Aquinas at 800, Part 13: Religious Epistemology

Episode Topic: Religious Epistemology 

How can the humblest among us invert traditional hierarchies by sensing truth through deep faith? Lessons on the Eucharist deepen our sense of God living within us while trusting God’s word secures belief in His power. Hear the call to reflect on these ideas to see your own journey to God from a fresh perspective.

Featured Speakers:

• Noah Karger, University of Notre Dame
• Mats Wahlberg, Umeå University (Sweden)
• Daniel Gordon '24 Ph.D., Ave Maria University

Read this episode's recap over on the University of Notre Dame's open online learning community platform, ThinkND: https://go.nd.edu/d36e91. 

This podcast is a part of the ThinkND Series titled Aquinas at 800. 

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Transcript

Welcome and Panel Intro

Speaker 10 0:12

Uh, good afternoon and welcome. this afternoon's, panel is on, theology and religious epistemology in Aquinas. And, uh, my name is Father Nicholas Lombardo. I'm here on the faculty of the University of Notre Dame and I'm pleased to introduce our first, panelist today. Noah k Ger, a doctoral student here at the University of Notre Dame, and he'll be speaking on revealed unto babes how the simple teach the learned through the example of their faith. Please welcome, Noah Krueger.

Teaching by Example

Speaker 3 0:54

Jesus. Thanks God and the Father for hiding the things of the faith from the wives and the intelligence. For revealing them instead to babes to infants. This is by no means a one-off, but rather epitomizes the teaching and ministry of our Lord. Namely that all those who exalt themselves will be humbled and those who humble themselves will be exalted To follow Christ then is to be a, is to be humble, is to go low. And yet, as Aquinas tells us, following dynes, divine revelation reaches people of lower degree through those of higher degree. And that because of this, the unfolding of the faith, those who depend on in the unfolding of the faith, those who are lower, depend upon the wisdom of those who are higher. Surely Jesus came not to disrupt disorder, but to give unto us the fullest revelation of its Telus. After all, Christ is the logos through whom all things were made in and to whom the cosmic order finds its meaning. What then are we to make of this dramatic inversion of human wisdom that Jesus teaches? What are we to make of the seeming unidirectionality of aquinas's creaturely hierarchy and lineup? And one brief pointing is Corpus Aquinas overtly admits a place for this inversion, at least in the most straight chord, quote in the ecclesiastical hierarchy. Sometimes those who are near to God and sanctity are in the lowest grave in are not gonna speak news for science. And on that account, superiors may be taught by inferiors. This admission, however, is not developed when discussing the transmission of the fade elsewhere. Aquinas describes its movement consistently from superior to inferior, from learned to simple. Our questions today then, is this, is there a way to incorporate Aquinas's mission that superiors can be taught by inferiors into the pedagogical hierarchy at the fate as otherwise consistently outlined without thereby completely undermining it? Moreover. Be the case that if we pull on this little thread, which Aquinas has given us, if we draw out the full implications of a wholly simple person teaching one who is far greater in station, might we in fact discover all the more the veracity of this cos order? This paper argues in the affirmative on both accounts and does so by employing a particular distinction, one that Aquinas elsewhere draws, but does not apply to the issue at hand. Namely, he knows that there are two ways to be called great with respect to the faith one viewed objectively and two viewed subjectively. It's in being great in the latter respect. I will argue that the simple can teach the learning and can do so in such a way that does not undermine the hierarchy, but conforms it evermore to the person of Christ. Let us first, however, it's into the distinctions which give rise to aquinas's unidirectional conception of the transmission of faith. Two sets of interrelated distinctions are, are of importance for one. Implicit and explicit. And two, the learned aqua presents these distinctions so as not to allow for genuine lever to pass into unbelief due to an innocent lack of capacity. He does so first of all by distinguishing between varying levels of explicit and implicit faith maintained that explicit fate is necessary for salvation, but that it is not required of everyone in every age. To the same extent, Aquinas explicit denotes that in which each of the things is considered in itself and implicit denotes that in which many things are contained as in one, thus, one with explicit belief in some article of the faith considers it directory. Whereas one with implicit faith in that same article considers it only indirect through grasping a more general article in which A does contains QAs outlines four levels of requirement for explicit faith, an article of faith must be believed explicitly, either one by everyone in every age, two. In every age, but not by everyone. Three by everyone, but not in every age, and four, not by everyone nor in every age. In two and four, not by everyone indicates that the article of faith in question must be believed explicitly only by those Aquinas calls the learner, but not by those he calls a civil. The learned are required to have faith that is more explicit because they have a greater capacity and are therefore charged with teachings. Meanwhile, it suffices for the simple. He writes to quote, know those articles through which they can direct their own proper intention to the ultimate end. The simple R, in other words, charge only with tending to their own growth in the faith. All this in view then it seems to be the case that the simple depend upon the learned, but not the other way around. This is of no small importance since the offices of the learned in the simple are according to Aquinas, nothing less than God-given vocations corresponding and very fabric or. The very means by which God has chosen to undo his blur. This is evidenced, first of all by the fact that the act of teaching is not accidental, but essential to the transmission of faith. This is because Aquinas argues, unlike knowledge, the articles of faith cannot be traced back to natural important principles, and therefore the entire determination of faith is in us through teaching. And so given these distinctions, how might it be that the simple have anything to offer? The learner? The way forward, I argue, is in drawing out this feature of quins concept that in explicating this particular relationship, he himself neglects, namely, quote, the quantity of a habit may be considered from two points of view. First on the part of the object, second on the part of its participation by the subject viewed objectively. One is felt great with respect to material object of fake believing, more articles, more explicitly. It's for being great and precisely this way that the learned are given. The task of teaching is simple. However, viewed subjectively, someone can be called great by virtue of the extent to which she participates in the faith, regardless of how many articles she has explicit belief in. In other words, one can be great in the faith viewed subjectively without necessarily being great in the faith, viewed, objected, one could be holy and not learner. What might this look like? The simplest participation in the faith is illustrated compellingly when Aquinas answers the question as to how they might respond in the face of Paris. Given that they themselves do not have the same capacity as the teachers and therefore have to take it on faith that what their superiors teach is true. Aquinas argues that the symbol in such instances have by virtue of their habit of faith, a quote inclination to the contracts quote, just as the habit of temperance. And clients wanna resist luxury, so too the habit of faith. Inclines want resisting all things that are against the faith. That is when one is truly habituated in the fate. One is not the need exhaustive knowledge of every article contained therein to adequately respond to Harrison. But it is instead enough that long with those few articles about which explicit will weak is required. The believer knows the rhythms of the fate just as the temperate person becomes stably disposed towards tempered acts, and thereby lives a tempered life. So two, the faithful person becomes stably disposed towards acts of faith and comes to know through their lived faith evermore the object of that faith. The God wound their every act of faith addresses in this way. The simplest responsibility in the face of heresy that is to heed this inclination to the contrary and go seek further counsel from the church is described not as the obligation of, but in fact the very height of their simplicity. The simple are able to discern that their teachers aired, not because they have been suddenly granted some capacity, which hinder to exceed them only because of their profound reliance on God having learned to live in such a way. That disposes them to know the humility proper to their station, the humility proper to a servant of God, a station that we're all called. It's in other words, through greatness with with respect to the faith you subjectively, that they have this inclination to contract. It's because of the intimacy with our God, which they grow in daily. How then does the simplest capacity to be great in the faith by virtue of participation translate into a capacity to thereby teach their learned superiors? Aquinas outlines a twofold manner by which one person teaches another one via external a and two, through strengthening the learners' intellect in the first sense, he further enumerates two kinds of external aid. One, a kind of conceptual help shared primarily through propositions and second sensible examples, either of likeness or opposition. The first of these is clearly provided by the learner as they bring the simple, the simple to greater explicit belief. But what of the second? Sensible. Now, the objects of faith in particular that is each one considered in itself cannot be seen and believed at the same time qua. But in general, that is quote, under the common expected credibility. The can be seen for aqua says he would not believe unless on the evidence of signs or something similar and so sensible examples can in fact point us to the object of faith, just as the object of faith are taught by quote certain words that do not suffice for their expression. So too are they taught by quote, certain likenesses falling short of their representation in both ways? Then the things of faith are said to be known, says as an anir or an enigma. Further, these sensible examples can take the form of human acts. That is one person can teach another by way of embodying and thus by way of providing sensible example of the very thing they hope to teach. This pedagogic possibility is substantiated by aqua's virtue ethics. A central feature of which is the notion that the virtues can and must be discovered through the sensible exemplification of virtues people. And so I here take it that this is no less possible with the theological virtue of faith, even if it's object is itself beyond their sense experience. It's therefore in this way by which we come to know the holy simple. As teachers, they teach with their own example. Having demonstrated that the simple can be great in the faith subjectively and that they can therefore teach by way of, of example, I turned out to consider a pressing question, namely in light of the foregoing is the pedagogical hierarchy but us undermine if we are to understand not only the learning, but also the simple as possessing the capacity to teach and matters of faith. Should we not therefore do away with the idea of the learn, it is higher and as simple as lower. To answer this, let us first note that though one is consistently affirms that lower things be moved by higher things. He nevertheless also affirms that God in his freedom is not bound to this order. God can act independently of the hierarchy, producing an effect and inferior things without a higher agent doing anything, and God does this. Aquinas goes on to say, in order to manifest his power for by no other means, can it be better made manifest that all nature is subject to the divine will. Since this shows that the order of things proceeded from him, not of natural necessity, but of free will, and yet even while manifesting his power by acting without respect to the hierarchy, God does nothing contrary to his nature rights because it is His nature to be first cause. Accordingly, it's our nature to be His instruments, secondary causes. Therefore, we we're rightly said, to act in accord with the natural order of things. Whenever we serve God, however, he wills in his perfect wisdom, God's power to act independent of this order is then demonstrated in the simple or elevated to the status of teacher. However, it is likewise demonstrated when relatedly God humbles the wa. Aquinas's treatment of this particular inversion appears when he, where he argues that all who are in a state of grace have the gift of understanding an objection. Notes. That understanding is sometimes withdrawn from those who are in a state of grace for their own good, so as to keep a learned believer from becoming puffed up or contented with their own wi, he responds to this objection by clarifying that though God will never move the degree of understanding necessary for explicitly grasping those articles necessary for salvation, God can and does, however, minimize one's degree of explicitness with respect to all the other, all the other articles of the faith. In other words, God will sometimes transform you learned believer into a simple believer suspending their capacity for a time, so to keep them from. Therefore, God sometimes gives higher beings a lower office and lower beings a higher office, and he does so to display his power, his glory, and yet the very reversal of the ordered pedagogy presupposes its existence in the first place. We come to see God's mysterious glory through the elevation of the simple or through the humbling of the learner. Only because the simple are low enough to be so elevated and the learned high enough to be so humble. In other words, if no order were established, there would be no reversing of the order, no display of God's authorial power through the kaleidoscopic relations of creation, organizing, and then reorganizing in service of his glory. And so we participate in God's providence when we govern our actions to accord with the hierarchy. But we also participate in God's providence when we obey his promptings to act without respect to the hierarchy. And in fact, it's only in doing both of these together that we reflect God's magnificence at all for if we were to only obey God in so far as he acts through the hierarchy. Others would come to call the hierarchy itself, God. But if we were only to obey God in so far as he reverses the hierarchy, then others would not find in creation any order, a tri to God thus. Simple by way of their participation in the faith. Teach by example, not to the desperate hierarchy, but so as to further conformant to the wisdom of God, the logos in responding to whether one ought by humility and subject oneself to all men. Aquinas argues in the affirmative specify that we are to subject that within us, which is proper to our humanity. Two, that within every other person, which is of God in this way, then we can say that by elevating the simple or humbling the wise, God not only reminds creation of his greatness, but reminds us of his greatness ins, regardless of where they rank on the cosmic orders, he reminds the learning that he is the God who associates with the lowly. He reminds us that is of the very telos of his design, namely his providential care for knowledge of all creatures. Even if not every learned person is at some point in her life miraculously transformed into a simple person. It's surely the case that only by truly encountering the temple is one ever come to know our Lord. Only by allowing the gravity of creation to pull us all the way down do we see where God with whom God votes and thereby who God is. Only by knowing whom God loves, for whom he sent his only son, can we truly come to encounter the fullness of his majesty? Therefore, not only did the symbol have something to teach to learn, they have something to teach, to learn that only they can teach. That is the symbol. Teach the learning that God cannot be adequately captured in a linear human hierarchy, even if that hierarchy be true and good in like manner. The Lord remind the simple through their efficacious mediation that God can and has ordered the universe so it's reveals glory. But every time we become satisfied with creation over and above our creator, the simple show the learning what it means to have faith. It means rely upon the God who is equally infinitely beyond the learning as he's beyond them and being. After Christ's own example, servants of God we're sent into, into the world in radical ways learned. Teachers live into the ammo of Christi as they lead the temple, but they likewise live into this image when they cannot empty themselves by following some. And in fact, they live into Christ's likeness only insofar as they perform both of us. And the same is true of the simple, the image Christ insofar as they become lowly servants to their learned superiors, but only also insofar as they courageously reveal God through their simplicity, teaching even those higher than themselves, what it means to be great in faith. And so this qualification that I have here provided does not undermine hierarchy, ITIF figures.

