeah. Thanks so much. Uh, I have a follow up in some way to the internal question.

Speaker 2 50:26

Yeah.

Speaker 7 50:26

Um, so, in a way your talk responds to this longstanding debate in Kant scholarship, whether the transcendental dialectic Yeah. Which can sort of enforce this critique of Russian metaphysics just spells out. Implications of the transcendental idealism he set up before. And now there's one very popular strand which says, no, not quite, because in eighth, 308 cant, introduces sort of the supreme principle of pure reason that if the condition is given, then the complete series of its conditions is given. Might take that to be can's take on the PSR.

Speaker 3 50:56

Mm-hmm.

Speaker 7 50:56

And now the thought is that this principle on kas account, or like the way kas buzz it out, runs into ANM conflicts and therefore leads to contradiction. But these, these contradictions, I mean at least allegedly do not depend on any antecedent commitment to transcendental idealism. Now, how is that relevant? I might think that the major premise of the cosmological argument that you glossed as the caus of principle really is not the cause of principle as it's presented in the second analogy, but it's really the supreme principle of pure reason that he's appealing to there and the critique of that principle. Turns on the intel and the contradiction to which that leads and therefore does not presuppose any antecedent commitment to the ontological argument or to transcendental idealism. There's a longer list of other points Kant might make in response to the cosmological and the physical theological argument. I do not neither turn on transcendental idealism or the ontological argument. I take that to be one very important one. So I was wondering whether have anything to say sort of to that dialectical structure, and the point can't make me there.

Speaker 2 51:57

That's very interesting. So I would, so may maybe I would've to ask back if you, if you, I mean, would you agree that, um, that if you're not a continent, it's not clear that you would totally have to agree to the, to thees being antenes? So I, I really don't see them as, I don't find them. So I used to be AAL before and I didn't find them convincing as aal. I didn't, and I think even with aol, I don't, I don't find'em convincing. So I'm not, I'm not sure if this is, um, so I don't see really how. Again, the point is, well, I would have to, I, I would have to buy into that can't really makes a valid point there. But maybe I'm, I misunderstood your question, so

Speaker 7 52:38

no, you would have to buy into that. So it's a question then what's the ambition of the project? Of course, at some point can, will make commitments somewhere in order to cre critique the arguments. Right. And you could of course always say, well I don't buy into that. Yeah. So point I was making that this a commit making, making turn. His critique of the ontological argument or on his argument for transcendentalism. But this is just a separate point. It could of course say, well, that separate point also doesn't hold. And now like sometimes we could go through a list further adopt. Oh, okay.

Speaker 2 53:10

Yeah. Okay. I, I, I agree. So you could now, yeah, you could now have like this whole list of like further, aspects of con philosophy that where he doesn't directly attack the, the proofs, but from which follows you, you could derive a certain critique of, of the, the proofs. Absolutely. Totally agreed. But so I was, I restricted myself, not only here, but also also in the book to those aspects that, are typically taught as like directly being against the, the possibility of proof. So my, my, my case was just, um, not even, saying that Kant is definitely wrong, but just to shift the, the debate into, well. It's not that because that's what I was, that's how I, in Germany at least, where where I studied it was what I encountered was the standard narrative of like, well, it's so obvious that these are so convincing. That, uh, his, his critique of the, of the proofs, of the existence of God, we can never like really turn back to them. And I would say no. No. what we, we would have to like do what you just said, go through all the lists of his other things, and then, then maybe, and I'm, I, I'm not even convinced really, that the ontological proof does not work. By the way, the, my, my punt was just, well. If Aquinas agrees with K there, it shows that he's, he. He can be, that's either we have to assume he really didn't see the connection, or maybe there's just other ways of arguing. So I would just say, yeah, that will be a different project, I guess. Right.

Speaker 3 54:49

Um, you say that Aquinas is opposed to the concept of an infinite regression of creators. does he give a reason for this?

Speaker 2 54:58

Well, Well, the, the, the, the idea is that in general for Aquinas, things that you cannot, if you have a hierarchical structure of cause and effects, like not one that go back in this stretch back in time, they would agree that it might be, that, that you can imagine something like a, an infinite series of like fathers and sons, for example. You wouldn't rule that out. just conceptually, but he says when it comes to like this foundational structure, which has to be in place like right at one point in time, you know, or at every point in time, then you cannot go, it's impossible to, to go into the infinite because it would be just as absurd. Like what is one of the, well, it would be like imagining you have to just, not imagining thinking that you have to, um. Add new carts of a train. And if you add, and if you go into infinity, then the, the train will start moving. No, you need something that pulls the train at some point. Otherwise the thing doesn't get moving. It's the same, the same idea behind why you could not, uh, just have like this unending series of, world architects. You know, at some point you'll have to have something which is, um. Which does not need, need a reason, for existing.

Speaker 8 56:34

Thank you. my question is about, your claim that, Kent responded to a false alarm when he addressed like him skeptical challenge. you referred to the argument Hume gives, about like being able to imagine something not being the case. Right? and you like brought this, argument as con ha about that, uh, to reject it and so on. Uh, but it seems to me that that is not the key point at issue because that is just one argument Hume uses and can't. point out that experience cannot give rise to necessity. And the argument goes, causality has, the concept of necessity within itself. And so since experience cannot give rise to, uh, necessity, then the skeptical problem arises. And that is what these pure concepts of the understanding and their working are supposed to solve. so my question is following, for your argument to work, you would have to argue that, experience can in fact give rise to necessity. Just if that is the case, can, could be responding to a false alarm. What could you say about that?

Speaker 2 57:51

Mm-hmm. Yeah, we would've to talk about like what experiences at at that point. So, I mean, this has a very,

Speaker 3 58:03

sensory experience.

Closing Announcements & Thanks

Speaker 2 58:04

Yeah. Sensory experience, yeah. Yeah. Would, I would probably say that you wouldn't have to need a, a, a certain epison epistemology that, that understands the reality to be already conceptually structured in itself. I don't see why that would be impossible then from, to gain, to gain something that, that, uh, is, um, that has universality going on with that. So it, you would have to like divide sensory experience from let's say the, if you like, the, the i the conceptual structure already embedded within, that sensory experience. in order to make that skeptical point, I would say.

Speaker 4 58:49

I think that's all that we have time for as part of the event, but if you have more questions, please feel free to come up and ask them. Also, they're t-shirts. Feel free to take those on your way out. We've got a QR code you can sign up to become. A maritime fellow can sign up to join our Mary uh, mailing list to receive updates about our events. so please do that on your way out and let's thank our speaker One more time. Thanks.