Aquinas at 800, Part 17: Cognition

Episode Topic: Cognition

Can we perceive the spiritual realm with our physical minds? Listen in to a dialogue examining how the human intellect navigates its material limitations to grasp immaterial truths. Understanding these cognitive structures is a strategic necessity for anyone seeking to reconcile the tangible world of experience with the firm convictions of spiritual life. Grasp the intricate ways St. Thomas Aquinas defines human understanding. Navigate through sensory barriers to envision the certitude of faith.

Featured Speakers:

• Therese Cory, University of Notre Dame
• Luca F. Tuninetti, Pontificia Università Urbaniana

Read this episode's recap over on the University of Notre Dame's open online learning community platform, ThinkND: https://go.nd.edu/93923f.

This podcast is a part of the ThinkND Series titled Aquinas at 800.

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Transcript

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Speaker 10 0:10

Good morning, everyone. Thank you for joining us for this early bird panel. My name is Noelle Johnson. I'm a doctoral student in theology here at Notre Dame, where I study Hebrew Bible and ancient Jewish interpretation with a focus on the, uh, ancient Jewish liturgical calendar. So when I knew I was chairing this panel, I thought, it's probably going to take me a longer time to come up with a good Thomistic joke to set up the mood, uh, than maybe one of you, uh, could do it faster. And after a while, I just had to admit defeat. Um, I have no jokes to actually offer you, but only a few maybe in potency. Um, but thankfully, none of our panelists need any sort of icebreaker this morning, and I'm delighted to introduce both of our esteemed panelists, Therese Cory, who I had the pleasure of taking as an undergraduate here at Notre Dame, and Luca Toninetti, who has traveled to be with us today all the way from Rome. The format for today's panel will be, uh, two half-an-hour presentations for each of the speakers, and each half hour will be followed by an individual 15-minute question and answer period, and then again at the end, we'll have a joint 15-minute question and answer period. So with that being said, I'd love to formally introduce our first panelist. Therese Scarpelli Cory is the John and Jean Oesterle Associate Professor of Thomistic Studies at the University of Notre Dame, where she also directs the Maritain Center and History of Philosophy Forum. Her research focuses on 13th century philosophy of mind with special attention to Thomas Aquinas and the reception of Arabic thought. The title of her talk is The Weakness of the Embodied Mind in Aquinas: Adam, St. Paul, and the Limitations of the Ordinary Human Thinker in This Life. With that, let's welcome Professor Cory.

Speaker 2 2:12

Thank you, Noelle, for the kind introduction. Um, and it's great to he- see so many people here at 8:45 in the morning. So thank you for being here. Um, this is a, uh, there's a handout, so if you don't have a copy, I think there's some copies on the table in the back. Um, the handout covers the main points of the talk and also some of the key texts. Now, this is a relatively long and convoluted paper, and so what I'm going to do is talk through the first part of the paper just using the handout as a kind of overview, and then spend a little bit more time developing the solution that I wanna propose, um, toward the second half of the talk. So the, the difficulty that this paper considers is the following. We are familiar with the fact that our experience is filled up with material things, like chipmunks or stars or other human beings, and they're constantly clamoring for our attention around us in, in the sphere of our material experience. Um, there's at least one immaterial thing of which we are also aware in the sphere of our experience, and that is our own souls in our self-awareness. But other than that, we don't have any experience in a natural way of immaterial substances like angels or God. Um, so this is so normal to us that we don't really think about it at all, but we should in fact be puzzled by the fact that as we go through the world, we don't have angels just showing up to us as part of our experience. And, um, this is, this is not just a problem that occupies my-- that, that puzzles me, but it's also something that we might see in, for instance, C.S. Lewis when he ta- um, Out of the Silent Planet, and he has the same sort of intuition that there's, there's something weird about human beings seem oddly cut off from the spiritual world in their experience. And he thinks of this in terms of sin having imposed a kind of barrier on the human mind so that we're not able to access, or, or, uh, metaphorically on our world, so that we're not able to access the spiritual world in the way we should be able to. Um, but when we turn to Thomas Aquinas, he doesn't seem to think of this barrier to our experiencing spiritual substances as being the result of sin. Um, in the texts in which he talks about the limitations of the human mind, he often says that it's just the nature of our human minds to know by turning to phantasm. So he seems to be locating the obstacle in some way in the nature of the human mind as opposed to its defect through sin Um, and I think that's how we probably would take for granted, that we would take for granted that's his view. But there's a, there's a, a, a difficulty with this, which is that in his doctrine of the separated soul's knowledge, if we read the text very carefully, which we're going to do in a moment, it becomes clear that in fact he thinks that there's another way for the human being to know that's a, um, an angelic type of knowing, and that this is something that is available within the nature of the human being. And so when I found that particular text and figured out that he was actually talking about a natural kind of knowing, that's when I started to think there's a real puzzle here in Aquinas's texts where, um, it looks as though we're oddly restricted in this life in a way that is not clear what the cause of that restriction is. Um, so I think we just don't notice this problem in Aquinas because we don't know what the options would be for us, what, what the alternatives are for the mode of thinking that we have now, and we also don't know what it would take on Aquinas's theory of cognition for us to experience something. There's actually-- Aquinas has very worked-out technical understanding of what it would take to experience an angel as opposed to, um, say, a tree. And so we're going to go over that. So basically what I wanna do in this paper, um, is four things. First of all, I wanna talk about, in the first section, what it would take for a mind to be able to experience the full range of beings, um, and try to clarify what he means by this mode of thinking by turning to phantasms that he says is our natural mode of cognition. Um, secondly, then we're going to look at this text from the Summa Theologiae Prima Pars eighty-nine, one, where he describes the knowledge of the separated soul and why that sets up a kind of puzzle for us. Third, I'm going to try to solve the puzzle by looking at a set of extraordinary cases of knowledge in an embodied state. For Aquinas, the case of Adam in a prelapsarian state, Christ, prophetic knowledge, angelic illumination. And we'll try to triangulate from those cases what he thinks the constraints are on our knowledge. And then the last part of the paper is going to try to provide some kind of account as to why Aquinas thinks embodiment restricts us in the way that it does. Um, and we'll spend, um, more time trying to work that out. It's relatively complex. All right. So starting with the first section then. Um, this is the qu- so I wanna ask the question of what it would take for an intellect to experience something in Aquinas's theory of experience. So for Aquinas, a mind can experience something in two ways. One way is when that thing itself acts on the mind in order to cause its own likeness in the mind. So if I see a squirrel running through the backyard, the squirrel is acting on my senses and thereby acting on my intellect to cause an intelligible species of squirrel-ness in my intellect. The important thing, what makes this be an a- a experiential knowledge, is that it's the squirrel itself that has acted upon me. So it's giving its own form to me, and I'm being in some way made cognitively in its image. So for Aquinas, that's why I would have sensory experience when the squirrel is acting on my senses, but he also thinks that I have intellectual experience of squirrel-ness when I've actually been acted upon by a squirrel, and that's different from, for instance, if I lived in a land with no squirrels and someone came from a f- from the faraway land of squirrel-- where squirrels live and told me about them. That would be an indirect knowledge, and I wouldn't have ex- even intellectual experience of squirrel-ness because that's a report as opposed to being acted upon by the thing itself. Um, there's another way for an intellect to experience something, and that is when the intellect itself is the principle or the cause whereby the thing is, is, um, comes to be in its existence. So that's the way that Aquinas says that God ex- uh, experiences creatures. S- since God is responsible for the whole being of the creature, um, God's knowledge of each creature is experiential and not just theoretical Um, okay, so one important thing to remember is that this, in this view, angels seem to be, and we could talk at, ad nauseam about this, but angels seem to be left out in the cold by this theory of experience because angels don't create things, but they also don't have bodies, so they can't be acted upon by, um, material things. Now, Aquinas' solution to this problem is that God causes in the angelic intellect s- uh, forms or species that are reflections of his own divine ideas of how he, whereby he e- experiences all creatures. Um, so, so that's how angels are, are able to, um, experience things. And I'll say a little bit more about that in a minute. Now, what that tells us, important for our, uh, e- inquiry here today, is that a restriction on what we can experience is going to be reducible to a, in a restriction on what can act on our mind. And that, that's gonna be the key, I think, to understanding Aquinas's thinking on this. So let's take that insight and use it to try to understand his widespread claim that our natural mode of thinking is by turning to phantasms. So what he says is that in this life, we think by turning to phantasms. If we think about this in terms of acting, what that means is that phantasms, which are forms in the imagination that derive from sensation, those are acting on-- That, that's what acts on our mind in order to, um, bring about an intel- intelligible species in us. And those kinds of species are called ab- what I would call abstractive species. An abstractive species is caused by a sense object through a phantasm, and it intrinsically refers back to the phantasm, so it's always paired with, in some way, a phantasm in the imagination. Uh, so it's a special kind of species, and those kinds of species leave out, in the intellect, they leave out any kind of individuality, and we only grasp the essence through an abstractive species. Now, if we, if we compare that with angels, Aquinas thinks that angels think by turning to immaterial things. So what that means is that the angelic intellect is-- we- the way to think about this is the angelic intellect is something like a mirror, and just by existing the way it is, the- God radiates instantaneously likenesses of all of the divine ideas directly into the human intellect-- or the, I'm sorry, the angelic intellect. So the angelic intellect is receiving intelligible species from above, where we're receiving intelligible species from below. So the kind of species that angels receive, I want to call exemplar-like species because they are like God's exemplar knowledge of, um, all creatures. And it's important to know that angelics, uh, these exemplar-like species, they encompass the full range of created beings, so material beings and their essences, but also immaterial beings, other angels, and their essences. Um, so it's very clear that just f-from, from the get-go, if we were able to have exemplar-like species in our intellects, we would in fact be able to know, we would have constant experience of all angels. All of, all angels would always be showing up in our experience all the time. We would be aware of their presence in the way in which we're aware of material things that are acting on us. So obviously, part of the problem here is we don't have that kind of species. What we have instead is these abstractive species which come to us from things that have bodies and can act on our senses.