Speaker 10 17:32

so now we'll have time for questions and in order to make sure the people viewing from home can hear, well use this microphone.

Speaker 4 17:45

Thank you for your presentation and, um, appreciate the point you, want to make. Uh, and I wonder, if you should, um, consider the difference between Fetus Way and Fetus Qua? because I think if we, if we see historically, I think, that the balance, got lost in the moment in which, it was not. Uh, human beings is an infused virtue so that there is, there are no, natural preconditions for, for faith. So that, I would say that condition of, of the, inversion that you, you see is that both in, in, in all believers, I is faith, an infused virtue is, uh, and there is, is not. Uh, and, and the difference, concerns, uh, the content of, uh, of, uh, the teaching, but, not faith as the form that enables.

Speaker 3 18:58

That's a no, that's helpful. I think that is definitely one way to narrate this, distinction that I'm drawing rather the lag there. Um, I think it still sort of remains to be shown though how the simple, having the same infuse version fit as the learner can therefore also teach the limit. Right. So that's sort of the, so that the, the first part of the argument though definitely hinges upon that and I think that would be a whole way to navigate it. So I appreciate Yeah, you drawing on that because that's definitely the point that I make. Absolutely.

Speaker 5 19:32

Thanks so much for your presentation. I really like what you're doing and looking at Yeah. The, the simple and all that. And I was just wondering if you could just talk a little bit more, about what you mean by, teaching and the simple as teachers and trying to map that on a little bit about the way Aquinas talks about teachers. So particularly it seemed, it wasn't totally clear to me about like. Are the simple, are they a teacher in so far as there an exemp or a s syn, or are they a doctor or a magista or maybe a sacramentum or something like that. And you know, if they, if they're, he, a lot of times in English when things get translated as teacher, the Latin behind it is doctor, which means the learned one, which then starts, I'm wondering, creating problems about, well, if they're not learned, they've got some sort of simple knowledge. Does how are they teaching? They're certainly not teaching the same way as a doctor might teach. Or, or, yeah. If, if there's some distinctions to be made with that. Thank you. I

Speaker 3 20:31

think it's certainly very helpful and I, yeah, it would be, it would be very useful to sort of, yeah, apply that distinction in Al Latin, that I'm not necessarily attaching the term doc force to them. I think Exem is much more in line with what I'm imagining. And so in that way it's not as if I'm taking a coin, inception of the pedagogical hierarchy and just mapping the simple into it perfectly. I'm kind of drawing out. A facet that can, I think, be drawn down without causing any particular tension. In fact, what I'm saying elevates misconception of the hierarchy, namely that people also teach by example, which he seems to be more ready to sort of admit when it comes to like moral teaching. Right. And that's kind of what I allude to there. So yeah, it's more, it's more as, as an example. Yeah. But thank you for the clarifying question.

