Faith and Philosophy, Part 4: I am My Soul

Episode Topic: I am My Soul (https://go.nd.edu/902b73)

Is personal identity a matter of degree or a literal soul? Join Oxford’s Dr. Richard Swinburne for “I am My Soul,” a deep dive into Thomas Aquinas and modern philosophy. Challenge your views on consciousness and the self—listen in or watch now to discover why your soul is the essence of who you are.

Featured Speakers:

• Dr. Richard Granville Swinburne, University of Oxford

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This podcast is a part of the ThinkND Series titled Faith and Philosophy. (https://go.nd.edu/a9a045)

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Transcript

Welcome and Introduction

0:07

Good evening and welcome to the first lecture of the Meritan Fellows, specifically in this case, the undergraduate Meritan Fellows of the academic year. Uh, tonight. I think judging by the size of the audience, our guest needs no introduction. professor Richard Swinburne is one of the most notable philosophers of religion and has been so for nearly five decades now. Professor Swinburne has contributed quite monumentally to discussions and debates on topics, the soul and philosophy of mind. To questions of the existence of God and proof thereof and even philosophical arguments for the incarnation and the philosophical reality of of Jesus Christ. Besides his 19 books and numerous additional articles, professor Swinburne has enjoyed a long teaching career at Oxford University where he was the known as professor of the Philosophy of the Christian Religion and is now an Emeritus Professor philosophy also at at Oxford. Professor Swinburne, thank you so much for your visit, especially in your old age. It, it really means a lot for you to, to come all the way across the pond. and speak to us tonight at the University of Theater Dam. Thank you. Yep. Don't forget the handout. Yes. Hello. Well, uh, thank you very much for inviting me to give this talk. it's based on, uh, views, which I have expressed a number of times in a number of. And most recently in a book entitled, are We Bodies or Souls? I understand that the society, uh, derives its special inspiration from the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas and also from Marianne's own vision of Integral Christian humanism. While I'd regret my ignorance of Marianne's particular vision. I can certainly appreciate the thought of Thomas Aquinas, but I plan to discuss a topic on which his views were, in my view, partly right and partly mistaken. The topic is simply what makes me, me. For Thomas. It's the union of two separate parts, my body and my soul. A a non, which is a non-physical part of me. His theory is a version of substance dualism, which I endorse the view that there are normally on earth, these two parts to me, but I hold that my, I hold that my soul is the one and only essential part of me, logically necessary and sufficient for my existence. My body is not necessary for being me. Although it is normally physically necessary for my existence on Earth and logically necessary for my full flourishing anywhere after death, Thomas, however, denied that the existence of my soul was sufficient for the existence of me. In the sentence anima known as Echo my soul is not me. This has strange consequences that while their bodies are in the grave, the saints are not in heaven. We can only pray to their souls. My view, which I shall now defend is that a Plato and Decartes, that my soul is what constitutes me. That alone constitutes me. I shall approach this topic by considering theories of personal identity, and I hope you've got all, got a handout and can follow. this here, a theory of personal identity is a theory of what makes one person P two at a later time. T two, the same person as a person, P one at an earlier time, T one for example. What makes George. Accused in 2025 of having committed a murderer in 1965, what makes him the same person as a person called George who committed that murder? One apparently obvious advance answer to that question is that P two is the same person as P one. If and only if P two has the same body as P one. How much of the same body? Surely if someone has a heart transplant, they still continue to exist, but with a new heart, and similarly for any transplant of any other bodily organ except the brain, but the brain is special because without our brain, we would, under normal earthly circumstances, not have any conscious experiences at all. So perhaps the answer to our question is that P two is the same person as P one. If and only if P two has the same brain as P one. What a similar question arises. How much of the same brain does P two need in order to be the same person as P one? Although at present, it's not possible for surgeons to replace a damaged brain brain part with the parts unplanted from another body. That should become possible during the present century. So how much of someone's brain could be replaced before that person ceases to exist? One important fact about the brain, which highlights this issue is this. The brain consists of two cerebral hemispheres, a left hemisphere and a right hemisphere, and a lower part, the cerebellum. Our conscious life depends on the upper part of the cerebral hemispheres, the cerebral cortex, patients suffering from some otherwise incurable epilepsy due to a malfunctioning hemisphere. Sometimes have parts of one hemisphere removed and may even have the whole hemisphere removed in an operation called an anatomical hemispherectomy. What happens then is that most of the functions of that part or holic hemisphere are taken over by another part or by the other hemisphere. And the patient thinks and behaves in much the same way as before, except for not having epileptic fits, at