Speaker 10 13:26

Okay.

Speaker 2 13:28

So we might say our-- it, it looks like from some of, some of the texts that, um, in which Aquinas talks about these restrictions, that the reason that we have abstractive intelligible species and angels have exemplar-like species is that our na- their intellects have two different natures, and we're just using the species that are proper to our nature. That's what it looks like from many texts. But I wanna argue that that's actually a, a misconception, and that we can see that it's a misconception if we turn to his doctrine of the knowledge of the separated soul. So that's section two. All right So one of the beautiful things about Aquinas' treatment of the knowledge of the separated soul, and this is in, um, Summa Theologiae 89.1, is that by this point, it's a r- the Summa is a l- later text in Aquinas, and by this point, Aquinas has really worked out how he wants to think about the role of embodiment in our knowledge. And he's particularly favorable to the way in which embodiment promotes our ability to think as the kinds of intellects that we are. Um, but he also wants to be careful because he doesn't want to end up getting backed into the conclusion that once the soul is separated from the body, it can't think at all, right? Because it lacks senses and imagination. So he-- so in order to solve this problem, he, uh, lays out a distinction between two available modes of being for the soul, and he says that the mode of operating, so the mode of knowing, corresponds to the thing's mode of being. So here's the text. He says, "The soul has one mode of being when united to the body and another when separated from the body, while the soul's nature remains the same. But not in such a way that being united to a body would be accidental to it. Rather, being united to a body belongs to the ratio of its own nature. Similarly, the nature of what is light does not change when it is in its proper place, being up, which is natural to it." Light, he means like a, like a feather or air, actually, properly speaking. "And when it is outside its proper place," if it's being pushed down, which is beyond its nature, praeter naturam. "Therefore, according to the soul's mode of being in its union to a body, it appropriately has a mode of thinking by turning to the phantasms of bodies which are in corporeal organs. But when it will be separated from the body, it appropriately has a mode of thinking by turning to those things that are intelligible simpliciter, just like other separate substances do. Whence the mode of thinking by turning to phantasms is natural to the soul, just as being united to the body is natural to it. But being separated from the body is beyond the ratio of its nature, and likewise, thinking without turning to phantasms is beyond its nature, praeter naturam. And therefore, it is united to the body so that it may operate in accord with its own nature." So here we see that Aquinas is explaining how the separated soul is able to know by assigning to it the same mode of thinking that's proper to angels. So as soon as the soul is separated from the body, it's instantaneously filled with the species of all creatures, exemplar-like species, in the manner of an angel. Um, now, Aquinas' use of the phrase praeter naturam, beyond nature, has suggested to many readers that separated souls receive exemplar-like species supernaturally as a divine gift that goes beyond their nature. However, um, throughout question 89, he's actually at pains to insist that thinking in this way is the natural way for the separated soul to exist, so-- or to think. So given that the soul is in an embodied state, it is natural to the soul to think in this angelic way in that condition. So what does that tell you? Um, it seems that if there's anything that's restricting the direction from which we can receive species from below or from above, it's not the nature of our intellect so much as it is the embodied or non-embodied condition of our intellect. That's what's doing the work here. And that leaves us with a bunch of questions. We might ask Aquinas whether embodiment is actually so good for intellectual life if it's shielding us from encountering ma- immaterial substances in this way. But more importantly, I think it's v- quite puzzling why embodiment should be shielding us from receiving these species in this way. If it turns out that in a separated state, we're able to receive them, and it's in accord with our nature to do so in this state, why don't we just receive them in this life? We'd have both sets of species from above and from below, and then we would have experience of immaterial substances at all times. So that's what I wanna try and, um, sort out in the rest of this talk. So section three then, let's think about, um, what we can-- what strategy we can put in place to solve this problem. So what I wanna do is to look at, of the cases that I mentioned earlier of extraordinary intellectual experiences in an embodied state. These are all supernaturally infused kinds of knowledge for Aquinas. Um, and I think what we can ask ourselves is when God supernaturally provides species to the human intellect in an embodied state, in these cases of Adam, Christ, prophets, other kinds of supernatural revelations to saints, um, is God providing to the human intellect in an embodied state exemplar-like species, the kind that would provide experience of immaterial substances or abstractive species? And if God causes exemplar-like species, say, in a prophet's intellect in the same way as in the separated soul, then we might conclude that embodiment is not actually an impediment to receiving those kinds of species. So my proposal, what, what we're gonna see from looking at these cases, is that Aquinas is extraordinarily consistent in arguing that even in these supernatural cases, the kind of species that God provides to the intellect are abstractive-type species, not exemplar-like species. And we might say this is very puzzling because God can do whatever he wants, so why is he restricted in this way? Um, or why does he, uh, observe this restriction of, um, of, uh, simply providing abstractive-type species? So here's some examples of the, um, of what he says about some of these different cases. So in the case of Adam and Christ, these are two cases in which he says that, um, these two human beings, because of their role in salvation history, they need to have knowledge of all, um, they need to have knowledge of all the, um, all creatures. So he says that God provides to Adam the s- the species enabling him to know all creatures, and this is not proper for any other human being. However, he's very clear that, um, this is the first text on the reverse side of the handout. He says, "The first man had the science, scientia, of all things through species infused by God. Nevertheless, this science was not of a different ratio from our own, just as the eyes which Christ gave to the man born blind were not of a different ratio from the eyes which nature produced." So it's almost as though God has substituted his causality for the causality of all creatures if A- what Adam would have gotten from experience with enough time. Um, and there's a second text where he basically says, says the same, uh... Oh, no, I'm sorry. That's the Christ text. Now, if we look at the case of Christ, what happens is that, um, Christ also receives all knowledge of all things through infused species. Now, in this case and this case alone, Aquinas says that the species that are received are exemplar-like species, and he emphasizes that they are the sorts of species that an angel has. So c- Christ has something like an angelic knowledge. This is the sole case, and I think if we-- we'll look at it afterwards and see that, in fact, it's very important that this is-- that there's a reason for this exception Um, and then there's if we look at cases of prophecy and illumination, angelic illumination, Aquinas is also extremely consistent in saying that angels, if they act on us to reveal something from God, they don't impress forms directly on our human intellect, but are rather limited to imparting knowledge in other ways. So an angel would act on our senses or on our imagination, then we abstract something from that, or they strengthen the intellect's light for better judgment, but they never cause an intelligible species in our intellect. Um, he's also consistent when he talks about prophetic knowledge that there's-- it would be nice if he were a little bit clearer, but I think for various reasons, we can, um, detect from the text that he thinks that even in prophetic knowledge, if the intellect receives species directly from God to reveal something to the prophet, um, he emphasizes that even in those cases, those species are such that they are oriented towards phantasm. So it looks again like they are abstractive, not exemplar-like species. Okay. So from this, uh, we could go on about all of this different evidence, but, uh, we don't have time. But we can return to some of these texts if, um, people would like to during the Q&A. So it looks like for Aquinas, from these cases, embodiment does in fact restrict us to species received from below, abstractive species, and not in the way in which we're setting-- he-- that they-- that this sets some kind of goal of ideal functioning. It's not natural in that sense, but in a much stronger sense of a kind of natural necessity, an inflexible constraint or something like a cognitive shield. So even when God provides supernatural knowledge, he does so not by breaking through the shield and allowing those exemplar-like species to flow in from above, but rather by supernaturally causing in us the kind of species that could have been caused from below by turning to phantasms. So we should be even more puzzled Okay, so last section then. Um, uh, I wanna try to give an account or an explanation of what is going on here. So why does embodiment restrict us in this way? So my proposal is this, and then I'm going to try to give some textual evidence to support the proposal. Um, so first of all, I think Aquinas' view is that embodiment fundamentally subordinates the intellect to the body, and that therefore, secondly, it forces our intellect into a downward turn in which condition our intellect is naturally sensitive only to agency from below through phantasms. Um, so let, let me, let me try to explain this. So the first part has to do with subordination to the body. And to see this, uh, see what Aquinas means here, we can go back to the case of Christ, which was the only case where there's exemplar-like species received in an embodied condition. So we might ask ourselves, look, well, this is not the case for Adam, but it is the case for Christ, so how is Christ's intellect so different from Adam's? And here's what Aquinas says. He says, "In his condition before the Passion, Christ was simultaneously a wayfarer and a beholder of the divine essence, as will be clear later. And certain conditions of wayfaring he had especially from the body insofar as it was passable, whereas the conditions of beholding he had most of all from the intellect of soul. But the condition of the beholding soul is such that it is in no way subordinated to its body or dependent on it, but rather totally dominates it. For that reason, after the resurrection, glory overflows from the soul into the body. But the soul of the wayfaring human needs to turn to phantasms because it is bound to the body and in a certain way subject to it and dependent on it." This doesn't sound quite so friendly about embodiment and its effect on our knowledge. "And therefore, the blessed soul, both before and after the resurrection, is able to think intellectually without turning to phantasms, and we must say the same about the soul of Christ in an embodied state because he fully had the power of a beholder." So here Aquinas tells us that the condition under which any intellect is open to receiving exemplar-like species, and therefore experiencing the full range of being both immaterial and, and material, is the following: That intellect cannot be subordinated to a body. So it looks like embodiment naturally and necessarily subordinates the intellect to the body, and that this subordination can be suspended supernaturally when an embodied intellect supernaturally achieves dominion over its body. So that's Christ before the Passion and the resurrected saints in glory. And the subordination of-- to the body is also de facto suspended when the intellect ceases to be embodied. That's the case of the separated soul. Um, now I won't go into this in too much detail in interests of time, but I think we can understand this idea of the embodied intellect's subordination to the body if we put Aquinas into the com- into the context of, um, a debate, a longstanding debate going back to the tension between Plato's recollection theory and Aristotle's insistence that our knowledge comes to us through sensation. So that was a well-known problem in late antiquity. The Neoplatonic commentators of late antiquity proposed many different ways of reconciling these competing theories. So they had views such as that the embodied soul already has all the forms, but it can't use them, it's not aware of them until it's awakened to their presence through the senses. Others argued for a distinction between an undescended part of the soul that's always eternally befor- beholding the forms, and a descended part that's looking toward the senses to abstract forms from the senses. And in medieval scholasticism, this turns into a debate about divine illumination. So in somebody like Roger Bacon, we see the view that the upper part of the soul is always being irradiated by divine forms, but that's something we... that's not part of our consciousness. And then our conscious life is sort of oriented toward the senses. But as we learn more and more through the senses, we can start to integrate those two realms so that we become more conscious of what's going on in the upper part of our soul. Um, so in these debates, it's not uncommon to speak of two directions in which the soul is looking. It's, has a downward gaze and an upward gaze. It's also not uncommon to blame the soul's downward focus on the weight of the body or the attractivity of the passions. Um, in Augustine, the soul's downward attentiveness is precisely because it's an embodied soul, so it has care of the body, it needs to attend to the needs of the body, and that's what links it to the senses and channels its attention to what happens in the sense organs. Um, and of course, for many authors in this tradition, including for Augustine, the therapeutic solution is for the soul to learn how to withdraw its attention from the senses and from the passions and to focus its attention up, inward and upward Um, so there's a general tendency in these debates to assume that the upward versus downward direction of the human soul is something that you can train yourself out of and, or train yourself to control in a way. Um, and what I wanna suggest that-- is that, is this, that in Aquinas, this notion of the embodied intellect's subordination to the body is a reflection of that long-standing debate, but he's modified it in some very important ways. The basic structure of the problem remains the same, where any soul is in principle capable of two modes of thinking, one caused from below and one caused from above. But rather than taking the more normal route of according both modes of thinking to the soul simultaneously, one unconsciously and one consciously, Aquinas is restricting the embodied soul exclusively to the from below mode of thinking. This restriction doesn't prevent us from understanding the essences of material things, which is something that some of the earlier authors were worried about, because for Aquinas, he thinks abstracted species are perfectly up to the task And if we had exemplar-like species of squirrel, for instance, they would make intellectually present all existing individual squirrels, but we have access to those through phantasms anyway. Um, so our lack of species from above is, for the most part, no loss at all. But it is a loss in one key aspect, which is that abstracted species are not able to provide experiential access to separated substances. Um, so we see that while Aquinas is able to resist the pull of recol- Plato's recollection theory by simply denying that exemplar-like species are useful for our knowledge of material essences, he has to accept that by being restricted exclusively to a lower mode of thinking, we're cut off from directly experiencing and hence properly conceptualizing the immaterial world above our own souls. So I think this is an interestingly different version of the historical problem, which replaces concerns about access to forms as principles of our knowing the material world, with concerns about access to angels as discrete immaterial substances that inhabit the cosmos. So an ep- an epistemological problem from late antiquity has now gotten repurposed into a problem about ex- experiential access. That, uh, that's, I think, what's, what's happened. Um, but I think what this does is it leaves Aquinas with a different sort of problem, which is how to justify the extreme rigidity of our confinement to a downward-oriented mode of thinking in this state. For other thinkers, the downward orientation has some kind of moral connotation and can be overcome by proper training. But for Aquinas, this seems to be something that even God respects in endowing us with supernatural knowledge, and that's kind of puzzling. Um, um, just about. Okay. Great. Um, so let me just briefly say a, a one thing about that and then conclude. So How does Aquinas justify the absolute inflexibility of this restriction to a downward-oriented mode of thinking? And here, I think we can get some insights by looking at the case of rapture in Aquinas. And it's a complicated theory, which I, I'm not going to go into. There's many different kinds of rapture, amazingly, that Aquinas identifies. But there's one of them that is restricted to two persons on-- that he knows of in this or on this, um, in this life, St. Paul and Moses, in which the enrapt person is ex- is experiencing the divine essence in the state of rapture. And what Aquinas says about that, he has a question whether it's necessary for the soul to be completely separated from the body in order to have this experience in this life, and whether it's necessary for the soul to be completely alienated from the senses in order to have this experience in this life. And, um, I think it's very important that he, that he has this concern, that you couldn't have the beatific vision and also just go around having your same sort of embodied awareness at the same time. You would, in fact, have to be taken away from your sensory experience in order to face upward to get the beatific vision. Um, and I think what that tells-- and which, which is what he says, in fact. You don't have to die temporarily in order to have the beatific vision in this life, but you do have to be totally alienated from the senses, withdrawn from the phantasms, as he puts it. Um, so what that tells us is that, um, what God can do is i- in order to give us exemplar-like species, is to completely withdraw us from our phantasm-oriented mode. That's how much these two modes of thinking are in conflict with each other and not possible to have at the same time. And what I want to hypothesize, sort of by way of wrapping this up, is to say that I think for Aquinas, the f- the way he's thinking about it is perhaps something like this, that the phantasms, given that they're the connatural n- uh, objects of our knowledge, they're so bright that when we're in an environment that's rich with phantasms, we're just-- we can't look away from them. They absolutely lock our vision onto them in a such a way that we cannot turn up. So it's the attractiveness of the phantasms in a way that's the effect of embodiment, and that, I think, for Aquinas, is why we are locked into a, a downward-oriented mode of cognition in an embodied state. Thank you.