Speaker 6 21:19

It's more a comment than a question, but also maybe answering this, going beyond Aquinas's time to Jean, who was asked in two different instances whether the non ordained could preach. So when his friend, the bishop of Ion had to deal with a rogue Franciscan who was going around preaching without being ordained, geal said no, the non-trained cannot preach. But then when he had to defend Joan of Ark. Was also obviously non non ordained and non-trained. He said, well, except if there are infused virtues, then this is an exception to the first rule about the simple being able to teach the learn learned by being a con or,

Speaker 4 22:02

that's great.

Speaker 3 22:02

Yeah,

Speaker 4 22:02

that's really helpful.

Speaker 3 22:03

Um, yeah, and it's really interesting when you get into some of the weeds on what he means by the intonation of the contrary. I almost get the sense that for Aquinas, the simple though, they don't have the kind of capacity to sort of, to preach, um, like a doctor would. They do have a kind of atic capacity, which is to say that if a preacher preaches something which is theoretical, it's not the case that a simple person could say, you know, man, something that's rightful and that's like a subtle matter, right? It's not the case that a simple person would say, aha, like I see that you buried any very precisely but precise this reason. But they can say supposedly.'cause of their sort of deep fish and fit ah, you there? And I'm not sure exactly how, but I know there's something off here and so I'm gonna go see for the council. There is, it's in some ways that's also another view of MSO is, is there's a sort of a, yeah, this register, the simple have in relation to teaching of the learn. Anyway,

Speaker 2 22:54

thank you for your comment that that's,

Speaker 7 23:02

I had a question, um, just broadly about the, the, the relationship between the simple and the learned as we understand it with parents and children, um, specifically in parents teaching children. And if you had, a parent who'd be categorized as one of the simple teaching their children, is there any tension with the church's teaching of the, the parents as the primary teachers of their own children and the understanding that these are not simply relative terms, but actually, vocational differences, um, with the, the teaching of a parent to their child. Given that the parent is one of the simple, be sufficient, um, for the religious education of that child?

Speaker 3 23:41

That's a nice question. I think that question, yeah, so they, they're not completely relative, but there are some irrelevant so far as one can be more simple than another. so I, I guess it would be the case. On one hand, this is one way to get a question, you said, but parent would presumably less simple than their child. but at the same time, um, what I'm talking about here is a particular kind of teaching. So if you have a simple parent, maybe they won't be able to explain to their child what transubstantiation means, but they can model for their child what it looks like to go take the Eucharist in a reverence or posture. So I would uphold that as a way that they can continue to teach you, but not teaching in the way that, um, the way they teach. So,

Speaker 8 24:28

thank you. The, that was great. Just a really quick comment. I love that question. Um, e the philosopher, Elizabeth Anco, was known to take her children to mass and, uh, during the elevation of the host point and say that's Jesus to her child. So that's kind of one simple way you could teach trans substantiation without being alerted. Um, and I just had a really quick question about, she was learned but she, she didn't have to use that with the, the kids. but just a really quick question too about the simple, like, does the simple refer to people that don't have a certain capacity to understand or they're not able to exercise the capacity? Or is it people that just don't have the education, like don't have the learning? Because if it's the latter, then I just think it's, it really is just like a, um, there's just a bunch of different degrees and kinda like everybody is, it's gonna be kind of vague, right? Like there's not gonna be a firm distinction between the simple and the learned.'cause we're all constantly in that state of learning.

Speaker 3 25:26

Yeah, so that's something that I'm actually not utterly clear on. Um, and it might be the quote, it might be because it's somewhat of a modern problem.'cause so far as like, but not, but not entirely. It's just, it's just definitely recognized in the model to a greater extent perhaps. But I do think there's something to sort of distinguishes between there. I am more inclined to lean towards just natural capacity. Um, but I think the idea would be if you have natural capacity to teach, then ideally you would be like trained to do that location. I think that's the idea. But yeah, you're right. It's not always a one to one correlation. So that definitely leaves us to a couple questions about how these categories shape up.

Speaker 10 26:06

time for one more question.

Speaker 9 26:16

I, I dunno how satisfied I'm with my formulation. So tell me if you think it's nonsense. in, in, in the Latin is, is the, the simple, are they called the simplex in in the text or,

Speaker 3 26:25

yeah, sometimes simplex and sometimes, whatever the English word is for whiner.

Speaker 9 26:29

Right. Okay. So I'm, I'm, I'm wondering what you make of this then. if, if, uh, if divine simplicity holds and if the simple are better teachers than the learn it, it would seem that the, the comments about teaching by exemp are landing even harder, right? Because the simpler you are, uh, whether it's by, by natural station or, or somehow you manage to remain simple, it seems that your, your power as a teacher for the faith specifically is gonna be augmented by you're maintaining a certain amount of simplicity.'cause then you have divine likeness on your side, as it were.

Speaker 3 27:02

So, well lemme first clarify. It's not that the simple or better, I don't wanna, I don't wanna make that clear. They just better make, they have a particular thing that be better at. But to your point about imaging of my simplicity, this was something I wasn't going, this is a, this is a direction I wasn't gonna go in, with much of tone in front of me, but it's definitely, we could take that route. it, it would be, it would not be easy per se because simplicity is something which is admits of no composition. Right? And humans are like necessarily composition. but yeah, I'm open to that. I, I think we have some work to do, but it's, it's certainly a very interesting thought position.

Speaker 10 27:35

Thank you. Please join me in thanking Mr. Carter again. Our next speaker is Dr. Daniel Gordon, who is an assistant professor of theology at Ave Maria University. He received his PhD in theology from the University of Notre Dame in 2024. His MA in theology from the Dominican House of Studies and his BA in intellectual history from Yale University. He is the author of The Passion of Love in the Summa Theolog of Thomas Aquinas Catholic University of America Press 2023 and is currently working on a volume of Trinitarian theology. The title of his presentation is The Graced Assimilation of Man to God, Thomas Aquinas on Eucharistic Reception and Trinitarian Indwelling. Please welcome Dr. Gordon.