least in the respect that their memories remain largely the same and their character is not very different. And it has been discovered only fairly recently that this is the case, whichever of the two hemispheres are removed. Which shows that there is very considerable overlap between the brain states of the two hemispheres, which gives rise to conscious memories and character. Now, suppose that both hemispheres are removed from a person who might, will call Alexandra and also from two other persons. Alexandra's left hemisphere is then connected to the brain of one of these persons whom I will now call Alex and Alexandra's, right hemisphere is connected to the brain of the, the other person whom I will now call Sandra. These probably both. Alex and Sandra would claim to have been Alexandra and they would claim to remember fairly accurately the details of Alexandra's past life because they each have, uh, one cerebral cortex and we've seen that, uh, each cerebral cortex will contain a sufficient mem character to be the same as those of Alexandra. But Alex and Sandra cannot both be Alexandra because they're not the same person as each other. They leave the operation room by different doors and subsequently live different lives. But there are three possible outcomes of the operation. One is that Alex is Alexandra. The other is that Sandra is Alexandra, and the third possibility is that neither of them is Alexandra. Yet there would seem to be no possible subsequent experiment which could show which of these outcomes has occurred for even if one of them remembers the events of Alexandra's, let life better than does the other. That may not be because that person is Alexandra. Simply because the traumatic operation has produced a greater degree of amnesia in one of the former persons than in the other, and even if neither of them can remember my much about Alexandra's life or even function very well, that is still compatible with them, one of them being Alexandra. The theories of personal identity prevalent in the English speaking world of the last few centuries have been of three kinds. Physical theories, mental or psychological theories and mixed theories. A physical theory analyzes P two at T two being the same person as P one at T one. In terms of having some or all of the same body or some or all of the same brain as P one, A mineral theory analyzes P two being the same person as P one. In terms of P two, having many largely true memories of the actions of P one and a similar character to P one. A mixed theory contains elements of both physical and mental theories. All of these theories are what is known as complex theories in the respect that being P, that P two being the same person as P one is to be analyzed in terms of some specified degree of continuity of one or more features of P two with those P one, for example, a detailed brain theory of personal identity. A continuity requirement that P one is the same as P two, if an only, only if and only if only any over any period of five years. Separating them. No more than 10% of P one's brain has been replaced by a part partaken from the brain of some other person, so it would follow. P one would be the same person as P two. If after five years only 9% of P one's brain has been replaced, but not if 11% of P one's brain had been replaced. A detailed memory theory might have a continuity requirement, but P two is the same as P one. If an only fo any period between T1 and P two. P one does not lo lose more than 60% of her memories, so long as after a very instant P two has at least 61% of P one's memories. P two is the same as P one, but if after some instant, P one has only 59% of pre the previous person's memories, P two is not the same as P one. Needless to say, or most such complex theories are open to the arbitrary objection. It seems highly arbitrary to suppose that P two is the same as P one only if no more than 10% of P one's brain has been replaced over five years, but not p1 if more than 10% has been replaced. And a similar objection applies to mental and. No conceivable experiment could show which of these theories was correct. All that an experiment could show is that P two had such and such brain matter and had such and such memories and character. But the issue is whether the person who did have such and such brain matter and such and such memories and character is P two. There could not be the slightest reason for preferring any one detailed theory of these kinds, which any philosopher might offer over a somewhat different one, but which is the right theory. Theory is a very important matter, which would rightly influence human decisions. Consider the case of a patient who has a serious brain disease, which can only be cured, not merely by removing a certain part of the brain, but by replacing it with a part obtained from another brain before the patient agrees to undergo the operation. The patient will need to know whether they will survive the operation. A neuroscientist might be able to tell the patient whether the operation is likely to be successful in the sense that after the operation there will be, there will be a living conscious person, and the neuroscientists might even be able to tell the patient how much of their past memory and character, the subsequent person will have. Unless he or she has access to a true philosophical theory of personal identity, the neuroscientist will not be able to tell the patient whether they will survive the operation. It's because of the continuity between persons who have less and less of the brain matter of some P person, P one, and less and less of the me character of P one. Most of those who advocate complex theories of personal identity have moved to a theory of personal identity of a kind which reflects that continuity. This