Speaker 10 35:17

Thank you, Professor Corey. For the sake of our Zoom attendees, I'll come and pass the microphone around as you have questions. So I think here

Speaker 3 35:29

Thank you so much for this interesting talk. I, I-- Something occurred to me about the distinction between the from above, from below species that comes up in the discussion of how God and angels know particulars. And I'm wondering, um, what you think about perhaps reframing it not just as a difference between their origin or how they're received, but actually their content. Maybe that's even the more important difference, such that when we say the species angels have and the species we have, there's only an analogical relationship between those types of species. Perhaps that's, that's going too far. But, um, just to say, as I understand it, the species God infuses with angels as that original inheritance they have in their creation are k- a fullness, um, whereas the human... A-and so we say they're, they're universals, but they're full universals that apply to the particulars, whereas for us, it's all abstracted from the particulars. So I'm wondering how that distinction might- Yeah play into your argument or maybe orient us, because the other question I'm then asking myself is, can-- do we even, in fact, have the epistemological equipment to receive those kind of species that are given to angels, even by a divine special, special grace?

Speaker 2 36:41

Yeah. Thank you. That's, um, that's a great question. So, so the, the... Yes, exemplar-like species and abstractive species have this difference in content in exactly the way that you describe. So the, the one way of thinking about this is that abstractive species are impoverished. They lose information because they don't reflect the individual, but exemplar-like species are super rich because they include all the individuals in knowing the essence. Um, now, I think s-so, so this is a very important difference, but the difference itself goes back to the causal origin. So it's actually reducible to where the species come from. So it's precisely because abstractive species are caused in this way through phantasms that are then we have to abstract from those phantasms in order to have an intelligible species. Um, that's why there's the loss of information for Aquinas. And then in the case of the exemplar-like species, the reason that they're super rich is precisely because they're coming from God as a reflection of the divine ideas. So the causal origin is what explains the content in the first place. Um- And then I forgot the second part of your question, sorry.

Speaker 5 37:52

Looks like-

Speaker 2 37:53

Oh by environment. Right. So, so I think the, the picture that I want to take out of all of these different case studies is that, um, we are not capable of receiving those species in an embodied state, but that's not because our, our, the, our intellectual nature is insensitive to those species. Um, so it's not like we don't have the equipment to receive the species. We do have the equipment, but it's just tuned into another channel. So we could use the example of a radio, right? We're just tuned into this channel to the senses, and while we're tuned in, we can't receive any other frequency, and if we were to receive another frequency, we'd have to tune out of the senses and into the other channel. Um, so a- and I think that's the, that's the interesting thing about this view. It's not about the s- receptivity of our intellectual nature itself. That's not the problem. The problem is that we're focused in on something else, and that's why we can't receive these species unless we were able to unplug and focus in a different direction. And so that's why in the case of Christ and in the case of rapture, Aquinas will allow that there is, in fact, some kind of influx from above it, but it's possible only because, in the case of Christ, he has total dominion over the body in such a way that he's not locked into the s- into the phantasms. In the case of the saint with the, with rapture, the... God has supernaturally abstracted him from the senses so that he's not, he's not tuned to that frequency anymore.

Speaker 6 39:28

Thank you. First of all, I apologize for my awful English, but I hope you will understand what I mean. In the same direction, when Aquinas, uh, speaks of the knowledge of the separated soul, he says that it's a better way of knowing, but the results are, uh, uh, inferiors. Why? Because there is a question of the proportion between the power of the intellect and, uh, the content of the ideas. So, uh, we are not able with our int- we can receive angelic species, but we cannot assimilate. So, uh, in the same way, uh, than Father, uh, Snyder, uh, I think that for Aquinas, we have to, uh, take into account The, um, the capacity of the intellect, uh, in, in the case of Christ, he has the beatific vision, so he has the lumen gloriae. That is, his, uh, intellect is empowered by a higher light. So it's not only the question of the, the type of species, but also the question of, uh, the capacity of, uh, assimilating, uh, such, uh, information. What, what do you think about it?

Speaker 2 41:01

Yeah, so, um, so when he... And, and this is one of the things that I love about the treatment of the separated soul's knowledge in question 89, um, is that he puts so much... It's the clearest and best-developed place where he says exactly what you're describing, that, so even if the separated soul were to receive, uh, e- even th- even though the separated soul receives exemplar-like species, nonetheless, it's only able to know through them in a confused way because, precisely because our- it's, there, it's too much for our intellect. So it's we, we tune into that station and we get a lot of static because the, the, a receiver is just not properly set up to be able to do w- fully take advantage of that, that mode of knowing. Um, now, when he's talking about, um, it w- when he gives examples here, often what he does is he focuses on our knowledge of material individuals. So he says that the separated soul is not able to know material individuals using exemplar-like species because its intellectual light is not bright enough to sort of penetrate to the depths of the essence to see all of the individuals in the essence, and that's why God doesn't give these species to us normally, 'cause we can't profit from them. But what he doesn't really deal with is the, is the, the fact that one thing exemplar-like species do give us, uh, this, do give the separated soul, is some kind of direct experience of angels. And he says, yes, it's not as perfect as the knowledge that each angel has of other angels, 'cause their intellects are higher, so they're more proportionate, and we're lower, and we're less proportionate to them, but nonetheless, as separated substances, we have some kind of dim knowledge of them. So it's pretty clear that when we're in this condition of being able to receive exemplar-like species and have this mode of knowing, there's a whole dimension of reality that does open up to the separated soul that's not accessible to us in this life. And so I think then the question still remains, well, m- maybe Aquinas thinks this is a good trade-off, right? It's better for us to be restricted to abstractive species, and then we're just gonna have to deal with the fact that we can only know angels through reason, um, in this life. But, um, but I think it still raises the kind of metaphysical question as to why, why don't we just receive the exemplar-like species along with everything else that we have when we're abstracting from the senses? And that would give us a little bit more knowledge than we have right now. And I think the answer for Aquinas is that we just can't. There's something about the condition of embodiment that just positively prevents us from receiving those kinds of species. And so for Aquinas, that's a trade-off that God had to make in designing the human being.

Speaker 7 43:57

Um, thanks for a great paper. You're making me wanna go back to my room and rewrite my paper. Um, uh, so first, just a kind of bibliographical note. The, the example of the man born blind is like, uh, I Had not registered this text because Aquinas uses the exact same example in talking about how God could give someone an acquired moral virtue supernaturally. Um, w- and this would be something different from the infused moral virtues. I don't know if he thinks God has ever done that, but he, you know... So, so it's a interesting example. But I guess I had, uh, two questions. Um, so, uh, for Aquinas, Christ has a threefold human knowledge, right? He has the acquired knowledge, he has the infused knowledge, he has the beatific knowledge. So are, are you saying that his beatific knowledge would be ex- exemplar-like, and his infused knowledge would be abstractive-like?