Speaker 2 28:38

it's great to be here

Proper Effects of Eucharist

Q&A Arguments and Testimony

Speaker 10 28:39

and I think very humbling to be among so many eminent a theologians and Thomas. So thank you for the kind introduction. So the title of my talk is The Graced Assimilation of Man to God, Thomas Aquinas on Eucharistic Reception and Trinitarian Indwelling. Much recent scholarship on the work of Thomas Aquinas examines the effects of the Eucharist and the Common Doctor emphasizing the presence of Christ and the intensification of charity. Another domain of scholarship considers the missions of the divine persons in relation to Trinitarian indwelling. But few of these works thematically interrelate these two loci of optimistic theology on the Eucharist and on the Trinity. There are, there are a couple of people working on this, but it's less common. This presents an opportunity for a deeper appreciation of their interconnection, can help to show on the one hand the profound grace of the Eucharist and relation to our ultimate end, the blessed vision of Christ and the Trinity. And on the other hand, the relevance of Trinitarian dogma to the liturgical life of the believer. Starting from the observation of Thomas that quote, spiritual food changes man into its self. Spiritu. This paper works to unfold the increase of grace and charity, not only through a christological, but also through a Trinitarian lens. This increase of grace not only likens us to Christ, although that effect is paramount, but it also brings the believer inly into deeper communion with the other persons of the Trinity. The emphasis on spiritual nourishment, mentum, spiritual refreshment, reio, and spiritual joy. Letitia from question 79 and 74 of the Teia pars, which are late motifs of the questions on the Eucharist, and the Sumer suggest a deep similarity with discussions of the Trinity in these questions. 27 through 43 of the prima pars Thomas observes that the believer can come to enjoy and experience the divine persons themselves. As he notes, uh, in question 43, article three of the prima pars, but also already in his sentences, commentary, distinction one, question two. Article two, Thomas deploys here the Augustinian distinction from De Trina book, one between use UUs and Enjoyment fario to clarify a relationship to the Trinity of persons who are both the means to our final end and the end itself. Indeed, it is through the use of this sacrament that the Trinity becomes present in a more intense way to the rightly disposed believer in virtue of the increase of faith, which Thomas discusses in questions 73 of the teia pars and the increase of charity in question seven. Well also question 73 about Article iii, uh, that this sacrament affects for the Eucharist, both elicits our faith and the gift of knowledge and increases our charity and the gift of wisdom. The depths of these gifts affect our assimilation to the persons of the Trinity that not only images the processions of the Sun and Holy Spirit, but finally and really terminate in the enjoyment of these persons making us friends of Christ and thereby friends of God. Sumit Taylor Lutia Pars Question 73, article five. The Eucharist thus brings about not only our assimilation to the divine persons, especially the Sun and the Holy Spirit, but also I will argue deepens within us the indwelling of the Trinity, insofar as the Eucharist increases the graces by which the persons are known and loved by us. This study will therefore have two major parts. The first part will look at the proper effects of the Eucharist. The second part will consider the spiritual effects, specifically in relation to the presence of the divine persons to the believer in virtue of the gifts and graces resulting from our worthy reception of the Eucharist. The upshot of this work is fairly simple, which is, is to show more precisely how the Eucharist is a key to deeper union with the God who is Trinity. So part one, the proper effects of the Eucharist. Thomas presents a spiritually dense reflection on the purpose and effects of the Eucharist and the Teia pars of the Sumit, and in parallel texts from the corpus. One of the most striking observations that he makes, I think, following a patristic trope is how we should understand the Eucharist as spiritual food that changes man into itself. Mentum spirituality. This article comes in the first question on the Eucharist and the Teia pars, and the topic of the question focuses broadly on the sacrament of the Eucharist. But already in this script I, on the sentences, Thomas observes that whereas bodily food is converted into the one who eats. Spiritual food is not converted into the one who eats, but the one who eats is changed into it, namely the spiritual food. So the proper effect of this sacrament is the conversion of man into Christ. Thomas says, so that one can say with the apostle, I live now, not I, but Christ lives in me. Vivo vivero in Galatians two 20, and for this end, Thomas says Two effects are required. First, the increase of spiritual quantity and the increase of the virtues that's plural of your tutu. And second, the restoration of what is lost in the remission of venial sin or the reparation of any of the preceding defects. That whole quote is from the fourth book of uh, his script among the sentences. Distinction 12. Question two. Article one, ion kilo, one. The increase of charity is especially associated with this sacrament since quote, it is proper to charity to transform the lover into the beloved. For love itself is that which causes ecstasy, as DiUS says on the divine names chapter four, number 13. Indeed this sacrament can bring about the perfection of charity so far as that is possible in this life and via though it cannot bring us, of course, to the perfection of charity and glory and patria, the purpose of the gift of the Eucharist is seen clearly through its proper effects. Thomas summarizes a good deal of scriptural, patristic and scholastic reflection on the Eucharist. The first article of this question I think is remarkable. Thomas here states that one should think about the effect in light of what is contained in the sacrament, namely Christ himself quote, the effect of the sacrament should be considered first and principally from that which is contained in the sacrament, which is Christ Thomas observes how there is a sort of twofold. Coming into the world of Christ. First through the incarnation Visibi Terra Romanians, and second, through the sacrament of the Eucharist sacrament Ians. In each case, Christ bestows grace on men in accord with the central text from the prologue of the Gospel of John John one 17, which Thomas Fittingly quotes In this discussion, grace and truth came through Jesus Christ. More specifically, the Eucharist would seem to increase our faith in charity faith, at least insofar as it elicits our faith in God. Perhaps also by strengthening it in charity insofar as the sacrament is especially responsible for the increase of that greatest virtue. Thomas thus not only mentions the increase of grace, but also specifically of the theological virtue of charity. And so he writes, quote, the Eucharist is the sacrament of the passion of Christ as man is perfected in union with the suffering Christ. So just as baptism is called, the sacrament of faith, which is the foundation of the spiritual life. So the Eucharist is called the Sacrament of Charity, which is the bond of perfection, as is said in Colossians three 14. This rich text suggests our conformity to Christ through the Eucharist as the sacrament of charity. As I will suggest further on, it also implies our union with the Trinity in virtue of what Thomas says in the prima pars. It's therefore noteworthy that Thomas speaks of the Eucharist as the sacrament of charity, sacramentum Carati as that which increases our charity in the same response to an objection where Thomas speaks of the Eucharist in this manner. He also suggests how the Eucharist itself presupposes a faith in the passion of Christ. The Eucharist itself is an occasion for faith. My phrasing, quote, for without faith in the passion of Christ, there could never be salvation, according to Romans 3 25, whom God put forth as a propitiation through faith in his blood, and therefore, it was necessary for all time that there be some representation. Before Men of the Do Passion, the Eucharist is a sign of the passion of Christ, which is an occasion for and perhaps even a cause of our faith in Christ and in God. Indeed, the poetry of the ADO devotee suggests the relationship between faith and the Eucharist. Visus Tu tour set out D two Solo Tuto credit tour Credo qui it de Neil Hook, Rabo Tatis verus sight, touch, taste all fail in their judgment of you, but hearing suffices firmly to believe. I believe all that the son of God has spoken. There is nothing truer than this word of truth, as the sacrament affects an increase of grace and charity, it would also seem to be a cause, perhaps not merely an occasion of the increase of faith. Part two, reception of the Eucharist and participation in the Trinity. Against the commentary of Thomas on the Trinitarian language of John in a Eucharistic context, uh, which we cannot discuss here though touches directly on the Trinitarian indwelling. There's a very rich, scriptural commentary on this theme in the gospel of John. One begins to see how his comments in the sum Mateo can be read within a Trinitarian valence, even if Thomas himself is not making the connections directly for us. The effects of the Eucharist is the increase of grace, both as food for the spiritual journey and for the attainment of glory. Taken in conjunction with earlier observations about the necessity of the Eucharist as the consummation and fulfillment of the spiritual life, one can also begin to grasp the centrality of the effect of unity. Interestingly, and perhaps surprisingly, Thomas only refers to the Trinity twice in these questions on the Eucharist. In one case while discussing the right of the sacrament and the mass, he observes that when asking that the sacrifice be born to God's altar on high, the God we besiege is he whose participation we seek. Who used partici, pat and Patmos? Thomas makes a similar observation in discussing the effects of the sacrament. Through the sacrament, grace has increased and the spiritual life is perfected so that man may exist perfect in himself through union with God. Perricone y, since God is a trinity of persons, in so far as the Eucharist affects our unity with God. It implies union with the divine persons. As Thomas notes elsewhere, the term Di God Deus can stand for suppon. The divine essence for this predicate belongs to the subject by reason of the form signified, which is deity. But it can also stand for the person, either one, only as it is said, God generates. Or two as when it is said God spy races. Or three, when it is said to the king of the ages, immortal, invisible, God alone. An example from one Timothy one 17 to be united with God. Setting aside that name as it refers to notional acts, is thus to be united with all three of the divine persons. As Thomas says in the questions on the Trinity quote, the soul is conformed to God by grace, and since the Holy Spirit is love, the soul is assimilated to the Holy Spirit by the gift of charity. So according to the gift of charity, one finds the mission of the Holy Spirit. Now the Son is the word, not any word, but as Thomas famously says here and elsewhere, the word breathing forth love. Therefore, it is not according to any perfection of the intellect that the sun has sent, but according to such an instruction of the intellect by which it bursts forth in the affection of love. Thomas intimates here that there is a relationship between knowledge and love. Of course, the charity which assimilates the soul of the believer to the Holy Spirit, would seem to presuppose the knowledge of the Son that itself bursts forth in love. To have charity requires the possession of faith, and so the one who has charity and faith by implication by would already seem to be assimilated to the Sun and the Holy Spirit, insofar as the Eucharist is a cause of the increase of the theological virtues of faith and charity. Therefore, it would also seem to affect not only our imitation of the persons of the Trinity, but also our possession and enjoyment of them by faith and charity. For by faith, we are assimilated to the person of the Son, and by charity we are assimilated to the person of the Holy Spirit. At the root of these theological virtues is habitual grace, quote, with respect to the effect of grace, the two missions of the Son and Holy Spirit communicate in the root of grace. But are distinguished in the effects of grace, which are the illumination of the intellect and the inflaming of the will. Further, these missions cannot be separated. One cannot be without the other because neither exists without the grace that makes pleasing Gracie Gra, nor is one person separated from another. Since the effect of the sacraments is grace, it would seem that the sacraments and the missions are intertwined. To be clear, Thomas does not refer to the Eucharist or the sacraments themselves as missions or sendings of the divine persons. That is not our claim. But the effects of the sacraments, namely grace and virtue, would seem to fall under that rubric. Now, on the other hand, the sacraments are a cause of grace. Quote. It is necessary to say that the sacraments of the new law in some way cause grace. And on the one hand, as Thomas Affirms quote, it is fitting for a divine person to be sent in so far as they exist in someone in a new way. It is fitting for a divine person to be given Dari insofar as he has had by someone, and neither of these is possible without the grace that makes pleasing. Of course, the sacramental grace of specific sacraments varies in the case of the Eucharist quote, every effect which food and drink does for bodily life, namely that it sustains, increases repairs and delights. This sacrament does all this with respect to the spiritual life. Again, in the same article, Thomas Affirms quote, and because Christ and his passion is the cause of grace and spiritual refreshment and charity cannot exist without grace, it is clear that this sacrament confers grace, especially the charity that binds us to Christ and to one another as Christians in the body of Christ. So while the sacraments are not missions, they're still instruments of our union with the divine persons. And it means by which the invisible mission of grace is affected in us. For quote, grace is in the sacraments of the new law. Instrumentally, just as the form of the thing made is in the instruments of the artist according to a certain outflowing from the agent into the patient. But mission is not said to be made except with respect to the term. So a mission of the divine persons is not made to the sacraments, but to those who through the sacraments receive grace. In other words, the invisible mission of the divine persons and grace is not made to the sacraments themselves, which are instruments of God, but to the persons who receive the sacraments. Grace is present in the soul of the believer who receives the sacraments and their salutary effects, even though a mission is not made to the sacraments. This passage suggests importantly that the divine missions can be made in a sense through the sacraments, insofar as the invisible mission is made in grace in the sacraments themselves, our efficacious causes of grace. It is not merely assimilation to the divine persons that is affected through faith and charity. The language of delight in God in these questions on the Eucharist also brings to mind our enjoyment of the divine persons. Thomas affirms that by grace one also experiences the divine persons in themselves. So Thomas refers to the Eucharist as spiritual nourishment. Mentum refreshment, Reio. Enjoy Letitia. The language of enjoyment also appears in the questions on the Trinity, quote, by the gift of the grace that makes us pleasing. Gracia, ATU, Fien, the R, the rational creature is perfected so that he may use UR freely, not only the created gift, but also that meat that he may enjoy through Ur, the divine person, and therefore, the invisible mission is made according to the gift of grace. That makes pleasing and nevertheless, the divine person himself is given further. Thomas refers to uh Augustine, who clearly says that the son is sent when he is known and perceived by someone day. Tate book four for perception signifies a certain experiential knowledge, Notia experimentalists, and this properly is called wisdom as a kind of savory or tasty knowledge. Sas. Thomas then links the Life of Grace to the indwelling of the Trinity in unmistakable terms, quote, by the grace that makes pleasing the whole Trinity dwells tota, tri toss in hobby to in the mind according to John 1423, we will come to him and we will make a dwelling Mons with him. The father is also known and loved, present, and enjoyed though he is not sent quote, and although it belongs to the Father, to indwell by grace. Nevertheless, it does not belong to him to be from another, a lio. And consequently, neither does it belong to him to be sent. And so while the soul is assimilated to the persons of the Son and the Holy Spirit, by the virtues of faith and charity, as well as the gifts corresponding to these virtues, the whole of the Trinity is actually known and loved and enjoyed through habitual grace, the theological virtues, the grace of axillium by which the persons are actually known and loved, and the gifts of the Holy Spirit. In conclusion, the Eucharist not only brings about and increases our union with Christ, converting us into images of Christ through the increase of grace and virtue, while deepening our union with the mystical body, but also deepens our union with the entire Trinity. Since the reception of the Eucharist deepens the life of grace, especially charity whose increase would also seem to depend on an increased faith. The Eucharist can be a means of our assimilation or likening to the persons of the Trinity, but the sacrament is also the means by which the Trinity comes to dwell in us. Insofar as the sacramental grace of the Eucharist intensifies the habitual grace and virtues present in us, especially faith and charity by which we know love and enjoy the Father, son, and Holy Spirit worthy reception of the Eucharist, thus not only unites us to Christ, but also deepens our assimilation of and participation in the Trinitarian life of God. A renewed appreciation of this mystery presents one pathway of renewal toward a deeper personal reverence for and more fervent reception of this great sacrament of charity. Thank you. Thank you. Questions.