is what I call a partial identity theory. The claim of a partial identity theory is that the less and less of P one's brain matter and or memories and character, a subsequent person P two has. The less and less gradual is the process by which the change occurred. The less is the identity of the subsequent person. P one, P two. With P one, among the imminent philosophers who have advocated such a theory are Derek Par, Robert Nozik, and David Lewis. Wrote of later persons being to different degrees. Survivors of the earlier person, no wrote of them being continuous of the earlier person to the extent to which they have physical and mental continuity with them. For all such writers, the only fats which a theory of personal identity needs to describe. Is the extent of such continuity, which constitutes the degree of partial identity with that of an earlier person. According to these philosophers, to call some future person identical with a past person is to use an imprecise, ordinary language term to describe the case where some person has a very great degree, perhaps the maximum degree of continuity with that past person. So the answer of these philosophers to what happens to Alexandra in the thought experiment, which I described earlier, is that both parties, subsequent persons are partly Alexandra. And if one of these persons had more of Alexandra's brain and memory, that person would be more identical to Alexandra than the earlier person than the other person. Advocates of these theories point out that the identity of a later inanimate physical object with an earlier one is a matter of degree. A later table is naturally described as being partly the same as an earlier table if it is made of only some of the parts of the earlier material, but its earlier table. For example, if it has all the legs of the earlier table at a different table top. So these philosophers claim, we should say the same kind of thing about the identity of a person with an earlier person, but persons are very different from inanimate objects. If personal identity were ultimately a matter of degree of continuity between successive persons. The theory must hold that the earlier person has reason to fear, to some extent the bad experiences and to hope for some extent of the good ex for the good experiences of any later person who is partly identical to the earlier person. If the person is. Then these philosophers will have to say, well, each of them must have, some of them must have, uh, the subsequent, the earlier person must, after the, the, uh, passage of time have to some extent the experiences of one and to some extent the experiences of the other. That's what the partial identity would consist in. That leads to what I shall call the more than one candidate objection, which I regard as a conclusive objection to any such pastoral identity theory. On any theory on which persons, continued existence is a matter of degree. It is always possible for some person to have more than one survivor or continue whatever. Although one of these may be a closer continuer than another. For example, if Alex has only 70% of Alexandra's brain, then the remaining 30% can be given to Sandra. And so while Alex is a close continuer of Alexandra, Sandra is also a continuer, although a less close one. Since they're both continuous, then Alexandra will be going to have to different degrees, both the experiences of Alex and the experiences of Sandra. So if Alexandra knows in advance what is going to happen to her brain and also knows that Alex is going to have a happy life and Sandra is going to have a miserable life. And Alexandra must expect to have a life that is partly happy and partly miserable, although, of course more happy than miserable because Alex is a closer continual than Sandra. But that cannot possibly be the case since in this experiment, no future person is going to have a life that's partly happy and partly miserable when the future time comes. One person has a happy life. One person has a a miserable life, and um, Alex and Sandra will have quite different lives, and so neither of their lives will include a mixture of happiness and misery. Hope we've got that point. The ifq split the brain, them. The person whose brain was originally. And if he knows that one person gonna have a happy life, one person gonna have a miserable life, then he will know that being to partly this one and partly that one, he can reasonably expect to have a life which is contains both happiness and misery. But no subsequent person will have a life that contains both. There will be Alex who has a happy life, and Sandra who has a unhappy life, and that's all that's happening at the later time. So this doesn't seem to be a, a conceivable situation. So what are we left with in contrast to all such complex theories? A simple theory of personal identity claims that personal identity is all or nothing. Each person is or is not the same person as an earlier person, and there's no intermediate possibility. Certainly the greater the continuity between P one and P two of brain memory and character, the more prob it's that. P two is P one. This continuity is only probabilistic evidence of personal identity, which is something different from that continuity, which is evidence of it. So why not just say that personal identity is un analyzable? There are just analyzable truths about which person? It's the same person as the earlier person. Why not just say that, we can't say anything more about it. The problem with this is it is the incompatible with a highly plausible principle, which I call the principle of the identity of composites. And if you're following all the handout there, it's, and which I'll now explain. A substance is a thing which has properties, a component of the world, and it