Speaker 2 45:11

Uh, no. So, so the beatific... And I- I'm- I think I saw Josh Lim in here somewhere, and so I'm very nervous to talk about Christ's beatific knowledge with Josh in the room. But, um-

Speaker 7 45:21

Well, I'm gonna have to do the same thing tomorrow,

Speaker 2 45:22

so So maybe he can, he can set us straight. Um, but as far, um, from my understanding, Christ's beatific knowledge is something different entirely. So that's the knowledge that Christ has of things in the, in the word, so in the beatific vision. Right. And that's something that also the saints have, um, the, the blessed, they have the beatific vision, and they know things in the, in verbo, as Aquinas puts it. And that's different in Aquinas from the infused knowledge that Christ has, and that's what he describes as exemplar-like knowledge in the manner of the angels.

Speaker 4 45:58

Right.

Speaker 2 45:59

Um, which is again, different from the abstractive-type knowledge that Christ has, because also Aquinas argues that if Christ didn't have any abstractive knowledge, then his agent intellect wouldn't have anything to do, and so there would be- Right a perfection that he lacks. And so he's got to ex- have things act on him and then have this abstractive knowledge as well. So he has these three sort of categories of knowledge. One is divine in some way, one that's angelic- Right and one that's properly human.

Speaker 7 46:27

Well, I mean, what's interesting, there's... And I, I can't give the citation, but there's one place, and m- generally, when he's talking about Christ-infused knowledge, he's comparing it to angelic knowledge, but there are places where he compares it to the knowledge of the prophets, which it seems to me you're saying the knowledge of pr- this would kind of introduce a fourth kind of knowledge that Christ has because the prophets would have the abstractive-type species, not the exemplar type, right?

Speaker 4 46:53

Yes.

Speaker 7 46:53

Um, so, and so I just, I just find that interesting. And the, but the other thing I wanted to ask about is that since Christ has, and this is just my puzzle that I've been puzzling about for 10 years, uh- What is your understanding of how Christ is able to simultaneously have the infused, uh, exemplar-type knowledge and the abstractive knowledge? Like, 'cause it seems like in every other case... Is it simply the mastery he has over his, his body? Is that what accounts for it, that he can have both simultaneously?

Speaker 2 47:33

Yeah. So I think, I, I mean, I'm, I'm puzzled about this as well. Um-

Speaker 7 47:38

We're not alone.

Speaker 2 47:39

Yes. It is, it, it is a, a, a very puzzling problem, and I think there was a text I wanted to put on the handout, but then I couldn't find it again. Um, so, so I, I'm still looking for it again. But, um, where he talks about the same problem, um, i- either in the blessed or in angels, where there's a kind of question as to whether the angel... I- it might be in connection with angels, where the angels see all things in verbo, but then so why should they also have these exemplar-like species? They don't need them, right? Um, and I think there's a, there's a parallel problem with relation to the glorified saints. And what he says is that, um, there's no problem having knowledge of two different rationes. There's no reduplication. He also says this in connection with Christ. There's no reduplication if there's knowledge of two rationes. But I think in these other texts, he makes clearer that what allows that to happen is that there's a complete coordination s- of the two knowledges so that one is referred to the other. And I think that's... The, it, to, to sort of spell out more about what I would like to say about the, the solution in a way for him, um, which we're going to have in a glorified state, is that somehow our relationship to the body has to change such that even though our knowledge is in some way oriented to f- we have abstractive knowledge that's oriented to phantasm, that whole body of knowledge becomes sort of reordered and coordinated towards the beatific vision. And once that happens, it's possible to have both of those kinds of knowledges operative at the same time in the same human intellect because they have the same end. Yeah. Right.

Speaker 10 49:19

Okay, let's thank Dr. Corey one more time. And it's now my pleasure to introduce Luca Tonietti, a full professor of epistemology at the Pontifical Urbaniana University in Rome, where he is now also serving as the dean of the School of Philosophy. In 2022, Pope Francis appointed him as the secretary of the Pontifical Academy of St. Thomas Aquinas. In his work on epistemology and the philosophy of religion, Professor Tonietti is interested in showing how some insights gained from reading Thomas Aquinas and John Henry Newman can be of help in addressing basic issues that remain unsolved in contemporary philosophical debates. The slightly modified title of his paper is Credere, Scire, and Opinari: Aquinas' Distinction of the Intellectual Acts and the Invention of the Concept of Knowledge. Let's welcome Dr. Tonietti.