Speaker 7 48:56

I had a question as to the manner of indwelling. when we receive the Eucharist, it's understood as you said, that, we're transformed into Christ by participation. Is there a sense in which the manner in which the Trinity indwells in us is by our participation in Christ's relationship imminently with the other two persons?

Speaker 10 49:19

That's really interesting. Yeah. the focus of what I was saying was that the, the primary assimilation and participation is through a deepening of habitual grace. but then also the theological virtues of faith and charity by which we're assimilated to the son and the Holy Spirit respectively. is there a sense in which our reception of. the body of Christ and Christ himself substantially present in the Eucharist implies a reception of the other divine persons in and of itself. There is a scriptural commentary that speaks to this question in a, in Aquinas, I think in the Pauline Corpus, and I could find it for you, in which he, he does say that the, at the very least since we're receiving the divine nature when we receive Christ and the divine nature is also the nature of the Father. In some sense. You could say we're, receiving the follower. He doesn't quite go so far as to say that, but he does note the connection between the two, where you do have this sort of peric indwelling of the persons themselves, which would seem to imply a reception of the persons, but it's not a reception of the persons in their. Personality, you could say it's a reception insofar as we receive, Christ and the divine nature. Does that make a little bit of sense? Yeah. Might be Galatians, but I can check. Yeah.

Speaker 2 50:54

Thanks Daniel. yeah, this is question is coming from a place of ignorance about how appropriations work as a, as a mere handmaiden to the theologians. Okay. so I thought of, so all the Trinitarian persons act together in any action ought extra. And, then there's things that we can about God and it's fitting to ascribe some of them to one person rather than to another based on the Trinitarian relations. And that's how like appropriation works, I thought. but then it looks like. When we start talking about what the specifically Trinitarian aspects of, of Eucharistic theology is, and it's all about appropriation, then it looks like it's all just gonna be a mode of speaking. So it's just gonna be a metaphorical participation in, in the, the sort of Trinitarian life of, of God rather than just Christ or deity or something like that. And so, so where am I going wrong with that?