may or may not have other substances as parts. Thus, the Milky Way, my house, my desk, and each of the atoms of which the desk is made are all substances. They all have properties including properties of shape, mass, volume, color, and such. Like persons are substances. The principle of the identity of composite states that there couldn't be a substance different from an actual substance which is made of all the same smaller substances as it with the same properties arranged in the same way, having the same history. Consider a certain car. See you won. To sink a certain time in a car park. It has many different parts, engines, wheels, seats, and so on. Arranged in a certain way. The car has had a certain history during which it has gained or lost various properties and parts. Each of its parts has had a certain history. Now, is it possible that instead of C one. There could be instead a different car C two parked in the same place at that same time, which is made of all the same parts arranged in just the same way parts, which have had all the same history of those of C one, and yet it's a different car. It doesn't make sense to suppose this, the history and properties of the car and the history and properties of its parts. Fully determine which car it is. Now consider the earlier example of one of the two persons, let's say, Alex, being formed of some of the bodily parts and having some of the memories of the experiences of Alexandra. Given the principle of the identity of composites, if the only parts of Alexandra and so of Alex were physical parts, then whether she is Alexandra or not would be fully determined by the parts. If they had all the same parts, they would be the same person. But given the simple theory of personal identity that is false. Alex's physical parts and her physical and mental properties are not sufficient to determine who she is. So in order to maintain the simple theory, we must hold that Alexandra has a non-physical indivisible part, which I have called her soul, which is logically necessary for her existence. hope you're with me on that argument. I'll just repeat it. The principle of the, uh, identity of composite said if a substance is made of all the same parts as another substance and these parts have all the same properties of those, of the earlier substance and all the same history, then that's the same substance. Now, if all there was to, uh, uh, but um, my earlier argument suggests. Even if, uh, we know all about, uh, uh, this Alex about the parts that, she is made of and the memories she has that is not enough to determine whether or not she is the same person as Alexandra, and so it's not sufficient to determine who she is. so that means that, um, she must have another part which determines who she is, and that part is the soul. If she has Alexandra's soul, she is Alexandra. If she doesn't have Alexandra's soul, she's not Alexandra. So that is the argument that having a soul is necessary for our existence because it determines who we are and our survival depends on having the original soul because nothing else will determine, and yet there will be a truth about whether we do or don't survive. Is it sufficient for someone's existence that they have such a part? I argued so far that to the conclusion that it's necessary for my existence that I have a part which is an indivisible non-physical part, which is essential for my existence, but is it sufficient for my existence that they have such a part? Could I exist without, a soul? yeah, that's the first question. But the second question is, would it be enough just to have a soul? Wouldn't I need a body as well? So what is it for a person to continue to exist over time? It cannot be merely to have a body since how well my body functions. Once I've lost any capacity for thought and feeling, and these are irre recoverable, ire recoverable by normal means I'm dead. Consider those sad cases where a person's body is keep kept functioning by artificial means, and a judge has to determine whether someone's life support should be turned off. The judge would decide that it should be turned off only if doctors can reasonably assure the doc, judge that the person has no conscious awareness, no thoughts or feelings or sensations, and that no surgical intervention could restore that awareness. And that shows that what is logically sufficient for the person's existence is that they have the capacity for conscious awareness, but is it logically possible that there should exist a person? And so a soul which is necessary for the existence of a person with a capacity for thought and feeling, yet without a body that is, is it conceivable that. Even if I do lose my body, I still exist because if it is, it must be my soul that keeps me going. And how do you decide whether some proposition is logically possible? The only way, the only way to decide that is by showing that it is conceivable we can make sense of supposing that it is true. The only way to show that a proposition is conceivably true is along the lines, argued by David Chalmers to modally. Imagine in detail what it would be like for one state of affairs in which the proposition is true. And if however, full and detailed is what you contradiction by. It is highly probable that that is what you imagine is conceivable and so that it's logically possible. There is no other way of deciding what is logically possible. It's crucial for Descartes' argument in his discourse on the method to his conclusion that he is a soul. That in his view, it is conceivable that when he is thief thing, he has no body. Or maybe he says he just dreams that he has a body. Now, here is a different particular example where we might find Descartes. Example. Not convincing, but here is I hope a rather better one. Where almost all of