Speaker 8 50:25

Thank you, Noel, for the kind introduction. Uh, thank you to, uh, I thank the organizers for inviting me. Good morning, everybody. So speakers of every language are apparently able to express a claim to knowing or not knowing something. However, this does not, uh, mean, uh, that all cultures share the concept of knowledge discussed by contemporary epistemologists who argue about the account of it in terms of justified true belief or, uh, something similar. Even if you l- we look back to the history of Western culture, we cannot presuppose that ancient or medieval philosophers had a concept of knowledges that matches the contemporary understanding of this notion. Many writers have contended that the concept of knowledge as a story that deserves to be told. I will argue that we can shed, uh, some light on that story if we consider Aquinas' reflections on the difference between believing, knowing, and opining. For Aquinas, believing is an act of the intellect. In a number of passages from his works, Aquinas compares this act or the corresponding habit, that is faith, to other acts or habits of the intellect, especially to scientific knowing and opining. In the first part of my paper, I will focus on a passage from, uh, the Summa Theologiae in which Aquinas discusses the definition of believing proposed by Augustine. According to it, credere means thinking with assent, cum assensione cogitare. In the second part, we will see how Aquinas uses this traditional characterization to address the difficulty that could arise when faith was considered against the background of the Aristotelian theory of intellectual acts. To avoid confusing faith with opinion, Aquinas must highlight what faith has in common with science. In both cases, we are entitled to fully, uh, holding a truth. Science, uh, and faith appear, uh, two kinds of a fully positive epistemic state that Aquinas indicates with the word certitudo, certainty or certitude. In this sense, one could claim that Aquinas has forged a concept that is broader than the Aristotelian concept of science or knowledge. In the third part of the paper, I will contend that this, however, is not yet what we would call knowledge. Even if unreserved acceptance is an essential component of our understanding of knowledge, Aquinas restricts the scope of the concept he discusses to the specific domains of what is known through a, through a demonstration in science and to what is believed because it has been revealed by God. However, by shifting the attention from the metaphysical necessity of what is known to the attitude of a person who is entitled to be certain of what they know and believe, Aquinas' discussion raises questions that will eventually contribute to the development of the concept of knowledge as we know it. Okay, first part. For Aquinas, uh, faith is the first of the theological virtues, the supernaturally infused habits that enable human beings to reach the relationship to God that is their ultimate end. In the Summa Theologiae, the discussion of the virtue of faith is organized on the basis of a principle according, uh, to which to define a habit as a virtue, one must consider the corresponding act, and to define the act, one must consider its object. Although this principle may appear highly abstract, it is my, uh, abstract principle, here it enables Aquinas to highlight at the beginning of the treatise on faith what is really central to his, uh, understanding of faith. He does, uh, that by affirming that the object of faith is the first truth. Uh, Aquinas uses, uh, um, traditional phra- phrase in, uh, many cases, and especially in the, uh, in his discussion of faith, Aquinas uses, uh, material that, uh, was a- available in, uh, the theological discussion. Uh, what is important, uh, is that for him, the object of faith is not only what one has to believe, the content of faith, but also and foremost what Aquinas occasionally calls the formal object of faith, what constitutes something as believed or constitutes faith as such as a unique form of cognition. This is the fact that one accepts something as true because God presents it as true. We believe something because we believe in God who reveals it. Therefore, faith is a participation to the knowledge God has of himself and of his creatures. If a b- believer knows something, knows it because God let him know something o- of what he knows. And that is, uh, um, the, uh, most important characterization for, uh, of faith for Aquinas. As we will see, uh, in our discussion of, uh, the, uh, definition of the act of believing given in seconda secunda, question two, article one. Aquinas ask, asks what it means to believe. The answer, uh, is credere est cum ascensione cogitare. Believing is thinking, uh, or reflection combined with ascent. After presenting, as usual, a few objections against this defic- definition, Aquinas states the reason why we should accept it, namely that it has been proposed by St. Augustine. This definition circulated in, uh, in the theological debate on faith. It is nothing original. Uh, and Aquinas himself quotes it on many occasions when, uh, he wants to explain what believing means. In the article of the Summa to which we are referring, Aquinas makes clear that Augustine's words very aptly express what is most peculiar to believing. One only has to realize that cogitare must not be co- understood here in its most general sense as any actual consideration of an object, but in its more particular sense as the act of the intellect by which it considers an object while not be- being arrived yet at the insight into the truth. We can express this sense of cogitare, as we have made, with the word reflection. The combination of reflection understood that way and firm assent characterizes believing and differentiates it from any other acts of the intellect that are related to truth and falsity. When one considers what they know or understand, uh, this is the, the Augustinian source. Ops. Uh, do, do not expect too much from my presentation. I think, eh, if there is at Notre Dame a prize for the worst presentation, I, I can, uh, be awarded. Eh, so, uh, when one considers what they know or understand, there is firm assent without any further reflection. In other cases, there is reflection, but there is no firm assent. While sometimes one simply doubts, on other occasions, one has a suspicion or has an opinion. In the case of believing, uh, the assent is as firm as in the case of knowing and understanding, but the insight into the truth is lacking, as in the case of the other three acts we have just mentioned In Aquinas, uh, so, uh, why, uh, is Aquinas, uh, interested to, uh, this traditional, uh, uh, Augustinian definition of believing? Uh, in, uh, Aquinas' account, Augustine's definition serves to situate believing among other acts of intellect. If, uh, Aquinas is concerned with the place of believing among the acts of intellect, this is because he knows the doctrine of the intellectual virtues that Aristotle exposes in book six of his ethics. As far as I know, uh, Aquinas is the first theologian who, uh, uses, uh, the doctrine of, uh, book six of the ethics in his theological work. Uh, both the intellectual virtues and other acts that do not reach the, uh, status, like opinion and suspicion, are concerned with something that can be true or false. We would say that they have propositional content. This is what links them to faith. When reading the passage from the Su- Summa we are discussing, one can gain the impression that Aquinas is ordering these acts on three different levels. In this tripartition, faith would hold an intermediate po- position. At the highest level, there is, uh, um, knowledge of the conclusions and understanding of the principles of demonstration. Uh, the two acts that enable one to have scientific knowledge according to Aristotelian epistemology. The lower level is marked by lack of firm assent, as we have seen. Uh, when one doubts, this is clearly the case. Uh, those who doubt are not in a position to accept either one proposition or its contradictory. Those who have what we have called suspicion have some clues that lead them to accept one proposition rather than its contradictory. The case of opinion is the most interesting and maybe puzzling. Uh, in current English, it would be difficult to make any sharp distinction between believing and opining. In one sense of the word believe, it is clear that those who believe something do not know it Do you know who won the game on Saturday? I don't know, but I, I believe that the Irish did. Uh, Therese, as, as she was in Rome, mentioned Michelangelo because she said, "I am in Rome in... I, I have to, to mention Michelangelo in my example." I am in Notre Dame, I have to mention the Irish. This is also in Latin the case, so that, uh, uh, credere excludes, uh, uh, scire. The distinction between credere and opinare appears to be the outcome of a decision to regulate the use of a language for theological reasons. How should we understand this, uh, distinction? Uh, uh, Aquinas acknowledged that those who have an opinion accept a proposition as true instead of its contradictory. However, while they embrace one side, they still fear the other side. Uni aderant tamen cum formidine alterius. Those who make a statement make a decision between the two sides of a disjunction constituted of one proposition and its contradictory. Was-- Those who, uh, mm, have an opinion make a decision for one side, but, uh, still fear that the opposite side may be true. Fear, uh, therefore, the other side. This phrase is curious. In the thirteenth century, it was currently quoted as the standard definition of opinion. The phrase itself comes from, uh, the Latin translation of, uh, Avicenna Liber de Anima. Uh, however In Arabic, the word translated as formido would not express the idea of a psychological condition