Speaker 10 51:53

I might need to talk with you more, but, but, um, yeah, so that's interesting. Yeah. Appropriation. I don't really get into appropriation'cause I, I don't, I don't think you necessarily need to, to make the argument that I'm making, which is, which is by faith and charity. So we not only imitate, uh, the processions of the divine persons, the son and the Holy Spirit in us, but we also come to know and love and enjoy them in their distinct individuality. so I, I don't think, I don't think you need appropriation to, to make that move, but I wonder if, if your concern is, lies elsewhere. I might not be speaking to your exact question. Is there another way you could,

Speaker 11 52:42

I hope part about beings?

Speaker 2 52:45

Yeah. So I may, I may just be missing something here, but, about being, being sent and things like that and how by grace we're, we're, conformed to the spirit. Like I thought you said at one point were conformed to the spirit because the spirit's the principle of, of charity or something like that. Mm-hmm. That would, all that stuff, I, I took that to be an appropriation and maybe that's not an appropriation, but it, it would strike me as a little weird if, like charity as a matter of metaphysical reality, bound us to the spirit, but not to the Godhead as a whole, or not to the, the three persons like. What, what, what's the specific role that the spirit and the son of their father are playing? Like, you know, peeling away the, the, the sort of appropriations or metaphor that's being used.

Beyond Communion and Adoration

Speaker 10 53:32

Yeah. I dunno if that's, so you're, you're more interested in the question of like, image vestige, perhaps so, yeah, because perhaps this is what you're getting at. Yeah. Charity is an effect that's produced by the entire Trinity, but it's appropriate to the Holy Spirit because the Holy Spirit is the one who proceeds by way of love. so I guess, yeah, so charity is appropriated to the Holy Spirit, and yet we're saying that we image the Trinity as images of the Trinity. We're imaging the procession of the Holy Spirit insofar as charity is in us. But how could that be? How could that be the case if charity is actually in effect of all three divine persons? So. Yeah, it's a little tricky, but I think the things you want to affirm is that yes, charity, charity is an effect of all three divine persons of the Holy Spirit, of all three divine persons of the Trinity. It's appropriated for a special reason to the Holy Spirit. but I think for that reason, we are said to be images of the Trinity because of the Holy Spirit proceeds by way of love. But I think what you're, maybe, what you're gesturing at more, maybe it has less to do with appropriation, has more to do with the, um, the inability, of the human nature, and the human person to adequately represent an image, the Trinity. yeah.

Speaker 11 54:56

I was wondering, since you focus on the reception of Eucharist and what comes from it, how much of what. You've described would apply to somebody who doesn't receive communion, but is either present at mass or perhaps praying before the blessed sacrament. What sort of relationship would they have to this idea?

Speaker 10 55:16

Yeah, I, I think it, I think it would work in parallel. I hadn't quite thought about that or work that into this, but I mean, yeah, insofar as you're making acts of faith and charity, you would be deepening the image of the trinity within you. and also coming to actually know and love and enjoy God, and the three divine persons. So yeah, so I, I think, I think that's a wonderful point. Yeah. That, that, there's a similar dynamic, not only in play with the Eucharist, although the Eucharist might be a, a privileged occasion of that. but in some ways the whole of the Christian life and Christian theological anthropology is predicated on this dynamism of faith and charity and our Ongoing assimilation to knowledge of, love of, and enjoyment of the divine persons in some ways that characterizes the whole Christian journey. Yeah. Thank you. We have time for one more question. Okay. Well, let's thank Dr. Gordon.

Speaker 2 56:18

Thank

Speaker 10 56:19

you. Our next presentation is by Dr. Matz Valberg, an associate professor of Systematic Theology at Umea University Sweden In 2021, he was the Aquinas chair at the Pontifical University of St. Thomas Aquinas, the Angelica in Rome. His research interests include arguments for God's existence, the problem of evil, the epistemology of theology, the dialogue between science, theology, and science, especially the theological implications of evolution. And the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas's research about the problem of evil and evolution has been funded by the John Templeton Foundation. So the title of this presentation is How Are Christian Beliefs Justified? Four Interpretations of Aquinas's. You Please welcome Dr. Walberg.