us can find it conceivable, but some other person does not have a body. To have a body is to have a physical substance, a chunk of matter through which one can make a difference to the physical world and through which one learns about the physical world. I have a body only if there is some material. Arrangement of matter, which is such that I learn about the world through it and I make a difference to the world through it. I make a difference to the world by moving some of its bits. I learn about the world by input onto my sense organs, eventually affecting my brain. To have a volume is to have a lump of matter. through which I act and through which I learn Now, we have all heard reports of near death experiences of per patients undergoing an operation. Sometimes they report to be unable to cross control their body. And also to have experiences of floating that floating above the operating table at some time and seeing what was happening there when the surgeons certify the brains of those persons were totally inact. And when the patients report accurately what was happening on the table, when they couldn't have learned by that by any ordinary means. Now, we may reasonably suppose that really the patients didn't have those experiences at exactly the same time as their brains were totally inactive, or that surgeons may sometimes judge a patient's brain to be totally inactive while there's still some activity in the brain. Is to say I am not arguing that these experiences are as described, but we can certainly understand what the reports are. Claiming couldn't reject them as false if we didn't know what they were claiming and we understand what they're claiming. We're claiming that somebody knows something and has having conscious experience. At a time when, their brains and so their body in total is not under their control and when it's not providing any information for them. But certainly I suggest we can understand what the reports claim and fairly evidently those reports do not entail any contradiction. The reports entail that at the time of their near death experiences, the patient could not control anybody or learn about the world through anybody. And so they're conceivable, though possibly false claims were claims that they were having experiences at that time when they did not have a body. We can develop this scenario at considerable length without finding any contradiction. That makes it very probable, though not absolutely certain that however long we went investigating, we would not find a contradiction involved in that supposition. And from that it follows that it's very probable that it is logically possible that a person's soul could exist without their body, but our conception of a person and our conception of the soul, as I've described it earlier in. Lecture is such that it is logically possible that the soul could exist and so the person could exist or vice versa. The person could exist and say the soul could exist without the body. Now, most contemporary philosophers hold that there is a concept that metaphysical modality different from that of logical modality such that while what is logically impossible. Is also metaly impossible. What is logically possible may not be metaphysically possible. And what is lo metaphysically impossible is meant to be impossible in just such a strong sense as what is logically possible. And what is metaphysically possible is supposed to be just as weak as a sense as what is logically possible. Given that there is such a concept, it follows that if, as I have argued, having a soul is logically necessary for my existence, it is also a meta physically necessary, but it does seem open to question then well, while having a soul is logically ne sufficient for my existence, it's also metaphysically sufficient. Whether a proposition, and so the state of affairs, which it designates is metaphysically possible, depends on what that mysterious notion of metaphysical possibility amounts to, in my view, for which I do not have the time to argue here. Metaphysical possibility reduces geological possibility, but whether it does or not notoriously any claim. Some proposition is logically possible, but not metaphysically possible or metaphysically impossible, but not logically impossible. Always proves, highly contentious and seems to defend. Depend on conflicting intuitions. For example, some philosophers claim that it's not metaphysically possible as a person with the same kind of body and brain as mine who is not conscious, and other philosophers claim that it is metaphysically possible, and there seems no generally agreed principle, uh, whereby the dispute can be resolved. I hope that in my example of the near death experiences, it seems to you as, it seems to me that it's, it's not many, it's practically possible. That is to say experiments might be done, which show without too much difficulty what is happening at the time when there was no physical substance through which. Could influence the world, or the world could influence him. I'm must say the experi would show, but we know what experiences would show that. And it's, it's undoubtedly, conceivable that the experiment could be done and could be shown, not me. In an abstract way, but as a practical possibility, a possible result of an experiment. And then it would be reasonable to conclude if the experiments went the right way, that the, person was having a, experiences when you did not have a body. And so that having a soul was not. Physically possible without a body, and so clearly not meta, physically impossible for the soul to exist and function without a body. If something can be shown to be physically possible, it cannot be physically impossible, physically possible that the, Experiment might have certain result. It cannot be