of fear, but rather the model concept of possibility. As it seem, Avicenna wanted simply to distinguish the opinion that is about contingent matters from the knowledge of, uh, necessary matters as Aristotle did. The Latin translation, however, suggested a connect- a connection between opinion and the psychological condition of the wilterment that was not present in the original Arabic text. When, uh, uh, one considers the definition in its Latin translation, those who have an opinion may appear as people who are hesitating and are always ready to call into question their own beliefs. Apart from the accidents of the translation from Arabic into Latin, the opposition of opini- opinion and knowledge must be traced back to, uh, its Platonic and Aristotelic sources. However, this could be a problem, uh, for Aquinas' argument in the, uh, passage we are commenting on. Uh, episteme and doxa build a dichotomy. Uh, it could appear, uh, as, uh, Aquinas, uh, were attempting to squeeze, uh, faith, uh, between science and, uh, opinion, hereby transforming the bipartite division of the ancient philosophers into a tripartite division. However, if a dicho- dichotomy is exhaustive, uh, any attempt to transform it into a trichotomy is doomed to failure. Faith should be rather assimilated to opinion, as the use of language also suggests. A tripartite, uh, division of knowledge, faith, and opinion had emerged in the theological debate on faith. More than one century, uh, before Aquinas, Hugh of Saint Victor had suggested that faith is a certitude about something absent that stands above science and below opinion. This, uh, tripartite account appears plausible to Yug because he has an understanding of science that is influenced by the Augustinian epistemology, in which the insight into the truth, uh, follow faith and accomplish it. Once science is understood according to the Aristotelian epistemology, however, the opposition of science and opinion appears in a different light and poses the difficulty, uh, mentioned above. If we closely consider the, uh, passage from the Secunda Secunda, however, uh, we can notice that Aquinas is not attempting to, uh, build a tripartite division of knowing, believing, and opining. Is rather interesting in showing that the apparently simple dichotomy of science and opinion conceals, uh, two, um, uh, different criteria for distinguishing its members. While on the one hand, we can distinguish them in relation to the presence or absence of insight, on the other hand, we can distinguish them in relation to the quality of the assent. In the case of science and, uh, and opinion, the divisions according to the two criteria overlap perfectly. If we consider faith, however, we can see that, uh, this is not the case. While according to, uh, the one, one criterion, the absence of insight, faith is on the side of opinion. According to the other criterion, the quality of assent, faith is on the side of science. In, uh, the previous, uh, question, uh, one, article five, uh, Aquinas had already pointed out that knowledge cannot consist, coexi- ca- uh, knowledge cannot coexist either with faith or with opinion. Uh, however, he wants to make clear that the reason why this occurs is not the same in both cases. The incompatibility of faith and science arises from the fact the object of faith is something one cannot perceive other than the object of science. Knowle- knowledge is incompatible with opinion because those who know something, uh, think that it could not be otherwise, while those who have an opinion think that things could also be different from what they think. We can acknowledge here the Aristotelian opposition of knowledge of what is necessary and opinion of what is contingent. Believers, however, also think that, uh, what they believe could not be otherwise, and they do it because faith is certain. Propter fidei certitudinem. I'm coming to the last part of my presentation. We are now in a position to better understand which is the point at issue in the text of Question 2 from which we started. Faith and opinion share a negative feature. Both of them concern what is not perceived, something that is in itself unknown. On the other hand, faith and science share a pos- a positive feature that Aquinas indicate with the word certitude We can say in, in its discussion of na- the nature of faith, Aquinas has introduced a concept that can embrace both fides and sc- scientia. What, um, unites faith and science is the fact that in both cases, there is firm assent or what we can call certitude. Uh, this may view as a step toward the formation of a contemporary concept of knowledge. According to it, beliefs that count as knowledge may be justified in different ways, but must be justified in a way that i- is sufficient to, uh, for them receiving that honorific title of knowledge I am not claiming, however, that Aquinas has created the contemporary concept of knowledge. To clarify why this is not the case and to understand what Aquinas is doing instead, we must consider the concept of certitudo is using. For Aquinas, it was, uh, not difficult to associate certitude with both faith and science. The term certitudo appeared in the glossato on the letter to the Hebrews, where there is what's called definition of faith. Uh, the same term also entered in the definition of faith proposed by Hugh of Saint Victor, as we have seen. As for science, for Aristotle, as, uh, we have, uh, seen, we can have science only of things that cannot change. The objects of science are necessary beings. The Arab philosophers eagerly espoused Aristotle's understanding of science. However, they maintained that science not only requires that the known object is necessary, but also that the knower has some reflective awareness of such necessity. To indicate this feature of scientific knowledge, they used a word that was translated in Latin, into Latin with the term certitudo. So for, in the Arabic understanding of the Aristotelian, uh, fear of science, certitudo, or in the Latin translation of the Arabic, i- uh, certitudo is a feature of, uh, science. Aquinas, uh, for Aquinas, both faith and science are associated with, uh, cer-certitude. In Questio Four, Article One, Aquinas contends that faith is even more certain that science or understanding of the first principles because of its cause. Since faith rests on the divine truth, even if, if science may be more certain, certain that faith from our point of view. But, uh, the certainty of faith, uh, uh, depends on, uh, the fact that, uh, uh, it rests on the divine truth. If we want to understand what is the certitude that links faith to science, we should not forget that in the case of faith, certitude depends on its being grounded in God's revelation. The reference to the revelation changes the framework provided by Aristotle. The philosopher says that opinion is unstable, but what distinguishes opinion from science for him is not the fact, uh, that those who opine are unable to stick to their beliefs. Aristotle himself observes that some people hold their opinions as strongly as other people hold what they know. Those who possess knowledge, however, grasp something that is necess- ne-necessarily true and therefore cannot change I- if we speak of certitude in relation to, uh, Aristotelian science, we are not interested in the psychological condition of those who have knowledge, but in the nature of what they know. It may seem that things change what we move to the certitude of faith. However, if the firmness of which Aquinas speaks in the Treatise on Faith were simply the strength of personal conviction, this would not suffice to establish the difference between having faith and having, uh, an opinion. What distinguishes faith from mere opinion is not the subjective condition of the believers, but the objective condition of what they believe. The ascent of the believers to what they believe, uh, is not firm because it's done not-- it, it does not change, but because it does not have to change, and it, it is not even thinkable that it has to change. The motive that enables one to accept the teachings of faith is such that it does not only warrant that they are true, but also that they are necessarily so. Aquinas' discussion on knowledge and faith is linked to an understanding of science that is very far from the con- pre-preoccupation of contemporary epistemology. Aquinas is not interested in showing that faith may be a justified belief, but in explaining why it is a way of holding truth, at least as sound as science. In Aristotle's view, the soundness of science depends on its object, that therefore must bear the mark of necessity. Faith is not limited to the realm of what cannot change. The object of faith, however, is constituted by the participation God gives in revelation to his knowledge. What we believe cannot be false because what makes it an object of faith is a link to God's cognition. When Aquinas insists on the firmness of assent in faith, he's not interested in highlighting the situation in which people unreservedly accept what they believe. The discussion of faith and knowledge, however, shifted the attention from the known object to the way in which a person holds the truth. On the other hand, the definition of opinion as fearful acceptance could lead, uh, many to see it as a psychological condition and to consider by contrast the situation in which people fully ascend, uh, to what they believe independently, independently from the kind of truths involved. If one accepts a truth, it is then legitimate to ask how this, uh, belief is warranted. We cannot, uh, further follow the story of our concept of knowledge. Those who are interested in telling it, however, cannot ignore the work of, uh, the theologi- theologians who in the thirteenth century tried to understand what happens to human beings when they accept God's revelation. Thank you.