Testimonial Interpretation

Speaker 12 57:35

Thank you, father Nicholas. How do the beliefs that we hold by divine faith acquire the status of being EPIs justified? According to Aquin? In this paper, which I hear will only be able to briefly summarize. I discuss and criticize three proposals about how this happens, and I, I then suggest a fourth interpretation that I, that I argue is better according to my very inclusive definition of epistemic justification. What justifies a belief is simply whatever gives it positive epistemic status. For example, the status of knowledge, which Aquinas ascribes to beliefs that we hold by faith, although he denies, of course, that faith gives us, gives us chiia. He often says that by faith we acquire coio, which is a term that more closely corresponds to modern notions of knowledge than CIA does. I would argue. So in the paper, I first give an overview of Aquinas's conception of faith, in which I highlight four features of faith that according to him, are characteristic characteristics of faith, and that all plausible interpretations must account for. The first characteristic is that we accept Christian doctrines on account of the authority of God himself, which means that we believe them on the basis of divine testimony. The second important feature is Aquinas's claim that faith ascend is caused by the will, which acts in view of the divine goodness. The third thing that Aquinas emphasizes is that the will's ascent is caused by divine grace, which moves the will without compromising its freedom. And the fourth characteristic feature is Aquinas's insistence that there are good apologetic arguments in favor of the claim that the articles of faith have been revealed by God. Exactly how strong Aquinas takes these arguments to be is somewhat unclear. Having recounted these four features of faith, I then in the paper proceed to evaluate how three common interpretation of Aquinas's view succeed in accounting for these features, and to what extent the interpretations in question managed to construe Aquinas's view as reasonable according to the standards of modern epistemology following Father John Jenkins. I call the first view the naturalist interpretation, but it can also be called the Evidentialist interpretation, and I'll not spend any time on it here since it's, in my view, the weakest of the three interpretations that I criticize. It emphasizes the fourth of the features I have just recounted and portrays Aquinas as a rationalistic evidentialist who thinks that faith is justified on the basis of apologetic arguments today, very few interpreters believe that this interpretation does does justice to Aquinas's thought. The second model is the voluntary interpretation, and it's defended in different versions by James Rosson Eor Stomp, who emphasized the second feature of Aquinas's teaching on faith. The will's role in the ascent of faith. Aquinas claims that the will moves the intellect to ascend to the articles of faith because the will desires something good, namely eternal life with God. St. Thomas writes quote, we are moved to believe what God says because we are promised eternal life as a reward if we believe, and this reward moves the will to ascend to what is said. Although the intellect is not moved by anything which it understands. End of quote, what proponents of the voluntary interpretation argue is that this way of arriving at Christian beliefs might be, or in fact, is a reliable belief forming process designed by God to be conducive to true beliefs. If this is the case and if reliable is of some sort, provides a correct account of epistemic justification, it follows that beliefs produced by the will driven process that Aquinas seems to envision or justified and therefore can count as knowledge. One general problem with this interpretation is that the authority of God seems to play no or very little role for the justification of faith ascend in this model, which goes against what Thomas holds the first of the features I mentioned earlier of faith according to Aquinas faith, quote does not ascend to anything except because it is revealed by God. This suggests that belief in the articles of faith is justified by the fact that it's God was revealed them rather than by the fact if it's a fact that a certain will driven process of belief formation is reliable. A second problem is that the proponents of the voluntary interpretation have difficulties explaining why and how a will driven process of the relevant kind is reliable. In the end, I argue they must resort simply to the claim that it is God's supernatural influence on our wills through grace that guarantees reliable belief formation and that distinguishes faith from ordinary wishful thinking. The third interpretation is the supernatural external interpretation, A term that, uh, father John Jenkins coined as a name for his own proposal. But there are other proposals sufficiently similar to Jenkins is to be included under the same label, such as The Interpretation by Paul McDonald and James Brent. Proponents of this general model usually suggest that Aquinas was an epistological external of something like the Albin planting archetype, who takes a belief to be justified if it's produced by a properly functioning cognitive faculty, successfully designed by God to attain true beliefs in its proper environment. They then argue that the supernatural light of faith, perhaps complimented by certain gifts of the Holy Spirit, is part of a divine design plan of the relevant kind, and that beliefs produced in this way therefore are justified or warranted. This model emphasizes the third feature of Construal of Faith, namely the claim that the act of faith is caused by divine grace. The supernatural external interpretation manages to do justice to many aspects of Aquinas's teaching on faith. In its general outlines, it represents, in my view, an improvement orbiter proceeding to interpretations. One problem that is shares with both previous interpretations, however, is that it seems to underplay the role that God's authority seems to have for the justification of Christian beliefs according to Aquinas. Another weakness that this model shares with Aist interpretation is that both models are forced to posit the existence of special cognitive faculties or sources, principles of justification, uniquely possessed by Christians. Although it could be the case that a justification of Christian beliefs escapes exp explanation unless we posit some uniquely Christian epistemic mechanism. It would, in my view, be greatly preferable if the justified status of Christian beliefs could be accounted for merely in terms of sources of justification that most rational persons already a knowledge in some form or another, such as perception, inference, and crucially testimony. Limiting the sources of justification in this way does not, of course, exclude a causal role for grace in producing ascent to divinely reveal propositions, as will soon become apparent. The fourth interpretation then, which is my own all, its partly inspired by John Lamont attempts to satisfy the Deum just mentioned. This means that what I call the testimonial interpretation aims to be more economical than previous proposals when it comes to positing, specifically Christian epistemic faculties and processes. Since this model is also capable of accounting for everything that Aquinas explicitly says about the nature and workings of divine faith, it is, in my view, preferable to previous models, at least if we want to understand Aquinas's teaching in such a way that it makes it as episte defensible as possible in a contemporary context. So let, let's now look at the testimonial interpretation. This model presupposes a philosophical view of how testimonial knowledge is justified. A view called anti reductionism thinkers who endorsed this view, including Thomas Reed, Michael Dt, CAJ Code, and John McDowell argued that testimony itself is a basic or suey generous source of epistemic justification. Arguably the best, anti reductionist account of testimonial knowledge and justification has been suggested by the philosopher John McDowell. He holds the testimony like perception and memory can constitute a cognitive link between a person and an objective fact, so that knowledge of this fact becomes available to the person. Of course, in some cases, people testify falsely and in these so-called bad cases, knowledge only appears to be available while in fact it's not. We cannot always know by our own autonomous powers when we are in a bad case, since a bad case can be indistinguishable for the subject from a good case in which the vertical testimony really makes knowledge available. However, when we in fact are in a good case, we are according to McDowell, rationally entitled to believe the testimony in question and we can therefore acquire the knowledge it makes available in order to acquire this knowledge. We don't do not need positive evidence for the trustworthiness of the speaker. However, since acquiring knowledge from testimony involves an exercise of reason, we need to evaluate the testimony of other people as well as what purports to be divine testimony. In light of our background knowledge and be on the lookout for se signs of deception or incompetence in the testifier, we must, in other words, be aware of the risks we expose ourselves to when we trust others and be rationally sensitive to information and considerations that tell against the truth or reliability of their testimony. McDowell refers, refers to this kind of sensitivity and vigilance as Dtic responsibility, and he holds that exer exercising such responsibility is a necessary condition for acquiring knowledge from the testimony of others. So a person who blindly believes everything he hears fails to acquire knowledge from testimony because he fails to respect the norms of rationality that are intrinsic to the pursuit of knowledge. However, if a person respects those norms and believes in a responsible way, a piece of testimony that is actually reliable, what he acquires then is knowledge he does not need to possess. In addition, positive evidence for the re reliability of the testimony in question. Now, it's not entirely clear what view of testimony Aquinas held according to Matthew Seabert. Aquinas's overall view is pluralistic, which means that it combines reductionist and anti reductionist stances to testimony, justif testimonial justification in different cases when it comes to acquiring knowledge from divine testimony. However, Aquinas clearly seems to take an anti reductionist approach. He seems to hold that the mere fact that God has said something constitutes a sufficient justification for believing it, irrespective of whether the hearer has sufficient evidence that the speaker indeed is God. This means that it's not the case that the hear is justification for believing divine testimony is constituted by an inferential argument from prior knowledge of the testifiers divine identity or something like that. Rather, it's the objective fact that the testimony is God's and therefore reliable that makes the beliefs that the here are forms on its basis justified. In this respect, Aquinas's view of the justification of faith can be described as ISTs, as McDowell might put it. Believers cannot autonomously guarantee their own epistemic standing with respect to purportedly divine testimony. In other words, we cannot buy our own powers. Make sure that we never end up in a bad case, but this is simply an inescapable feature of the human cognitive condition and not something we should try to eliminate at all costs. So this I is a plausible framework of interpretation for Aquinas's view. According to him, Christian Faith exists only quote when one believes for this reason that it is said by God, which is designated by calling it cera de. And this specifies faith the way any Cogno habit has its species from the reason rat by which it ascends to anything. Note that Aquinas here does not set, does not say that our reason for believing a proposition P is that we believe that P is said by God, perhaps on the grounds of very solid evidence. What it says is that our reason CIO for believing P, is that P is actually said by God, which is a fact about the world external to our own minds. Suppose now, now that God supernaturally by means of the light of faith makes a person inclined to believe that it is God who has communicated a Christian message. God could make a person inclined to believe this by making it seem very plausible to her that this is the case, as well as by making her desire to believe that the Christian message is true. In order to make the fact of divine revelation seem implausible and attractive to a person, God may have to make certain other beliefs that a person has seem less plausible to her than before, and God could do this in a gradual way by drawing the person's attention to certain facts or arguments, or by enlightening her about certain misconceptions or reasoning mistakes. By affecting the emotional coloring of various conceptions and beliefs. As we know, the process of coming to faith is usually not instantaneous, but often takes the form of a gradual change of perspective on the world, a change that also involves a person's will and motivations. Now, when this gradual process has reached a certain point, it might seem very plausible to the person that Christian beliefs are revealed by God and she can then move by grace, ascent to these beliefs as revealed by God. This ascent will be voluntary sin since it is not forced by the evidence. The ascent will also be diagnostically responsible if the believer indeed finds it very plausible that Christian beliefs are revealed by God, and if the fact that she finds this plausible is not due to any neglect of epistemic duties on her part, which need not be the case, if Christianity in fact is true. What justifies the person's ascent to the Christian message, however, is not the fact that it seems plausible to her. Her belief in that message is justified instead because it's based on divine testimony, which as such is supremely reliable. Okay? So this theory of the justification of Christian beliefs would need to be further elaborated in many respects, but I submit that it could be defended as a reasonable epistological model for how Christian doctrines can be known. I also think that the theory does justice to the various elements of Aquinas's teaching on faith, and especially the four features I mentioned earlier. The suggested model portrays Christian beliefs as justified directly by divine testimony, which sat size the first feature. The model. Furthermore, prote portrays the ascent of faith as voluntary and due to the influence of grace. These were the second and third features. The fourth feature, the existence of good apologetic arguments for the fact of revelation is also congenial to the suggested model in virtue of its emphasis on astic responsibility as a negative criteria. If there is a strong apologetic case to be made for Christianity in light of public evidence, then it'll be possible for God to make the fact of divine revelations seem plasible to any person without deceiving her or clouding her judgment or something like that. It should be noted furthermore, that the notion of astic responsibility is relative to a particular person's epistemic position. What Astic responsibility requires of me might be different from what it requires of you. Depending on our respective levels of knowledge and our situatedness in the world, it's not the case. Therefore, that every person needs to have sophisticated knowledge of apologetic arguments in order to be able to believe in a diagnostically responsible way, what God has revealed. Okay. Thank you for listening.