logically impossible or impossible in any sense, as strong as that for it to be true. I conclude that it is not logically or metaphysically possible for a person to exist without a body, not logically impossible for a person to exist a body. therefore it is logically and so metaphysically possible for a person to exist with only a soul. And I therefore conclude that having a soul is sufficient for a person to exist. And I've earlier argued that it's necessary. So being both necessary and sufficient for the existence of a person, that's what we are souls. Thank you. Can't see any one. Thank you for the lecture. I'm wondering, it seems to me that, in your theory, you two, uh, two people are. Are the same if they correspond to the same soul. But doesn't this just reduce the problem of personal identity to the problem? Sorry, I When you speak fairly sharply and fairly slowly Oh, sorry. Yeah. it seems to me that in, in your theory, two per two people are the same if they correspond to the same soul. But does this just reduce the problem of personal identity to the problem of soul identity? What if soul can also have some complex structure so that you can lose some part, but they still, they're still the same soul. Is this something that can be knowable or something? good question. Uh, I certainly do discuss this issue in the book, but, uh, uh, for reasons of time I didn't discuss it here. Um, given that, um. It's connection or absence of connection with the body, doesn't determine, which soul. It's, it would seem that, having a particular soul is an irreducible fact. It's just, I mean, there must be some irreducible, things in terms of which we analyze other things. If you say what makes that chair, that chair? Uh, well, it's, its shape and so on. And it's the matter of which it's made and yes. What makes the atom the same as the, the atom and atom the same as an atom in that chair? Well, you, you come down to one of two, two answers between which, physicists are arguing. Uh, one is that, um. some fundamental particles, are, have the same properties but are different. Solo numero, they're just different. uh, the other answer is that, they're really what makes a particle, the particle it is, is simply its properties which he shares with other, other examples, the other electrons. And what makes it that particular electron is just its place in the, in the chair. but in that case, of course, there would be no difference in a chair if the, the atoms, the electrons have been swapped around, it should still be the same chair. So, at some level you have to say things are ultimate. That's just how it is. And I think there's a very strong case, for thinking that's just how it is with souls. Um, all that science could do, uh, with regard to the soul is show that at a certain stage of human development, six months, eventually the, uh, fetus becomes conscious. And if it's conscious, then, I, it'll have a soul. but, uh, no science could show which show it could have. That is to say the same scientific laws could operate, um, and produce. Someone I grew up like me, talked like me, had the same experiences I do, but was a different person. This is just one of the ultimates. And, um, if you try and analyze it in some term, then you come down to a different, a different item. That just is what it is. and, um, that's all there is, I'm afraid. SOS just are ultimates and as, as, as physicists argue with respect to some physical particles that they're just are, they're just the particles. They're even if, their properties were the same as those of some other electron. Hey, Richard. Hi. So I wonder what you think of a possible, counter example to your argument from the principle of the identity of composites? Yeah. So you say since the two different logically possible persons who might result from the same operation, P one and someone who's not P one have and always have had all the same physical parts and all the same physical and mental properties. In order for one of them to be different from the other one of them, she must have a different mental part. Yeah. Which the other person lacks. Well, I, uh, am no expert in the philosophy of Don Scotus, but I'm given to understand from people who are, and from reading him that he felt that in order to move from a common nature, for instance, rational animality. To an individual nature. For instance, Socrates', rational animality act, you need to adjoin to the common nature. A hex and a hex. Sounds a lot like what you were sort of just saying. As the case of, of souls, as you conceive them, they're sort of fundamentally individuated entities or individuating entities. I don't think hex as the SCOTUS thought of them are mental parts or mental properties. So maybe somebody could respond to your argument by supposing that the two overlapping substances, though they had all the same physical parts with all the same physical and mental properties, nevertheless were individuated by the virtue of the one having a hex, which the other one lacks. what do you think about that? Well, uh, I'm very pleased to include Dun Scotus, as expounding the same, view as mine and indeed in, um, uh, an appendix to an earlier book of mine, the Evolution of the Soul. I did have an appendix saying that, uh, this seemed to be what SCOTUS was getting at. Um. He didn't spell out very much. At least I'm no SCO expert either, and I don't think the is present. he didn't spell out very precisely what it was to have, uh, but I think this is what he was getting at. And, uh, yes, I, that was just it. the person, I don't. Whether he talk about the soul very much in this connection, but person has, which is notable in any of these ways. And yes, he was right. Thank you so much for your talk. I particularly liked the idea that, Personal identity