Speaker 4 1:21:37

Any questions?

Speaker 2 1:21:47

Thank you, Luca. This was very illuminating. Um, so I had one question about... I, I like how you explain the way that Aquinas carves out this third type of knowing that's science-like in one sense and opinion-like in another sense. Um, but I was wondering whether in Aquinas specifically, there's any evidence that he would find this kind of mental state anywhere else than in connection with the theological virtue of faith. So I'm thinking of an example, for instance, you know, if, um, you know, I'm, I might be... Let, let's say I'm climbing up a rope, uh, in a cliff, and my husband's at the top of the, at the top of the cliff, and, you know, and he, he's hauling up the rope or something like that. And let's say I, I say, "I'm absolutely certain that he's not going to push me off the edge of the cliff," right? Um, and I could say that's something that's not a matter of necessity, but is it a case of absolute trust where I would just... You would stake your life on the conclusion of the, or that the judgment that you have is true. Um, so that seems parallel at least to these examples of faith. They're based in trust in some figure that you have confidence in, um, but the matter itself is not the matter of Aristotelian science. So do you think there's room for that in Aquinas's view, or is it just limited to the theological virtue of faith?

Speaker 8 1:23:15

Uh, thank you. It is an important point because, uh, uh But this would, uh, would be the, uh, the topic of another paper. But there was a discussion in, uh, in, uh, among Thomists, and, uh, Domingo de Soto says, uh, there are, uh, people who believe, uh, that, uh, when, uh, uh, Aquinas, uh, is speaking of a certitude of of fides is not just considering the so-called fides divina, but also the fides humana. And he shows convincingly, in my view, that this is a great mistake. And our later scholastic says De Soto is clearly wrong. But I think that reveals that they had a concept of knowledge different from the concept of Aquinas. So that in our understanding of knowing, it does not make sense to say that you don't know that your husband will let you fall. But as I try to point out, I don't think that this is the concept of The certitude of faith means that faith, divine faith, is as certain as Aristotelian science. So that if I can trust a human being, but a human being cannot give to my beliefs the strengths that gives the, that may have when I believe God. So that, and I think that is the reason why this case is interesting, because in the case of faith, divine faith, the source may give that kind of absolute certainty that is proper to science according to Aristotle. But once we have considered the possibility that our beliefs are grounded on the source, it opens up the question if there are other beliefs. But I would say it is a different concept of knowledge. And of course, for some people, it may be a scandal to say that you cannot trust your husband as you trust God. But I would say that for Aquinas is a fact that nobody can be trusted like God, no human beings.

Speaker 9 1:27:23

Uh, thank you, uh, Luca, uh, for your presentation, and I have to first a disappointment for you. You are definitely n- not going to win the prize for the worst presentation here. What you said about cogitare, that was really an eye-opener, uh, for me. But w- I would like to take issue with you with what you said at the end of your paper, if I understood you correctly. You said that, uh, the certitude, uh, of faith is not, does not sup- does not, um, depend on a subjective experience or it's not a matter of subjectivity, but the assent is an act of the will, and that act of the will also makes faith, uh, meritorious. So there is a kind of, I would argue that there is a kind of subjective, basically subjective element to faith, um, which also, uh, um, w- it has to do with this cogitare, not having insight. It means a kind of, not maybe a jump of faith, but the, or, or a leap of faith, but there is something of, you know, surrendering or, or an act of the will assenting to something that is not obvious

Speaker 8 1:28:50

Uh, thank you. Uh, of course, uh, objective and subject, subjective are dangerous words because, uh, uh, uh, for that, that matter, certainty or certitude is also a dangerous word because, uh, it has many different, uh, meanings. Um, I would agree that, uh, in some sense is, uh, is my point the, uh, that, uh, faith is subjective so that, uh, uh, the relation, uh, i-is, is not what I believe that, uh, so the, uh, is necessary, but, uh, uh, my, uh, ascent, um, uh, um, gains, uh, uh, its certainty from the rela-- my relationship to God who reveal-reveals it. In this sense, I would say, uh, is subjective and, and is, uh, it is, uh, uh, because, uh, I, I think the, uh, reflection on faith opens up a new avenue of, of, uh, reflection on, on, uh, subjective, uh, certainty. But, uh, uh, I, I would s- um, say that, uh, uh, the case of faith, uh, remains unique because, uh, this relationship is, uh, to God who cannot fail. Hmm. Uh, uh, n-n-in, in no other case is, uh, is a subjective, uh, relationship, uh, able to, to ground, uh, a certitude like in, in faith.