Speaker 10 1:15:32

Thank you. questions.

Speaker 13 1:15:39

Thank you. Matts, so, as I understand it, in the typical interpretation of St. Thomas, among Dominicans, you know, it's important to underscore that the formal object of faith is supernatural, and the consent to the formal object is for. Motives fundamentally of the divine authority revealed in faith and moved by charity rather than as the term of a rational argument according to rational premises and irrational conclusion. Even if there can be reasons of credibility to also show that there's no epistemic irresponsibility in that the object of faith has some extrinsic manifestation of its supernatural origins through revelation, I mean through miracles and, and things like that. But I mean, then you think okay, sometimes Paul seems to give us arguments internal to, I would call it like the theological object of faith, or he is presenting the object using arguments like he appeared to 500 minute one time in the last he appeared to me. He's not proving it as much as he's just saying, this really happened to me in this historical scenario. So is that. What's the place of argument in the presentation of the formal object of faith? Or is an argument like Paul's, that he actually saw the Lord after his resurrection on the side of a ra, a reason of credibility. I don't know if that argument makes sense, but I mean, that, that question makes sense. But

Speaker 12 1:17:10

yeah, I, I, I, I would definitely say that, that those kinds of considerations are on, on, on the side of the credibility evidence that makes possible an ascent to faith that is justically responsible. So by saying this, by producing this kind of evidence, testimonial ev, human testimonial evidence for, for the resurrection, then Paul makes it easier for believers to, to obey the dictates of astic responsibility in various and to, to, to what God reveals. So I, I would, I would place it there, but I don't know if you had some other idea that

Speaker 3 1:17:50

that's very.

Speaker 4 1:17:57

Uh, thank you for your presentation. um, I'm sympathetic to the idea of thinking, faith in analogy, to testimonial, knowledge. but, I would say we, we should discuss what, uh, what is testimonial knowledge and, how far this, testimonial knowledge, this analogy between testimonial knowledge and, and, um, faith, works. Uh, perhaps one way to put my, my, my worry or my is, uh, that, that I would say. I very briefly that testimonial knowledge requires a relationship to the person of, of a witness. And, in case of, and I think that fits very well in, in, uh, in the theology of faith of St. Thomas because, faith requires a relationship to God. uh, and, I therefore, I think is in, in your presentation, I am not that convinced that we can, tell part, authority of God and grace because they are different ways to express this idea that, there is a relation to God that make, faith possible. Does make sense to you? Do you understand in which direction I'm, I'm going?

Speaker 12 1:19:35

Yes. I, I, I think so. but, but I definitely think that there is, there is at least a logical distinction to be made between God's authority as a testifier, so to speak, as a speaker. He speaks and the means where, whereby he enables our ascent to his speech, namely grace and faith, the light of faith and grace. So I think that that's, that's a meaningful distinction to make. So God, God presents a message in the public forum. I mean, that's, that's what we're talking about. We're talking about public revelation here and, and, and, and that's, that's like the divine act of testimony then through, through human intermediaries. And then he also produces our response to, to this message in us through, through Grace. yeah, uh,

Speaker 4 1:20:28

uh, we could not listen to God who is speaking without grace. Uh, yeah, there is a number of passages where, we can acknowledge, uh, the, uh, announcement of the faith as, word of God because of the grace, so that there is, grace, what of course there is, the preaching of, of, of the gospel, but, uh, acknowledging the preaching as the word of God. it requires a relationship, to God. That in, in, I I see it is not possible without grace in, in so far, I think,

Speaker 12 1:21:14

but that's exactly my point. So even, even though a person does not have grace, that does not make, I mean, it's still the case that what God says through the prophets and through the apostles and so on, that's, that's the, the, the word of God. That's, that's a divine revelation. But then grace is necessary to be able to acknowledge it as revelation. And that's what I mean by, by the resection of the test, divine testimony. So God testifies and also guarantees the reception of his own testimony through, through Grace. Then, then your point about, that a relationship is necessary in order to, in order to absorb testimony from another, even in human contexts. I, I wouldn't agree with that actually. I, I think that you can, you can absorb and gain knowledge from testimony even without knowing anything about the person that testifies. For example, if you read a textbook in school, you don't know who's written it and, but you can still acquire knowledge from, from that, that text. So I don't think that the relationship is necessary, but of course, it, it'll strengthen the ability of a person to acquire knowledge from, from a, a source of testimony if there is a personal relationship. And that, that, in that respect, grace, of course, is, is important to, to kind of, accomplished this connaturality between, between, the soul and God. That is a kind of relationship that, that en en enables us then more easily to, to accept, the divine testimony.

Speaker 8 1:22:57

Thank you. Um, that was great. Really interesting talk. so I had a question about the relationship between, um, justification and knowledge on your view. So if I understood correctly, you said that, dog astic responsibility is necessary for knowledge, but that's not what confers justification. Justification is conferred. because the, it's divine testimony. So it's divine testimony that confers justification of the belief. But astic responsibility is necessary for knowledge but not, but astic responsibility is not justification, conferring.'cause I would be kind of tempted to say it sounds like these two conditions would be individually necessary and jointly sufficient, for knowledge. But is that not what you wanna say? I'm just trying to understand the relation, because I guess normally I would think. At least on most contemporary accounts, it's like you, justification is what converts a belief into knowledge. So I I just trying to figure out how that all works together on your view.

Speaker 12 1:23:56

No, that, that, that's my view of justification. That that's, that's what, what, what makes a, a belief knowledge done, a true belief knowledge. but, so it's, it's, it's the case that, that, uh, astic responsibility is, of course, you can say that it, it provides some additional justification. I mean, if you, if the main justification for, for, for a belief is, is testimony. So I, the, the, the main reason why I, why I am justified in believing a certain thing is that it's, it's, its source is a reliable source of testimony. That's the main justification. In order to be able to absorb that testimony to, to, to, to, to acquire knowledge from that testimony, you have to act in a diagnostically responsible way. So you cannot be, you cannot be too gullible. You cannot believe everything you hear and so on. So that's the main function of the, of, of the, the, the, the astic responsibility that it provides this context in which the absorption of testimony, the, the reception of testimony is possible. But then you can also say, of course, and I think you, you make a good point there, that it might confer a, a, a, a slight additional, justification to the beliefs in, in terms of the credibility arguments and so on. But the main justification is the very fact of, of testimony. And that's especially in the case of divine testimony. So the reason why we are justified in believing Christian doctrines is because, we have heard them from God. and then we can also have a little additional justification from the fact maybe that there are credibility arguments, but that that's not the main thing. And that fun function of docs, of, of credibility arguments is not essential. The only essential function is to kind of, take away obstacles that would make it irrational for me to believe, to believe what God says. I mean, you can compare it with, with the perception. I mean, if I see, I see Father Nikola over there and that provides a justification for believing that he stands there for me. But let's suppose I, I had just previously, I had injected myself with a drug that distorted my perception and that made me hallucinate. Then that would kind of produce a defeater for my belief that he is there because, uh, it seems very likely that I'm just hallucinating. and it's in that context that the, the astic responsibility is important. You cannot believe anything under any, circumstances. You have to be on the lookout for problems and potential defeaters of your knowledge and so on. Yeah. So that, that's basically what I would, would say.

Speaker 10 1:26:39

Okay. Thank you. I think we're out of time, so let's thank again, Dr. Wahlberg, and please thank again our, our three panelists.