is all or nothing, and that you link the all or nothing character of personal identity to the indivisibility of the soul or the principle that explains personal identity. but I wanted to, I wanted to interrogate the, the sort of assumption behind the question, I am my soul. because at the beginning of the. Described the, the I as going with conscious experience. And there I think there's a big, so I wondered whether you and Aquinas are actually answering the same question when he says, I am not my soul, and you say I am my soul. because I don't think his notion of the, I, he thinks of the referent of the I, the pronoun I as being the entirety of this substance that is speaking. The pronoun I, which includes the body, which I think is a different assumption than the one that you're starting with when you say, I am my soul, but only referring to the seed of conscious experience. So I was wondering what would be the justification for thinking of the I as going with conscious experience as opposed to the the broader referent of the pronoun I. Uh, yes. Uh, it would be rather odd to say that, I, my soul weighs 10 stone, as it were. Is that what you're getting at? Yes. but, um, I think you, you can, given my claim, you can analyze statements about I, which clearly implies something about, uh, the body, which I have. In certain obvious ways. I mean, if it's, I, I weigh 10 stone, then this is to say that the body connected to my soul waves 10 stone. And, uh, similarly for other, uh, statements about me, which imply, a body, yes. it's my, what I'm trying to, uh, delineate is what makes it the case that something is my body. and, um, that means that it's connected to the essential part of me just as, uh, um, yeah. Sure. Thank you, professor. I was wondering if, uh, prenatal injury law or how it affects your theory, uh, that you've argued today. we have in this country basically 50 jurisdictions which hold that if an, an embryo at any time after conception is injured, and of course, based on proof and medical developments and science and so forth. uh, it is, uh, that injury is demonstrated to exist after birth. that, that there is continuity there, between the embryo and the born individual. So the implications are before consciousness, before brain, before parts. The embryonic individual is the same as the born one. yes. Well, my view is that we have no grounds for supposing, that there is, so before we have grounds for supposing that the fetus is conscious. I don't wish to deny, of course, that I can exist at a time without being conscious. You do certain moments of sleep, makes. Uh, that doesn't affect the fact that I have a soul. It's that I can easily be woken up. but if I can't be woken up, then there is no soul anymore in connection with my body. Now it may be the case that at conception, we are, what is conceived is not merely a physical unit. But a soul connected to it. But the soul doesn't show itself until it manifests particularly soul like attributes. Uh, that is consciousness at six months. So I would certainly claim that there is no good reason to suppose it might be true, but there's no good reason to suppose that any abortion before the six months constitutes murder. Of course it might be wrong for other reasons, but it couldn't be wrong for that reason. does that get at the sort of points you're making? Well, the law, the tort law today is in all, tort law today, in all jurisdictions, extends the prenatal injury back to, uh, conception. But even in the criminal law, uh, that is the case going back to approximately 1600. And of course I think Aquinas would agree with me about this matter because Aquinas thought, that the features started by being a vegetable and then became an animal and then became at a slightly later stage humans, and he got this view from Aristotle. So it puzzles me a little why the modern Catholic church is so convinced that souls appear on the scene after, uh, uh, simply at conception. It may be saying, well, it better to be safe than sorry, but, I can't see it has any very good reason for, for that claim. This will be the last question. That's a great honor to have. The last question, in regards to the argument, it seems to hinge, uh, please a little louder, but a little sharper. If you'll, I'll try. As a German, I can speak very sharp. Ah, no, I'm just kidding. the argument seems to hinge on, the importance of the brain, uh, for our consciousness, feelings, et cetera. but for example, I think of Thomas Fox, who in, uh, the economy of the brain states that the brain is, the brain's importance for our, consciousness. Our identity is overstated by neuroscientist. He's a philosopher and he's a psychiatrist and a neuroscientist. So the question is, if that is really true. That the brain might be not as important, to personal identity as you make it, but the entirety hex. So he's actually, following the previous speaker, then where would that lead us? I'm sorry. It's, it's my hearing, but I haven't quite got that. Um, oh, could, uh, so, the question would be, what if the brain is not. Important for our thought and consciousness as, for example, F states in the brain. I was of course, assuming that all consciousness does depend on the cortex. Were it to be shown that some other part of the brain or even some other part of the body, had a role. The same arguments as I have given would, would apply as it were. That is to say, if it's a part, it could be divided into parts. and the same argument then goes through, well, I think, uh. A hardy round of applause is in order. If there's anything left over here, you're welcome to take it. I also, I, well, as as Professor Swinburne's driver, I can assure you he's not just about to dash off, so there will still be time, for a little bit more dialogue if you wish.