Speaker 10 1:30:59

So right now we can move into about 10 minutes of questions for, directed at both presenters. But before that, if we could thank Professor Tunonetti one more time. And then Dr. Corey, if you both don't mind sharing the one mic at the front. Thank you. Um, yes I just had a question on, um, the state of the intellect in the glorified state, and I was wondering why, uh, humans still retain the capacity for abstract, intelligible knowledge in the glorified state and why it's not strictly exemplar knowledge. Like, what purpose does it serve?

Speaker 2 1:31:50

Yeah, this is-- So, so this is a very good question, and I mean, in one, in one way, we could just say Aquinas could have dispensed with a lot of the complication by just saying you have beatified knowledge, then that just supersedes all of the other kinds of knowledge. And the thing that he seems particularly keen on is, um, to make sure that in a glorified state, as also in the, in the- for Christ, that all our natural faculties are getting used so that they don't-- There, there's nothing in the glorified state that's just useless to us. Um, so, so he has to, he has to kind of admit that, that some of our natural powers just stop being used, like the nutritive power, because we're not digesting food anymore because there's no corruption, so things aren't changing. You're not changing food into your body. Um, but in the case of cognition, he wants to say even the sensory powers are being used. You're seeing things in heaven, and it's not just that God is producing sort of images of himself in your senses, so you have something to look at. You're actually looking around at other glorified bodies. So, so I think that's the thing that's motivating him is he, he wants to say that, um, our faculties are perfected by grace and not just set aside by grace.

Speaker 5 1:33:16

Uh, um, Miguel Romero, uh, St. Louis University. Uh, Teresa, I, I, uh, uh, uh, to the point, um, what, uh-- Given your account... Thank you for your presentation. Given your account, what of the, uh, underlying bodily faculties need to be intact for the, uh, for the, uh, for the ab-- by your reading, for the abstractive intelligible species to be received, um, uh, by the act of intellect? In the three instances, I'm curious to hear how you're thinking through this or how your schema would play this through. Uh, is, uh, the human being in, uh, in utero, uh, uh, the human being with advanced stage dementia, and someone with a, a profound and utterly debilitating, uh, cognitive impairment or intellectual disability. Um, in all cases, a, a living human body, uh, uh, um, but with severely damaged brain.

Speaker 2 1:34:19

Yeah, so, um, in the case of human cognition in utero, I think Aquinas's view is that, um, so the, the imagination has to be developed enough for the phantasms to reach the point at which you're able to abstract something from them. So it takes, on Aquinas's view, it takes some time even after birth and a small child to have some kind of cognitive development of the imagination of the brain to the point at which the phantasms become developed enough and organized enough to be able to abstract, um, a species from that. And he's not at all clear on what stage that would take place at, and as Father Gjertic said yesterday, um, he just doesn't have a very worked-out theory of-- that's another kind of development that he doesn't have a very worked-out theory of, which is cognitive development. Um, but it happens at some point, and maybe, you know, those of us who are familiar with small children might say for each child it's a little bit different. Um, in the cases of dementia or profound cognitive impairment, Aquinas says, and so there's, there's a passage of this, you're probably familiar with this from his, um, treatment of prophecy, where he talks about different kinds of abstraction from sense that can happen. So where the intellect is not, either not being acted upon from the direction of the phantasms or is not, is, is in some way turned away from the phantasms. So it's a little bit unclear, but he, he seems to say that there are the sides, um... So, so he's got cases in mind where I as a, let's say as an academic, am very focused on reading a text and someone comes into the room and starts talking to me and I just don't hear them at all. He said that's a kind of abstraction from the sense. It's not the kind that we're talking about in the case of rapture, but it's a way in which very little of my cognitive attention is directed sense word, and it's very focused on the, the intellectual, um, thing that I'm doing. But he's-- but he also uses the same language to talk about, um, what he says is a, um, I forget the exact word, but it's, it's something like a, um, a natural impediment. Like something... There's, there's conditions of the brain that could also cause an abstraction from sense. And there it seems to be, uh, what, what I'm not sure of that, that I would love to, to know what you think of this, but, uh, whether, whether he's thinking of this in terms of just a severing of the connection between the intellect and the phantasms because the brain is not functioning in the way that would actually allow the phantasms to provide the proper material for abstraction. Or whether he thinks of this more in terms of the agent being in some way turned away from the phantasms in a way that human beings aren't normally, and that that turning away from the phantasms happens because there isn't anything there that the phantasms are providing, again, because of the non-functioning of the brain. So you've got this, this kind of, I think, picture of someone in these conditions as either not receiving in, not receiving, um, from the, from the brain or in some way having some alternative intellectual life that's not phantasm-oriented, and it just-- I think he's not clear on the topic. This. Do you wanna weigh in on this? Uh- Do, do you wanna weigh in on that?

Speaker 4 1:37:49

Uh, no, I think I'm gonna question- Oh, okay whether or not. No, I- Yeah

Speaker 10 1:37:58

Thanks to both of you for these really illuminating talks. Um, I, I had a question for, uh, Professor Tuninetti, just following up on something that you said at, at the very end of your talk that I kind of spaced out on, and I think, I think I didn't quite catch it. Um, you, you mentioned that Aquinas is not interested in showing how faith is justified in the sense that we might be nowadays, and that, and that sounded right to me. But then you said right after that, that you thought Aquinas is interested in showing that faith is epistemically legitimate or something like that in, in some other way as opposed to opinion, and I think, I think I missed your explanation of just how that is. I wondered if you could repeat it for me, 'cause that seemed really important.

Speaker 8 1:38:45

Uh, thank you. Uh, so I, I am saying, uh, and I would s- uh, uh, that, uh, Aquinas is not interested in, uh, showing that, uh, faith is justified. Uh, by the way, uh, it is interesting, there was a huge debate on this issue at the beginning of, uh, of 20th century. And, um, and, uh, um, it is-- But, well, I, I don't want to be too, too long, but we can, uh, talk, uh, because, uh, um- Aquinas does not exclude that we have, uh, reasons for believing, uh, but, uh, um, faith is not based on the reasons one may have for, uh, uh, believing that, uh... Uh, a-and it, it is interesting, uh, to see how his position is different from the position of other theologians, uh, of hi-his time and, uh, later. And I was not, uh, um, uh, uh, the second, uh, passage w-you were referring, I was saying that once, however, once w-we understand, uh, uh, beliefs as, mm, subjective condition, as a, as a holding, uh, uh, m-something as true, the question of, of, uh, uh, the justification becomes a, a, a legitimate question. But I would say that is for a later stage in, in the history of a, of a concept of knowledge. And, uh, if I, if I, uh, add to, to mention a point, I think that the, uh, religious division of Europe was, uh, of paramount importance. And I would say even more, uh, the, uh, separation of, uh, Church of England, uh, from the Church of Rome was of paramount importance because, uh, uh, um, it, uh, um, motivated, uh, many theologians to, uh, to reflect on the reasons for accepting, uh, um, the, the, the beliefs of a, of a Christian faith. And, uh, there was a, a great debate on, uh, on the reason why one should accept one or another version of, uh, of a Christian, um, belief. And, and, and that is, I th- it, i-i think is a later stage that, uh, had consequences on the, uh, interpretation of Aquinas, but was not the, uh, Aquinas preoccupation. That's all.

Speaker 10 1:41:59

Okay, I think that just about wraps up our time. So if we could thank our panelists.